MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, Michael Jent (Jent), appeals the trial courts summary judgment in favor of Appellee-Defendant, State of Indiana (State) et al., concluding, as a matter of law, that a law enforcement officer acted within the course of his employment.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Jent presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the State, concluding, as a matter of law, that Officer Dennis Davis (Officer Davis) is immune from suit pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On February 28, 2018, Jent, a prisoner housed at New Castle Correctional Facility (Facility), Indiana, was placed in protective custody by Internal Affairs. During this process, Jent claimed that Officer Davis, the property officer at the Facility responsible for securing and maintaining offender property, took his therapeutic pillow. When Jents property was returned to him on March 13, 2018, the pillow was missing. Jent filed an internal grievances complaint against Officer Davis.
[5] On July 7, 2021, Jent filed an amended Complaint against the State and Officer Davis, alleging that Officer Davis maliciously deprived him of his pillow, an act which was outside the scope of his employment and in violation of an internal policy of the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Jent claimed that the deprivation of his pillow caused him “pain and suffering from inadequate support of his head and neck.” (Appellants App. Vol. II, p. 32). On July 21, 2021, the State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Officer Davis was entitled to (1) immunity under ITCA because he was a government employee acting within the scope of his employment, and (2) immunity under the doctrine of law enforcement immunity because Jent alleged that Officer Davis failed to abide by DOC policy. On September 1, 2021, Jent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that Officer Davis maliciously deprived him of his therapeutic pillow, which was outside Officer Davis’ employment. The State filed a response in opposition to Jents cross-motion. On October 21, 2021, the trial court summarily entered judgment for Officer Davis and denied Jents cross-motion for summary judgment.
[6] Jent now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[7] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well-settled: [t]he party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kluger v. J.J.P. Enterprises, Inc., 159 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Once these two requirements are met by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. at 87. Any doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only if the evidence sanctioned by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. A House Mechanics, Inc. v. Massey, 124 N.E.3d 1257, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We may affirm an entry of summary judgment “if it can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record.” DiMaggio v. Rosario, 52 N.E.3d 896, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
[8] We further note that statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Sanders v. Bd. of Commrs, 892 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result. Id. Finally, the fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review or change our analysis: the party that lost in the trial court has the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
II. ITCA
[9] Jent contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the State and Officer Davis concluding, as a matter of law, that Officer Davis is immune from suit under the ITCA. In support of this contention, Jent maintains that Officer Davis’ action to take his therapeutic pillow was “malicious, willful and wanton, and calculated to benefit him personally,” thereby placing him outside of the protection of the ITCA. (Appellants Br. p. 10).
[10] Indiana Code chapter 34-13-3 controls tort claims against governmental entities and employees. A plaintiff may not maintain an action against a governmental employee personally if that employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b). Rather, to bring a suit against an employee personally, the plaintiff must “allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employees employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.” I.C. § 34-13-3-5(c). In addition, the plaintiffs complaint “must contain a reasonable factual basis supporting the allegations.” Id.
[11] The purpose for granting immunity to governmental employees is to “ensure that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.” Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000). “To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Id. at 453 (citing Restatement (Second) Agency § 229 (1958)).
[12] In addition, our supreme court has further explained:
In Indiana, an employees tortious act may fall within the scope of his employment “if his purpose was, to an appreciable extent, to further his employers business.” Even the commission of an intentional criminal act may be considered as being within the scope of employment if “the criminal acts originated in activities so closely associated with the employment relationship as to fall within its scope.” The question of whether the tortious acts of an employee are within the scope of his employment is usually a question of fact, but may be determined as a matter of law. However, the question of whether the governmental employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident (not the degree of culpability) remains the central focus of the inquiry. Even willful or wanton behavior does not necessarily remove one from the scope of his employment.
Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind. 1993) (internal citations omitted). If authorized and unauthorized acts are sufficiently associated, the unauthorized acts can be within the scope of employment. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, if some of an employees acts were authorized, while other acts were not, the jury should determine whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of employment. Id.
[13] Officer Davis is the property room officer at the Facility and is responsible for offenders’ property that is stored in the Facilitys property room. The act of securing Jents personal property, including the therapeutic pillow, is directly related to his job responsibility of maintaining the offenders’ property. Besides a conclusory statement that Officer Davis’ conduct was in “satisfaction [of] retaliating against Jent for filing grievances, etc.,” Jent did not designate any evidence indicating that Officer Davis’ action of securing the therapeutic pillow might have been willful or wanton. (Appellants Br. p. 10); See Higgason v. State 789 N.E. 2d 22, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (as converting Higgasons cell to strip cell status was a task within the scope of the officers employment, Higgason could not properly sue the officer in his personal capacity for the misplacement of personal items). Therefore, as the securing and alleged misplacement of the pillow are sufficiently associated, Jent cannot sue Officer Davis, as a matter of law, in his personal capacity for an act that was within the scope of his employment. See I.C. § 34-13-3-5(b).
CONCLUSION
[14] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the State and Officer Davis.
[15] Affirmed.
Riley, Judge.
[16] May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur