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DILORENZO v. NUNZIATTO (2022)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.2022-10-19No. 2019–12682

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Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Linda J. Kevins, J.), dated September 26, 2019.  The order denied the defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly fractured her ankle while descending a staircase in the defendants home.  The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries.  The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In an order dated September 26, 2019, the Supreme Court denied the defendants motion.  The defendant appeals.

In a premises liability case, “a defendant real property owner who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that [he or she] neither created the allegedly dangerous or defective condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence” (Deutsch v. Green Hills [USA], LLC, 202 A.D.3d 909, 910, 163 N.Y.S.3d 213).  A defendant can also establish his or her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of his or her accident (see Redendo v. Central Ave. Chrysler Jeep, Inc., 205 A.D.3d 1060, 1061, 166 N.Y.S.3d 912).

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint based on the plaintiffs alleged inability to identify what caused her alleged accident (see San Antonio v. 340 Ridge Tenants Corp., 204 A.D.3d 713, 166 N.Y.S.3d 256;  Samuelsen v. Wollman Rink Operations LLC, 201 A.D.3d 490, 161 N.Y.S.3d 64;  Hughes v. Tower Crestwood 2015, LLC, 197 A.D.3d 633, 153 N.Y.S.3d 104).  The defendant also failed to establish, prima facie, that a dangerous condition did not exist on the staircase (see San Antonio v. 340 Ridge Tenants Corp., 204 A.D.3d at 715, 166 N.Y.S.3d 256;  Costen v. Cohen, 124 A.D.3d 819, 819, 2 N.Y.S.3d 552), or that he lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition (see Chuqui v. Amna, LLC, 203 A.D.3d 1018, 1023, 166 N.Y.S.3d 192;  Taliana v. Hines REIT Three Huntington Quadrangle, LLC, 197 A.D.3d 1349, 1352, 154 N.Y.S.3d 136).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, MALTESE and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.