OPINION
In this personal-injury case arising from a motorcycle accident, the plaintiff appeals the trial courts final judgment sustaining a citys plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. We conclude that the evidence before the trial court conclusively proved that the alleged defective condition does not fall within the narrow class of defects that are special defects under section 101.022(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Because the plaintiff has not shown that the trial court reversibly erred, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On or about June 28, 2015, appellant/plaintiff Jason Kownslar was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in downtown Houston, Texas. At his deposition Kownslar testified as follows:
• While driving his motorcycle, Kownslar exited Interstate 45 and got on Rusk Street.
• Kownslar was traveling in the right lane of Rusk Street heading toward the intersection with Bagby Street.
• Kownslar came to a part of Rusk Street where a light-rail track joins the street.
• When Kownslar reached that part of the street, he saw the light-rail track.
• The front tire of Kownslars motorcycle got stuck in the “cut-out, the divot that was the space in between that [one of the rails of the] track is laid in.”
• Kownslar stated that his tire got stuck in the space for “the first rail that [he] would have come across from that direction.”
• The back tire of Kownslars motorcycle “was riding in the track as well.”
• Kownslar was traveling at a speed of “10, 15 miles per hour.”
• Kownslar drove for a period of time with his tires like that, and he was applying his brakes.
• Kownslar tried to change lanes and “felt the resistance of the tire on the edge of the concrete.” The motorcycle would not exit the place where it was wedged in the light-rail track.
• The back tire “fishtailed” and Kownslar was thrown into the air over the front of the motorcycle.
• Kownslar landed on the back of his neck, and he slid on the pavement towards the intersection. Kownslar did not make contact with another vehicle.
Kownslar filed this lawsuit, originally suing only Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas (“Metro”) and later adding the City of Houston (the “City”) and other parties as defendants. In his live pleading, Kownslar asserted against the City (1) a negligence claim based on an alleged special defect in the roadway (the “Special Defect Claim”), and (2) a negligence claim based on the Citys purported negligence in allegedly “failing to design, construct, properly implement[,] and maintain the metro rail track in question in a reasonably safe condition and free of hazards to [Kownslar] and other members of the public traveling on the roadway” (the “Negligent Activity Claim”). In the pleading, Kownslar cited the Texas Tort Claims Act as the basis for a waiver of the Citys governmental immunity.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it asserted that the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive the Citys governmental immunity as to the Negligent Activity Claim, and Kownslar has not established a waiver of the Citys governmental immunity as to this claim. In addition, the City asserted that its immunity from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity has not been waived as to the Special Defect Claim because: (1) the City does not own or occupy the light-rail track in question; (2) the condition of this track is not a special defect; (3) the light-rail track in question did not create an unreasonable risk of harm; and (4) Kownslar was warned of the condition. The City attached a consent agreement between the City and Metro (the “Agreement”), the transcript of Kownslars deposition, and four photographs of Rusk Street. The City asserted that the evidence showed that the Citys governmental immunity had not been waived.
Kownslar responded in opposition to the Citys jurisdictional plea, and the only evidence Kownslar submitted was the Agreement. After an oral hearing, the trial court sustained the Citys jurisdictional plea and dismissed Kownslars claims against the City with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court later severed Kownslars claims against the City into a separate case to make this ruling final and appealable. Kownslar has timely appealed.
II. Issues and Analysis
The City is entitled to immunity from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity unless the Citys governmental immunity has been waived. See City of Houston v. Gonzales, No. 14-19-00768-CV, 2021 WL 2586242, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Kownslar asserted two claims against the City in the trial court: (1) the Special Defect Claim, and (2) the Negligent Activity Claim. The trial court granted the Citys jurisdictional plea as to both claims. On appeal, Kownslar has not discussed the Negligent Activity Claim, asserted that the Citys immunity has been waived as to the Negligent Activity Claim, or briefed any argument challenging the trial courts judgment as to the Negligent Activity Claim. Thus, we need only determine whether the trial court erred in granting the jurisdictional plea as to the Special Defect Claim.
A. Did the evidence conclusively prove that the condition of the light-rail track was not a special defect?
In his first issue, Kownslar asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the Citys jurisdictional plea because the City failed to meet its burden to conclusively negate the challenged jurisdictional facts. Under this issue, Kownslar asserts that the evidence before the trial court did not conclusively prove that the condition of the light-rail track was not a special defect.
