MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary and Issue
[1] In 2020, the trial court granted the petition of M.J. and T.J. (“Adoptive Parents”) to adopt M. (“Child”). In 2021, P.B., Childs alleged father, filed a motion to intervene in the adoption cause in order to file a motion to set aside the adoption decree. The trial court granted the motion to intervene but subsequently denied the motion to set aside. P.B. appeals the trial courts denial of his motion to set aside the adoption decree.
1
Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] H.J. (“Biological Mother”) and P.B. were romantically involved in 2017 in Iowa. P.B. knew that Biological Mother became pregnant in November and attended an ultrasound appointment with her. Biological Mother returned to Indiana in January 2018 to live with her parents, and sometime prior to Childs birth, she and P.B. ceased to have contact. When Child was born in August 2018, no father was named on the birth certificate and no paternity affidavit was executed. Further, P.B. did not register with the Putative Father Registry in Indiana or seek to establish paternity. In May 2019, P.B. came to Indiana. His visit went poorly, and Biological Mother filed a protective order against P.B. that was ultimately dismissed after P.B. contested the order and returned to Indiana for a hearing. P.B. had no other apparent contact with Child.
[3] In November 2019, Adoptive Parents
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filed a petition to adopt Child, alleging in their petition that Child was born to Biological Mother “and an unnamed biological father. Paternity has not been established for the Child and no father has been named.” Appellants Appendix, Volume 2 at 34. Biological Mother consented to the adoption. In February 2020, the trial court granted the petition to adopt, finding adoption to be in Childs best interests.
[4] In February 2021, P.B. filed a motion in another court seeking to establish paternity, custody, parenting time, and support of Child. When P.B. thereafter learned of the adoption, he filed a motion to intervene in the adoption case for the purpose of seeking to have the adoption set aside. The trial court granted the motion to intervene, and P.B. filed a motion to set aside alleging he was not given notice of the adoption and further alleging Adoptive Parents fraudulently represented in their petition for adoption that there was no named father. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying P.B.’s motion to set aside.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[5] P.B. filed a motion to set aside the adoption decree pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). Relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60 is an equitable remedy within the trial courts discretion. In re Adoption of C.B.M., 992 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 2013). Accordingly, we review a trial courts Rule 60 ruling only for abuse of discretion. Id. The burden is on the movant for relief from judgment to show sufficient grounds for relief. In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
II. Motion for Relief from Judgment
[6] P.B. contends he should have been granted relief because he was not given notice of the adoption petition pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-4-3. He also contends the Adoptive Parents perpetrated a fraud upon the court when they alleged in their adoption petition there was no named father. We disagree with P.B. on both points.
[7] First, P.B. was not entitled to notice by publication pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-4-3. That section by its terms only applies when a child was conceived outside of Indiana and the mother of the child informs an attorney or the agency arranging the childs adoption before executing a consent that the child was conceived outside of Indiana but does not disclose the name and/or address of the putative father. Ind. Code § 31-19-4-3(a)(1) & (b) (2009).
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Here, there is no indication that Biological Mother informed anyone that Child was conceived outside of Indiana and therefore notice by publication was not required under this section. As the trial court noted:
I.C. § 31-19-4-3(a) does not require the mother to disclose the state of conception or the information pertaining to the fathers identity. [Biological Mother] did not provide that information to an agency and/or attorney, and publication was not completed in accordance with I.C. § 31-19-4-3(b). [Further, P.B.] did not take the necessary steps to protect his rights pertaining to [Child] by filing with the Putative Father Registry or by filing any actions with the court.
Appealed Order at 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying P.B. relief from the judgment based on lack of notice.
[8] Second, P.B. has not shown he is entitled to relief because of fraud. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(3) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. To assert a claim of fraud on the court, the party must establish that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the courts decision and that such acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. In re Adoption of L.G.K., 113 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The party also must show that he has a “meritorious claim or defense.” Id. Fraud on the court has been narrowly applied and is limited to the most egregious of circumstances involving the courts. Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ind. 2002). To prove fraud on the court, it is not enough to show a possibility the trial court was misled; rather, there must be a showing the trial courts decision was actually influenced. Id. at 358.
[9] The trial court noted that although Adoptive Parents were “not forthcoming with the identity of the father in the petition for adoption[,]” Biological Mother “never took any actions to prevent [P.B.] from filing a paternity action or filing with the Putative Father Registry.” Appealed Order at 9. Even if P.B. could show that Adoptive Parents unconscionably failed to disclose the identity of a man who was not named on Childs birth certificate, had not signed a paternity affidavit, and had not registered as a putative father, P.B. could not show a meritorious defense to failing to preserve his own rights when he was aware of Childs birth. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying P.B.’s motion for relief from judgment based on fraud.
[10] And notwithstanding P.B.’s arguments about notice or fraud, Indiana Code section 31-19-14-4 limits a persons ability to challenge an adoption decree outside certain time limits:
After the expiration of the period described in section 2 of this chapter, neither a person whose parental rights are terminated by the entry of an adoption decree nor any other person may challenge the adoption decree even if:
(1) notice of the adoption was not given; or
(2) the adoption proceedings were in any other manner defective.
The time limit provided in section 31-19-14-2 is six months after the entry of an adoption decree or one year after the adoptive parents obtain custody of the child. The adoption decree was entered in this case in February 2020, the time limit for challenging the decree ran in August 2020, and P.B. did not seek to set the decree aside until May 2021. P.B. is precluded from belatedly contesting the adoption decree no matter the reason.
Conclusion
[11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying P.B.’s motion to set aside the adoption decree. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[12] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. P.B., pro se, has filed a brief that complies with none of our appellate rules regarding the arrangement and content of briefs, but particularly the provision requiring a brief to “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning [and] citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). On this basis alone we could deem this appeal waived. See Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 834 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (explaining contentions supported by neither cogent argument nor citation to authority are waived). P.B. never clearly states the legal issue he is raising for our review, but it appears he primarily takes issue with his counsels representation of him during the hearing on his motion to set aside. P.B.’s dissatisfaction with his private counsel is not reviewable in this adoption case. But because this is a case involving a child and as we prefer to decide cases on their merits and have before us a very thorough order by the trial court denying the motion to set aside, we will consider the merits of the trial courts decision.
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. Adoptive Parents are the parents of Biological Mother and the biological grandparents of Child.
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. Additionally, the putative father must have failed or refused to consent to the adoption and have not registered with the putative father registry within the statutory time period. Ind. Code § 31-19-4-3(a)(2) (2009).
Robb, Judge.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.