The defendant, Alex Brandon Schexnayder, was charged by bill of information with felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:80, and initially pled not guilty. The defendant later withdrew his original plea and pled guilty as charged. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment at hard labor. The trial court denied his motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant in this case entered an unqualified guilty plea. At the Boykin
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hearing, the parties stipulated to the factual basis contained in discovery. Thus, the facts have not been developed in this case. According to the bill of information, the offense occurred between July 1, 2019 and July 20, 2019, and the victim, G.D., victim was sixteen years old at the time of the offense.
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As further stated in the bill of information, the defendants date of birth is August 5, 1996, and, thus, he was twenty-two years old at the time of the offense.
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In her impact statement read at the presentencing hearing, the victim stated that the offense occurred at work. She stated that while she was on bathroom duty, the defendant repeatedly entered the bathroom and would chat for a minute or two before leaving. He kept returning to the bathroom and ultimately approached the victim, stood very close to her, pushed his forehead against her forehead, and kissed her. She stated that the defendant proceeded to put his hands on her body, and when she whimpered in displeasure, the defendant started choking her. The defendant then left the bathroom again.
G.D. stated that she attempted to forget what happened, but as she was cleaning the first bathroom stall, she turned around and saw the defendant standing in the bathroom with his pants undone. He shoved her head closer and “eventually forced himself in [her] mouth.” She cried, and the defendant told her to “shut the f*** up.” The defendant left the bathroom again, but he returned while G.D. was cleaning the handicap stall, sat on the toilet, and tugged his pants down. She stated that as she cried, the defendant grabbed her by the neck, forced her to her knees, and “[a]gain, [she] found his penis in [her] mouth.” The victim stated that the defendant subsequently penetrated her vaginally and anally. The victim further stated that the defendant repeated his actions on another date before the incidents were reported.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In the sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the three-year sentence is excessive as it is not in line with the facts and circumstances of the case. He further states that he believed the acts were consensual and never denied his actions. The defendant notes that the victim stated that she was “super happy” after the incidents and noted that at sentencing, the trial court even expressed its belief that the intercourse was consensual.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendants constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1979); State v. Honea, 18-0018, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/18), 268 So. 3d 1117, 1120, writ not considered. 19-00598 (La. 8/12/19), 279 So. 3d 915. A sentence is constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hurst, 99-2868, p. 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So. 2d 75, 83, writ denied, 00-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So. 2d 962.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the trial court adequately considered the criteria. In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial courts stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Brown, 02-2231, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So. 2d 566, 569. Remand is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown even where there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475, 478 (La. 1982); State v. Graham, 02-1492, p. 10 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So. 2d 416, 422.
Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile occurs when “[a] person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not the spouse of the offender and when the difference between the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater.” La. R.S. 14:80(A)(1). Felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years. La. R.S. 14:80(D)(1).
In her victim impact statement, G.D. provided a detailed account of the crimes, her fear of the defendant, her fear that the defendant (her supervisor) would fire her from her job, and the resulting pain and humiliation she felt. The victim stated that she lost her self-value after the incidents, noting that she hated what she saw when she looked in the mirror and later suffered a mental breakdown.
At the outset, we note that there is some indication in the record that the defendant agreed to a sentencing range of up to three years imprisonment prior to the sentencing. A defendant cannot appeal or seek review of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement that was set forth in the record at the time of the plea. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2); see State v. Young, 96-0195, p. 7 (La. 10/15/96), 680 So. 2d 1171, 1175. While the terms of the sentencing agreement were not fully stated at the time of the Boykin hearing, we find that the imposed sentence was not excessive in this case.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court listened to the testimony of the defendants sister, wherein she noted that the defendant was bullied a lot as a child, that he acquired a GED, and that he was “very sorry” for the offense. The trial court also acknowledged an email written by the victim after the offense, wherein she, in part, stated, “Afterwards I was super happy that I had this guy being sweet to me and I trusted him with talking about my mental health.
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The trial court additionally observed that the offense to which the defendant pled guilty, felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, is an offense that involves “consensual sex” with an underage victim. Thus, whether or not the victim consented is not an issue in this case. The trial court further concluded that the defendant had not shown much remorse. Specifically, regarding the defendants recorded interview, while the defendant cried after confessing, the trial court noted, “when it came to the direct questions about the actual physical act, his demeanor, I wont say border lined [sic] on braggadocios [sic], but he didnt really necessarily seem remorseful for the acts.” Finally, the trial court noted that the defendant did not directly apologize.
As noted, the defendant faced a statutory maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Thus, the imposed three-year sentence is at the low end of the sentencing range. We find that the sentence is not shocking in this case. Considering the victims impact statement
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and the trial courts reasons for sentencing, we find no abuse of discretion. Thus, we find no error in the trial courts denial of the motion to reconsider sentence. Accordingly, the defendants sole assignment of error lacks merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
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. Herein, we will refer to the victim by her initials only. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).
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. The record is inconsistent as to the defendants age. The bill of information states that the defendant was born in 1996, as stated above. At the Boykin hearing on April 26, 2021, when asked his age, the defendant said, “22. 24. Sorry,” He was then asked for his date of birth and said, “August 5th, 1994.” However, the year of birth given by the defendant would have made him twenty-six at the time of the hearing, inconsistent with both the initial and revised ages that he provided. The year of birth provided in the bill of information is consistent with the age of “24” stated by the defendant. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that at the time of the offense, the defendant was “seventeen years of age or older” and that the difference between his age and the age of the victim “is four years or greater.” See La. R.S. 14:80(A)(1),
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. The victim also stated in the email, “Alex and I did do stuff we werent supposed to in the bathroom. If Im being honest I never planned or intended for [A]lex and I to have that sort of relationship. It happened so suddenly (for me at least) that I was afraid to say no.”
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. As the trial court stated, the victim was unable to complete the reading of her statement at the presentencing hearing, and it was read by her therapist on her behalf.
GUIDRY, J.
Wolfe, J. concurs.