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FRANKLIN v. STATE (2022)

Court of Appeals of Indiana.2022-07-18No. Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-91

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] David B. Franklin, Jr., appeals the sanction the trial court imposed after he admitted that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. We affirm.

Issue

[2] Franklin raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 16, 2020, the State charged Franklin with domestic battery as a Level 6 felony and intimidation as a Level 6 felony. The State alleged that Franklin had shoved his father, causing him to fall to the ground and suffer an injury. The State further alleged that after Franklin was arrested and placed in a police vehicle for transport to jail, he threatened to kill the transporting police officer and the officers family.

[4] Franklin was released from jail on bail, but he subsequently failed to appear for scheduled hearings. The trial court issued a warrant for his arrest, and Franklin was taken into custody.

[5] Franklin and the State negotiated a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty as charged. In exchange, the State agreed that, if the trial court accepted the plea agreement, Franklin would be sentenced as follows: (1) one year for the offense of domestic battery, with thirty days executed and the remainder to be served on probation; (2) one year for the offense of intimidation, with ninety days executed and the remainder to be served on probation; (3) with the sentences to be served consecutively.

[6] The trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreement, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced Franklin in accordance with the plea agreement. The trial court further ordered Franklin to serve his sentence in this case consecutively to a sentence in a separate case from Elkhart County. The November 17, 2020 sentencing order provides, in relevant part:

The Defendant is ordered to report to Noble County Court Services within 48 hours of his release from incarceration and schedule a substance abuse evaluation and thereafter, in a timely manner, successfully complete any recommended program of substance abuse treatment. The Defendant shall pay all costs associated with the substance abuse assessment, specifically the assessment fee of $400.00 payable to Noble County Probation, together with the cost of any subsequent treatment that may be recommended as a result of such assessment. If the Defendant fails to comply with this order requiring a substance abuse assessment and recommended treatment, the Defendant may be cited for contempt of court and punished accordingly.

Appellants App. Vol. II, p. 45. Other terms and conditions of Franklins probation included reporting to the probation office and refraining from committing new criminal offenses.

[7] On November 8, 2021, the Noble County Probation Office filed a probation violation report. In the report, Franklins probation officer explained that although Franklin “has not yet started serving his probation time in this case,” id. at 51, he had failed to report to the probation office after finishing his sentence for the Elkhart County case, and he had committed new criminal offenses. The trial court issued an arrest warrant, and Franklin was arrested the next day.

[8] On December 17, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Franklin admitted he had failed to report to the probation office after finishing his sentence in the Elkhart County case and had committed new offenses. In particular, he conceded that he had pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement and theft, both misdemeanors, in another case.

[9] The trial court heard the parties’ arguments on possible sanctions and ordered Franklin to serve 610 days, the balance of his suspended sentence, in the Noble County Jail. At the end of the hearing, Franklin vehemently denied that he had committed domestic battery or intimidation, the offenses to which he had originally pleaded guilty. He ended his outburst only after the trial court threatened him with a contempt-of-court finding. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Franklin argues that the trial court should not have ordered him to serve his entire sentence in the county jail. Specifically, he claims a shorter sentence in a facility where he can obtain mental health treatment would be more appropriate.

[11] Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court has broad discretion in imposing conditions of probation in order to create law abiding citizens and to protect the community, with the only limitations being that the conditions must have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of the public. Hurst v. State, 717 N.E.2d 883, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[12] If a trial court determines that a person has violated a term or condition of probation within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the persons probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015).

[13] We review a trial courts selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Castillo v. State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. (quotation omitted). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or reassessing the credibility of the witnesses. Cain v. State, 30 N.E.3d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[14] Franklin was forty-one years old when the trial court imposed the sanction of serving the entirety of his previously suspended sentence. During the dispositional hearing, the prosecutor informed the trial court, without objection from Franklin, that he had a prior conviction of battery, and further described the circumstances of the original criminal charges in this case, which painted Franklin in a poor light. The prosecutor further argued that Franklin had squandered the opportunity he had been given to obtain mental health counseling on his own while serving part of his sentence on probation, and that “full revocation” of probation was necessary because Franklin was a “danger to the community.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 20. The record supports the prosecutors statement. While the criminal charges of domestic battery and intimidation were pending, Franklin wrote a letter to the trial court asserting that he had been hospitalized for mental health treatment “at least 30 times” in the previous four years. Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 39. Despite these treatment opportunities, Franklin committed new criminal offenses, including misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[15] Franklin argues that being placed in a treatment facility would have been more appropriate than jail. But his probation officer, Ms. Iovino, told the trial court that allowing Franklin to live in a shelter or a half-way house while he sought treatment would be inappropriate because she would not be able to keep track of him. Further, based on Franklins history of noncooperation with Ms. Iovinos office, she thought that revocation of probation was necessary for “the safety of the public and the safety of himself as well.” Id. at 19.

[16] Franklin further argues that the trial court should have acknowledged that he took responsibility for himself by admitting to the probation violations. But the evidence against him (lack of contact with the probation office, and new criminal convictions including resisting law enforcement) was strong. Further, at the end of the dispositional hearing, Franklin strongly denied that he had committed the original offenses to which he had pleaded guilty. The trial court was in the best position to assess Franklins demeanor and sincerity. Under these circumstances, the trial courts decision to order Franklin to serve his previously suspended sentence was not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. See Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (trial court did not abuse discretion in ordering probationer to serve the balance of previously suspended sentence; defendant had many opportunities to obtain treatment for his mental illness but continued to consume controlled substances), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[17] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[18] Affirmed.

Darden, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.