The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of a governmental units sovereign or governmental immunity, allowing suits to be brought against the governmental unit “only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances.” Tex. Dept of Crim. Just. v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). “Given the Legislatures preference for a limited immunity waiver,” courts must strictly construe the Acts waiver provisions. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015). In the Texas Tort Claims Act, the Legislature waived a governmental units immunity from suit and liability as to claims seeking to hold the governmental unit liable for personal injury caused by a condition of real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (West, Westlaw through 2021 C.S.). Subject to certain exceptions, if a claim against a governmental unit arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022 (West, Westlaw through 2021 C.S.). This limitation on a governmental units duty “does not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets.”
1
Id. When a special defect exists, the governmental unit owes the same duty to the claimant that a private landowner owes to an invitee. Tex. Dept of Transp. v. Perches, 388 S.W.3d 652, 654–55 (Tex. 2012).
Whether a condition is a special defect is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 655. The Legislature does not define “special defects” but likens them to conditions “such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b); see The Univ. of Texas at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex. 2010). The Supreme Court of Texas has determined that conditions can be special defects only if they pose a threat to the ordinary users of a particular roadway. See id.; Denton County v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. 2009). A court cannot classify a condition as a special defect if the defect is not like an excavation or obstruction on a roadway. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 331–32. In deciding whether a condition is a special defect, the Supreme Court of Texas has considered characteristics of the class of special defect, such as (1) the size of the condition, (2) whether the condition unexpectedly and physically impairs a vehicles ability to travel on the road, (3) whether the condition presents some unusual quality apart from the ordinary course of events, and (4) whether the condition presents an unexpected and unusual danger to the ordinary users of the roadway. See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116.
The class of special defects contemplated by the statute is narrow. Id. Courts determine whether a condition is a special defect based on the objective expectations of an “ordinary user” who follows the “normal course of travel.” Id. A claimants subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge of a condition is not relevant to a courts determination of whether the condition is a special defect. See Perches, 388 S.W.3d at 655.
In filing its jurisdictional plea, the City challenged the trial courts subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we conduct a de novo review of the trial courts granting of the plea. Tex. Dept of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In its plea, the City challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts, so we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do. See id. If the evidence created a fact question as to the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court should have denied the plea. See id. at 227–28. But, if the relevant evidence was undisputed or failed to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court should have ruled on the plea as a matter of law. Id. at 228.
The photographs in evidence show the part of Rusk Street at issue in this case is a one-way street. Kownslar testified in his deposition that he was traveling on his motorcycle in the right lane of Rusk Street heading toward the intersection with Bagby Street when Kownslar came to a part of Rusk Street where a light-rail track joins the street. At that point Kownslar stated that the front tire of his motorcycle got stuck in the “cut-out, the divot that was the space in between that [one of the rails of the] track is laid in,” and the back tire of his motorcycle “was riding in the track as well.” Kownslar stated that his tire got stuck in the space for “the first rail that [he] would have come across from that direction.”
On appeal, Kownslar asserts that the width of the space in which each rail is laid presents an unexpected and unusual danger as evidenced by Kownslars motorcycle tire getting caught in that space. We presume for the purposes of our analysis that the space in which each rail is laid on the part of Rusk Street in question is wide enough for Kownslars front tire to get caught in the space and that this width constitutes a defect (the “Alleged Defect”). The photographs submitted by the City show that Rusk Street is a concrete roadway and that a light-rail track enters into Rusk Street from the left and then enters completely within the far-right lane. The photos show that each of the two rails of the track is embedded in the concrete of the roadway in a space in the streets concrete. The photographs show the light-rail track entering the far-right lane of Rusk Street before the intersection with Bagby Street. The photographs show that there are two spaces in the concrete each of which contains one of the rails of the light-rail track. Though the evidence does not contain a close-up photograph of the spaces or the rails, the photographs submitted by the City show that the two spaces do not take up a significant amount of the width of the far-right lane of Rusk Street.
The Alleged Defect is nothing like the special defect found to exist in Harris County v. Eaton. See 573 S.W.2d 177, 178–80 (Tex. 1978); see also City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 764–66 (Tex. 2012) (holding that a two-inch to five-inch difference in a streets elevation was not a special defect and stating that the allegedly defective depression in the street was nothing like the special defect found to exist in Eaton). The Eaton case involved an abnormally large hole in the road. See Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 178–80. This hole varied from six to ten inches in depth and was four feet wide at some parts and nine feet wide at other parts. See id. at 178. The hole extended over ninety percent of the width of the highway. See id. In Eaton, the Supreme Court of Texas commented that the condition “reached the proportions of a ditch across the highway” Id. at 179. The high court also observed that “one could not stay on the pavement and miss it.” Id. at 178.
