Valerie Badia pursued two workers’ compensation claims against her employer, OReilly Auto Enterprises (OReilly). In both cases, she was and continues to be represented by attorney Nicholas Platt. After an unsuccessful mediation, settlement talks were rekindled via emails and phone calls. Counsel for the parties reached a settlement agreement resolving both claims and engaged in actions consistent with the terms of the settlement agreement. When it came time to finalize the settlement documentation and have OReilly make the agreed-upon settlement payment, Platt informed OReilly’s counsel that Badia did not agree to certain terms of the settlement agreement. Platt proposed alternative terms as requested by Badia. OReilly refused and filed this action seeking to enforce the settlement agreement it claimed to have with Badia.
In pursuit of this action seeking to enforce the claimed settlement agreement, OReilly sought to depose Platt. Platt resisted, expressing concern about attorney-client privilege. Court intervention was sought to compel Platts testimony. The district court permitted Platt to intervene in this action and then issued an order directing Platt to participate in a deposition. The order required Platt to answer questions related to whether a settlement agreement was reached and the terms of the agreement. However, the court refused to order Platt to give information related to his communications with Badia. The bases for restricting Platt from divulging information related to his communications with Badia was that “[Badia] has not waived the privilege that exists between her and attorney Platt nor, at this time, has [Badia] placed attorney Platts authority at issue.”
OReilly deposed Platt. Consistent with the courts order, the questioning of Platt did not delve into his communications with Badia, and, when questioning did drift in that direction, Platt was directed by his attorney not to answer.
OReilly moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, it relied on emails exchanged between counsel confirming terms of a settlement agreement and excerpts from Platts deposition in which Platt expressed his belief that a settlement had been reached on the terms detailed in the emails. Badia resisted the motion. In support of her resistance, Badia submitted an affidavit in which she asserted that she had communication problems with Platt, did not agree to the terms of the settlement agreement (as outlined in the emails exchanged between counsel), and did not authorize Platt to enter a settlement on her behalf.
Despite the fact that Badias resistance raised an issue over the authority she gave to Platt—which contradicted one of the reasons the district court did not allow OReilly to depose Platt about his communications with Badia—the parties proceeded to a hearing on the motion based on the information they had. The district court granted OReilly’s motion. Badia appeals. She contends there are genuine issues of material fact that cannot be resolved via summary judgment.
Appellate courts review rulings granting summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 2022). Summary judgment is properly granted when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In assessing whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
At the heart of Badias argument is her claim that she did not authorize Platt to enter the settlement agreement on her behalf. There is no dispute that Platt was representing Badia at the time the claimed settlement was reached. As Badias attorney, Iowa Code section 602.10114(2) (2021) gave Platt the power to bind Badia “to any agreement, in respect to any proceeding within the scope of the attorneys or counselors proper duties and powers.” See Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). Generally, an attorneys offer of settlement is within the scope of the attorneys litigation duties. Id. If the attorney settles a case with authorization from the client, the settlement is binding on the client. Id. “However, an attorney cannot settle or compromise a case without authority.” Id.
In assessing whether Platt had authority to enter the settlement on Badias behalf, we start with the premise that an attorney is presumed to act with authority. See id. However, this presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted. Id. It takes clear and satisfactory proof to overcome the presumption. Id.
The district court applied these principles, concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact, and granted summary judgment to OReilly. In doing so, the court was persuaded by three categories of evidence: (1) the actions of the attorneys after the claimed settlement was reached; (2) Badias conduct of signing releases and asking for a modification of the settlement terms; and (3) Platts deposition testimony. Unlike the district court, we are not persuaded that these, or any other, pieces of evidence eliminate the factual dispute generated by Badias affidavit.
As to the first category of evidence, given Badias denial of granting Platt authority to enter the settlement, the actions of the attorneys are inconsequential in deciding whether Platt had authority. Badias narrative is that Platt took all those actions on his own without her authorization. There is nothing about those actions that resolves the factual dispute to negate Badias narrative.
Regarding the second category of evidence, we do not believe the record supports the conclusion reached by the district court. While Platt did forward at least one medical-information release signed by Badia to OReilly after the alleged settlement date, the release is undated and the record provides no information as to when Badia signed the release or what she was told to prompt her to sign it. Without such information, we would have to speculate to reach the conclusion that Badia signed the release after the settlement and did so for the purpose of effectuating a settlement to which she agreed. We are not permitted to speculate in favor of a party moving for summary judgment. To the contrary, we are required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to give the nonmoving party every legitimate inference reasonably deduced from the record. Garrison, 977 N.W.2d at 76. As to the district courts conclusion that Badia asked to “modify” the settlement terms and that such request shows she had previously authorized the settlement, OReilly does not point to any part of the record demonstrating that Badia made such a request. The only evidence in the record even touching on this area appears to be the email from Platt to OReilly in which he informs OReilly that Badia did not agree to some of the terms of the settlement. Nothing about this email from Platt is inconsistent with Badias narrative that Platt agreed to a settlement without Badias authorization. Again, this evidence does not resolve the factual dispute created by Badias affidavit.
As to the third category of evidence, Platt testified at his deposition that after the parties resumed negotiations, he contacted the mediator to go “over the details of the offer that my client authorized me to accept for her workers’ compensation case.” Following that contact, the mediator emailed Platt and OReilly’s attorney to “confirm[ ] the terms of a settlement agreement between [Badia] and OReilly.” His deposition does not contain any further details about what Badia authorized, when, or how, likely because of the district courts order limiting the scope of his testimony. Badias affidavit, on the other hand, declares that she did not authorize the settlement agreement Platt entered with OReilly. Because Platt could not settle Badias claim without her authority, see Gilbride, 620 N.W.2d at 251, we find this affidavit sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Rolling Hills Bank & Tr. v. Vetter, Nos. 11-1162, 11-1163, 2012 WL 1860347, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (finding assertions in defendants’ affidavits, based on their personal knowledge of the dispute, were alone sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact); cf. Gilbride, 620 N.W.2d at 250 (“In the absence of a resistance and an affidavit from the appellants to support their contention that [their attorney] did not represent them when the settlement offer was made and settlement was reached, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to this contention.”).
1
Because we find summary judgment should not have been granted on this record, we reverse the district courts grant of summary judgment in OReilly’s favor and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
We want to be clear that the outcome here is in no way intended to express an opinion on what the final outcome should be on remand. This case highlights some of the pitfalls and inefficiencies that come with prematurely requesting—and granting—summary judgment. Once Badia submitted her affidavit in resistance to the summary judgment motion, it made it all but impossible for OReilly to obtain summary judgment on this record in part because OReilly was previously precluded from delving into Platts communications with Badia—a prohibition based on what has turned out to be the erroneous premise that Badia was not challenging Platts authority to enter a settlement on her behalf. Now that it is clear that Badia is challenging Platts authority, the parties and district court are free to act accordingly on remand. No party is precluded by this opinion from engaging in additional discovery on remand or seeking summary judgment based on any additional information that may be discovered, although the district court remains free to regulate such actions within the bounds of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. We note that OReilly makes no claim on appeal that Platt had apparent authority to settle on Badias behalf, so we consider the issue of apparent authority waived and express no opinion on it. See Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v. Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664, 690 (Iowa 2020). We also express no opinion on the propriety of consideration of apparent authority on remand.
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.