MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The father appeals from a decree of the Juvenile Court finding him unfit and terminating his parental rights to his child.
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Specifically, the father argues that the judge improperly injected settlement discussions, prejudged the case, and deprived the father of due process. The father also challenges the judges decision to place the child with his preadoptive foster family. We affirm.
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Background. We briefly summarize the judges findings of fact, which find ample support in the record.
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The father has a long and troubled history of drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, criminal activity, and incarceration, as detailed by the judge in her findings of fact and rulings of law. He has been diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety, and opioid dependency. The father has never cared for the child alone for any substantial period. He has also “been incarcerated at numerous times throughout [the childs] life, oftentimes leaving him without a caretaker or without a stable father figure.” In addition, the child “witnessed and was exposed to significant domestic violence between [the father] and his various partners.” The child “expressed that at times he did not feel safe in [the fathers] home.” By contrast, the childs foster family has provided a “secure two-parent household where he can seek refuge in the stable presence of his foster parents.”
Following the childs removal, the father failed to take necessary steps to clear his criminal record, engage in services, and demonstrate his parenting abilities. Instead, as the judge found, he continued to accumulate criminal charges and was incarcerated for much of the childs time in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF). He has refused to accept responsibility for his actions and has failed to appreciate the impact of his violent behavior on the child. He also lacked credibility at trial; the judge found that he “did not demonstrate the level of truthfulness and accountability that is befitting of a parent.”
Discussion. 1. Judicial bias/prejudgment of case. Citing comments that the judge made before and during trial, the father primarily argues that the judge prematurely decided the case and was “pressing [him] to settle,” thereby depriving him of the right to a full and fair hearing before an impartial fact finder. The parties dispute whether the father raised the issue of judicial bias for the first time on appeal. “Generally, issues not raised ․ in the trial court are not addressed on appeal, absent exceptional circumstances.” Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 712 (1993).
It is undisputed that the fathers trial counsel did not object to the judges comments that the father now challenges. See Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 270-271 (2021) (“timely objection affords the trial judge an opportunity to correct any possible errors”). Nor did the father seek the judges recusal. See Adoption of Norbert, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 545 (2013) (affirmative obligation to seek recusal “at the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such disqualification” [citation omitted]). Nonetheless, the father contends that his statement to the judge that he was not “having a fair trial” was sufficient to preserve the issue. We disagree. The father made this comment in the context of his counsels motion to withdraw. At no point did the father mention the judge or her comments in this exchange. Rather, he expressed that he was dissatisfied with his counsels lack of communication and “game plan” such that he wanted a different attorney. Accordingly, the issues of alleged judicial bias and due process violations were not properly preserved and are waived.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the father had preserved the judicial bias and due process issues for appeal, the outcome would not change. We note that the judge stated, more than once, that she had not reached any conclusions and would listen to the evidence. We further note that the judges detailed findings of fact and rulings of law reflect a thorough and even-handed assessment of the evidence. See note 4, supra. After careful review of the entire record, we disagree that the judges discussions regarding potential settlement rose to the level of judicial bias or a due process violation. “While we acknowledge that some of the judges comments were ․ inappropriate, we are not persuaded that the record discloses any bias or prejudice against the [father].” Adoption of Norbert, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 545. Furthermore, in the present case the “evidence could lead only to the result the judge reached here.” Adoption of Tia, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 124 (2008) (despite judges inappropriate comments undercutting appearance of fairness in proceeding, “the evidence in this case so substantially supported the judges findings and conclusions that the mistakes do not warrant reversal”).
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2. Approval of DCF adoption plan. The father argues that the judge erred and abused her discretion in approving a plan of adoption by the foster parents because she failed to conduct an even-handed assessment of the competing permanency plans. The claim is unavailing.
When a judge is “[p]resented with more than one potential adoption placement, the judges task is to determine which plan will serve the best interests of the child.” Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 226 n.9 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999). See G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). The judges determination will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of discretion or clear error of law. See Adoption of Hugo, supra at 225.
Here, the judge determined, inter alia, that at the time of trial, the child had developed strong bonds with the current foster parents for “over a year and a half in total.” The child had also bonded with the daughters of the foster parents, was comfortable in this environment, and was well-cared for by the foster parents. The judge further found that “[t]o remove [the child] from this placement again would be detrimental to his well-being and cause him unnecessary psychological harm.” In this regard, the judge contrasted the fathers limited relationship with the child stemming from his incarceration and other problems, with the childs ongoing and developing connections to his foster family.
As to the competing plan proffered by the father, the judge found that the child had not had any significant contact with his relatives in Washington State. The judge also noted the detrimental effects of “uprooting [the childs] connections in Massachusetts and further displacing [the child] for a fourth time.” The judge determined that it would not be in the childs “best interests to once again disrupt his stability in order to send him across the country to live with family members he has not met in person since he was a baby.” The judge concluded that the foster parents had shown “their commitment to maintaining [the childs] well-being and ensuring he has all that he needs in order to succeed” and that his current foster placement was in the childs best interests. Here again, the judges comprehensive findings and rulings support her determination, and we discern no abuse of discretion in her finding that DCFs proposed plan serves the best interests of the child.
Decree affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The father does not challenge the finding of unfitness on appeal.
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. The judge also terminated the parental rights of the mother, who did not appear at trial. The mother is not a party to this appeal.
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. Details regarding the procedural history of this matter, as well as the fathers criminal history, failure to comply with family action plan tasks and services, lack of credibility, and absence from the childs life, are delineated in the judges thoughtful and comprehensive findings of fact and rulings of law. The father does not challenge the judges findings.
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. We note that the judge evaluated the provisions of G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), and found factors (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi), (vii), (viii), (x), and (xii) to be applicable. The record evidence amply supports the judges determinations.