Unlike the roadways condition in Eaton, the Alleged Defect did not physically impair an ordinary users ability to travel on Rusk Street, even an ordinary user riding a motorcycle. See Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 766 (concluding that an allegedly defective depression in the street did not physically impair the ability to travel on the street). Rather, the photographs submitted by the City show that an ordinary user riding a motorcycle on Rusk Street could have avoided the Alleged Defect without leaving Rusk Street or entering a lane of oncoming traffic
2
by crossing the two spaces containing the rails at a ninety-degree angle or an angle close thereto and travelling in the next lane over from the far-right lane.
3
See id. at 764–66 (holding a two-inch to five-inch difference in elevation in a street was not a special defect and stating that photographs indicated that the allegedly defective depression in the street could have been avoided without leaving the street or entering a lane of oncoming traffic).
We base our determination as to whether the Alleged Defect is a special defect on the objective expectations of the ordinary users of Rusk Street who follow the normal course of travel. See Perches, 388 S.W.3d at 655; Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116. Kownslars subjective lack of knowledge of the Alleged Defect is not relevant to this courts determination of whether the Alleged Defect is a special defect. See id. The Alleged Defect does not present some unusual quality apart from the ordinary course of events, nor does the Alleged Defect present an unexpected and unusual danger to the ordinary users of Rusk Street. See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116. Based on the objective expectations of the ordinary users of Rusk Street, the Alleged Defect does not pose a threat to these ordinary users. See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116; Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 331. The Alleged Defect is not an excavation or obstruction on Rusk Street, nor is the Alleged Defect like an excavation or obstruction on Rusk Street. See Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 331–32. We conclude that the evidence before the trial court conclusively proved that the Alleged Defect is not within the narrow class of defects that are special defects under section 101.022(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b); Perches, 388 S.W.3d at 655–56; Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116–17; Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 331–33.
Kownslar contends that the photographs submitted by the City were insufficient. Kownslar asserts that the Alleged Defect is not readily apparent in the photographs. Though the City did not submit a close-up photograph of either rail or the space in which the rail is embedded, the photographs and the other evidence submitted by the City provide adequate information to determine, as a matter of law, that the Alleged Defect is not a special defect. See Tex. Dept of Transp. v. Pierce, No. 12-19-00260-CV, 2020 WL 500779, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule Kownslars first issue.
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B. Did the trial court err in sustaining the Citys jurisdictional plea because the Citys jurisdictional challenge implicated the merits of Kownslars claim and because genuine issues of fact exist as to the jurisdictional issues?
In his second issue Kownslar asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the Citys jurisdictional plea because the Citys jurisdictional challenge implicated the merits of Kownslars claim and because genuine issues of fact exist as to the jurisdictional issues. Kownslar argues that when there is a genuine fact issue as to a jurisdictional fact that is intertwined with the merits, the trial court cannot grant a jurisdictional plea. In a case in which the jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of a plaintiffs claim and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court reviews the relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. If the evidence creates a fact question as to the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder. See id. at 227–28. But, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. See id. at 228.
Kownslar did not submit any new evidence in response to the Citys jurisdictional plea. As discussed in section II.A. above, this court determines as a matter of law whether the Alleged Defect is a special defect, and the evidence before the trial court conclusively proved that the Alleged Defect is not within the narrow class of defects that are special defects under section 101.022(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b); Perches, 388 S.W.3d at 655–56 (determining as a matter of law that concrete guardrail did not constitute a special defect); Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 115–17 (determining as a matter of law that a metal chain blocking a driveway did not constitute a special defect); Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 330–33 (determining as a matter of law that a seventeen-foot floodgate arm located about three feet off of a two-lane rural roadway did not constitute a special defect). We overrule the second issue.
C. Did the trial court impermissibly consider arguments that exceeded a jurisdictional challenge or that were raised for the first time during the oral hearing on the Citys jurisdictional plea?
