DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Dominos Pizza, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Loren Baily–Schiffman, J.), dated June 27, 2019. The order denied that defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Dominos Pizza, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it is granted.
On June 9, 2016, the defendant Kevin R. Allum was employed by the defendant Dominos Pizza, LLC (hereinafter DP), and was delivering pizza in Brooklyn. At about 1:00 a.m., New York City Police Department Officer Benjamin Maldonado pulled over Allums vehicle and cited him for a defective headlight. During the course of the traffic stop, Allum allegedly kicked his feet, flailed his arms, and resisted arrest. Maldonado forcibly removed Allum from the vehicle and both Maldonado and Allum fell to the ground.
Maldonado thereafter commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against Allum and DP. DP subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, contending that Allum was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the incident, and that it did not know, or have reason to know, that Allum would engage in a struggle with a law enforcement officer. Maldonado opposed the motion, contending that there were issues of fact regarding whether Allum was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the incident. By order dated June 27, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the motion. DP appeals.
“ ‘The doctrine of respondeat superior renders a master vicariously liable for a tort committed by his [or her] servant within the scope of employment’ ” (Meehan v. County of Suffolk, 144 A.D.3d 640, 641, 40 N.Y.S.3d 494, quoting Rivera v. Fenix Car Serv. Corp., 81 A.D.3d 622, 623, 916 N.Y.S.2d 169; see Camisa v. Rosen, 150 A.D.3d 809, 810, 54 N.Y.S.3d 111). “ ‘An employees actions fall within the scope of employment where the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employers interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employers business’ ” (Scott v. Lopez, 136 A.D.3d 885, 886, 25 N.Y.S.3d 298, quoting Beauchamp v. City of New York, 3 A.D.3d 465, 466, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129; see Camisa v. Rosen, 150 A.D.3d at 810, 54 N.Y.S.3d 111). “An action may also be considered to be within the scope of employment when it ‘is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of the employer, or if the act may be reasonably said to be necessary or incidental to such employment’ ” (Scott v. Lopez, 136 A.D.3d at 886, 25 N.Y.S.3d 298, quoting Pinto v. Tenenbaum, 105 A.D.3d 930, 931, 963 N.Y.S.2d 699; see Camisa v. Rosen, 150 A.D.3d at 810, 54 N.Y.S.3d 111). “Conversely, where an employees actions are taken for wholly personal reasons, which are not job related, his or her conduct cannot be said to fall within the scope of employment” (Beauchamp v. City of New York, 3 A.D.3d at 466, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129; see Ciccone v. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d 910, 910, 31 N.Y.S.3d 124). “[I]n cases involving a use of force, whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment requires consideration of whether the employee was authorized to use force to effectuate the goals and duties of the employment” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d 383, 390, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641).
Here, DP established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging vicarious liability by demonstrating that Allums allegedly tortious conduct was not within the scope of his employment. Specifically, DP demonstrated that the violent conduct displayed by Allum during the course of receiving a ticket for a defective headlight was not reasonably foreseeable or incidental to the furtherance of DPs business interests and that Allum was not authorized to use force to effectuate the goals and duties of his employment (see Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d at 390, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641; Ciccone v. City of New York, 138 A.D.3d at 911, 31 N.Y.S.3d 124; Yildiz v. PJ Food Serv., Inc., 82 A.D.3d 971, 971–972, 918 N.Y.S.2d 572; Danko v. Forest Lake Camp, Inc., 63 A.D.3d 1099, 1099–1100, 882 N.Y.S.2d 280). In opposition, Maldonado failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Allum was acting within the scope of his employment when he kicked his feet, flailed his arms, and resisted arrest (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324–325, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572).
Similarly, DP demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. In this regard, DP demonstrated that it did not have knowledge, or notice, of Allums propensity for the violent conduct that resulted in Maldonados injury (see KM v. Fencers Club, Inc., 164 A.D.3d 891, 892, 83 N.Y.S.3d 197; Flanagan v. Catskill Regional Med. Ctr., 65 A.D.3d 563, 566, 884 N.Y.S.2d 131; Yildiz v. PJ Food Serv., Inc., 82 A.D.3d at 972, 918 N.Y.S.2d 572). Moreover, “[t]here is no common-law duty to institute specific procedures for hiring employees unless the employer knows of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate the prospective employee” (Yildiz v. PJ Food Serv., Inc., 82 A.D.3d at 972, 918 N.Y.S.2d 572 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In opposition, Maldonado failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Finally, DP demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205–e, since DP demonstrated that it was not vicariously liable for Allums allegedly criminal conduct (cf. Cioffi v. S.M. Foods, Inc., 178 A.D.3d 1006, 1011, 116 N.Y.S.3d 306). In opposition, Maldonado failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted DPs motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
DILLON, J.P., ROMAN, MALTESE and GENOVESI, JJ., concur.