DECISION & ORDER
In a consolidated action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant FirstService Residential New York, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Larry D. Martin, J.), dated December 3, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of that defendants motion which were to hold nonparties James Woods, Woods Lonergan, PLLC, and Holihan & Associates, P.C., in civil contempt and to disqualify nonparty Holihan & Associates, P.C., as counsel for the plaintiff.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The Board of Managers of Brightwater Towers Condominium (hereinafter Brightwater) manages a condominium complex in Brooklyn. FirstService Residential New York, Inc. (hereinafter FirstService), was the managing agent for Brightwater, and hired various vendors to make repairs to the condominium buildings. Between 2015 and 2017, Brightwater commenced four separate actions—one against FirstService (hereinafter the FirstService action), and the other three against individual vendors who had made repairs to the condominium buildings—alleging, among other things, breach of contract and negligence. Woods Lonergan, PLLC (hereinafter the Woods Firm), initially represented Brightwater in each of the four actions.
Thereafter, FirstService moved, inter alia, to have the Woods Firm disqualified as counsel for Brightwater in the FirstService action on the ground that the Woods Firm had represented FirstService in a prior action (see Board of Mgrs. of Brightwater Towers Condominium v. FirstService Residential N.Y., Inc., 193 A.D.3d 672, 147 N.Y.S.3d 78). By order dated July 13, 2018, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of FirstServices motion (hereinafter the disqualification order). Holihan & Associates, P.C. (hereinafter the Holihan Firm), was then retained as substitute counsel for Brightwater in the FirstService action.
In January 2019, one of the individual vendors moved to consolidate all four actions. Brightwater, which was represented by the Holihan Firm in the FirstService action and by the Woods Firm in the other three actions, opposed the motion to consolidate. In an order dated August 14, 2019, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the motion to consolidate the four actions. The court noted in its order that, since the Woods Firm had been disqualified from representing Brightwater in the FirstService action, it was disqualified from representing Brightwater in the consolidated action.
Thereafter, FirstService moved, among other things, to hold the Woods Firm, James Woods, an attorney and managing partner of the Woods Firm, and the Holihan Firm (hereinafter collectively the attorney respondents) in civil contempt, arguing that they had violated the disqualification order by communicating with each other when preparing their opposition to the motion to consolidate. FirstService also sought to disqualify the Holihan Firm from representing Brightwater in the consolidated action. By order dated December 3, 2019, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of FirstServices motion, and FirstService appeals.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of FirstServices motion which was to hold the Holihan Firm in civil contempt. Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 756, a contempt application must be in writing, must be made upon at least 10 days’ notice, and must contain on its face the statutory warning that “FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT MAY RESULT IN ․ IMMEDIATE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT.” Here, FirstServices motion did not contain the warning required by Judiciary Law § 756, and, in its papers submitted in opposition to FirstServices motion, the Holihan Firm objected to FirstServices failure to include the required warning. As such, the court was without jurisdiction to punish the Holihan Firm for contempt for allegedly failing to comply with the disqualification order (see Judiciary Law § 756; Community Preserv. Corp. v. Northern Blvd. Prop., LLC, 139 A.D.3d 889, 890, 31 N.Y.S.3d 584; Cappello v. Cappello, 274 A.D.2d 538, 539, 712 N.Y.S.2d 41).
Although Woods and the Woods Firm did not object to FirstServices failure to comply with the warning requirement of Judiciary Law § 756, and thus, waived the protections afforded by the statute (see Matter of Rappaport, 58 N.Y.2d 725, 726, 458 N.Y.S.2d 911, 444 N.E.2d 1330), the Supreme Court nevertheless providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of FirstServices motion which were to hold Woods and the Woods Firm in civil contempt. In order to prevail on a motion to hold another party in civil contempt, the movant is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, “(1) that a lawful order of the court was in effect, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, (2) the appearance, with reasonable certainty, that the order was disobeyed, (3) that the party to be held in contempt had knowledge of the courts order, and (4) prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation” (Matter of Mendoza–Pautrat v. Razdan, 160 A.D.3d 963, 964, 74 N.Y.S.3d 626; see El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 29, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340; Matter of Banks v. Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 140, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515). The movant “need not establish ‘that the disobedience was deliberate or willful’ ” (Rhodes v. Rhodes, 169 A.D.3d 841, 843, 94 N.Y.S.3d 123 [alterations omitted], quoting Matter of Philie v. Singer, 79 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 913 N.Y.S.2d 745; see El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d at 35, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340). “Once the movant establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movants showing, or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order” (El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 114 A.D.3d 4, 17, 978 N.Y.S.2d 239, affd 26 N.Y.3d 19, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340).
Here, FirstService failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Woods and the Woods Firm disobeyed the disqualification order. Although the attorney respondents acknowledged that they communicated with each other when preparing their opposition to the motion to consolidate, FirstService failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the Woods Firm thereby continued to represent Brightwater in the FirstService action. The Woods Firm had an independent obligation to continue to represent Brightwater in the three actions against the individual vendors which, along with the FirstService action, were collectively the subject of the motion to consolidate (see generally Gulino v. Gulino, 35 A.D.3d 812, 812, 826 N.Y.S.2d 903).
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of FirstServices motion which was to disqualify the Holihan Firm as substitute counsel for Brightwater, as FirstService failed to prove any of the requisite elements that would warrant the disqualification of the Holihan Firm as Brightwaters counsel (see Tekni–Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 131, 651 N.Y.S.2d 954, 674 N.E.2d 663; Board of Mgrs. of Brightwater Towers Condominium v. FirstService Residential N.Y., Inc., 193 A.D.3d at 675, 147 N.Y.S.3d 78).
In light of the foregoing, we need not address the parties’ remaining contentions.
CONNOLLY, J.P., ROMAN, CHRISTOPHER and FORD, JJ., concur.