In his third issue Kownslar asserts that the trial court impermissibly considered arguments that exceeded a jurisdictional challenge or that were raised for the first time during the oral hearing on the Citys jurisdictional plea. The trial court sustained the Citys jurisdictional plea without specifying any ground on which the trial court sustained the plea. If the trial court signs an order sustaining a plea to the jurisdiction without specifying in the order the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm if any of the independent grounds in the jurisdictional plea has merit. See Shannon v. Meml Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
Kownslar asserts that a review of the reporters record from the oral hearing on the jurisdictional plea demonstrates that the trial court erroneously considered arguments by the City that exceeded a jurisdictional challenge and issues raised for the first time at the oral hearing. We presume, without deciding, that the trial court erroneously considered arguments by the City that exceeded the scope of a proper jurisdictional challenge and that the trial court erred in considering issues raised for the first time at the oral hearing on the jurisdictional plea. Even under this presumption, we cannot reverse the trial courts judgment unless we conclude that this error (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). The City raised in its jurisdictional plea the ground as to whether the Alleged Defect was a special defect, and this ground is a proper basis for a jurisdictional challenge by the City. See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116–17. After reviewing the record, we conclude that, even under the above presumption, the trial courts error did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment and did not probably prevent Kownslar from properly presenting the case to this court. See id.; In re Estate of Gibbons, 451 S.W.3d 115, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Thus, no harm resulted from any such error, and we overrule Kownslars third issue.
III. Conclusion
The evidence before the trial court conclusively proved that the Alleged Defect does not fall within the narrow class of defects that are special defects under section 101.022(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. There is no genuine fact issue as to whether the Alleged Defect constitutes a special defect. Presuming, without deciding, that the trial court erroneously considered arguments by the City that exceeded the scope of a proper jurisdictional challenge and that the trial court erred in considering issues raised for the first time at the oral hearing on the jurisdictional plea, any such error was harmless. Having overruled all of Kownslars issues, we affirm the trial courts judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which concludes that the alleged defective condition does not constitute a special defect under § 101.022(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b). I believe that the evidence before the trial court conclusively proved that the condition of the light-rail track was a special defect. Furthermore, I believe the other grounds asserted by the City of Houston (“the City”) in its plea to the jurisdiction are unmeritorious. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial courts order granting the Citys plea to the jurisdiction.
A “defect” is an imperfection, a shortcoming, or lack of something necessary for completion. City of Houston v. Rushing, 7 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). The Texas Tort Claims Act defines “special defect” by listing examples of defects “such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b); Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex. 2010). The statutory list is not exclusive. Tex. Dept of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam); City of Grapevine v. Roberts, 946 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). To be a special defect, the condition must be of the same kind or class as those listed in the statute. York, 284 S.W.3d at 847; City of Houston v. Joh, 359 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 764 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam).
In determining whether a particular condition is like an excavation or obstruction and therefore a special defect, courts consider several helpful characteristics, including but not limited to: (1) the size of the condition; (2) whether the condition unexpectedly and physically impairs an ordinary users ability to travel on the road; (3) whether the condition presents some unusual quality apart from the ordinary course of events; and (4) whether the condition presents an unexpected and unusual danger. Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 765 (citing Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116). We also consider the objective expectations of an “ordinary user” who follows the “normal course of travel.” Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116. Whether a condition is a special defect is a question of law. Tex. Dept of Transp. v. Perches, 388 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. 2012).
Here, the divot, which is part of the light-rail tracks located in lanes of traffic in the street, is not a common pothole or other similar depression in the street. Cf. Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 766 (“Such irregularities in the roadway unfortunately are to be expected.”). It is not open, obvious, or predictable; it is unexpected and unusual. See Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605, 607 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (“We have described the class of conditions intended by the statute as those which, because of their size or ‘some unusual quality outside the ordinary course of events,’ ․ pose ‘an unexpected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways.’ ”); cf. Wildermuth v. Parker County, 1 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that the small trees and brush growing inside the curve where the impact occurred were neither unexpected nor unusual, and thus, did not constitute a special defect as a matter of law.”). It cannot be said that an ordinary user who follows the normal course of travel would expect the divot in the street to present the hazard encountered by Kownslar. The divot in the road unexpectedly and physically impairs ordinary motorcycle users’ ability to travel on the road by obstructing a motorcyclists path on Rusk Street and allowing a motorcycles tire to become lodged in it, while subsequently preventing the motorcyclist from dislodging the tire and reentering the roadway. See, e.g., Tex. Dept of Transp. v. Ramirez, 566 S.W.3d 18, 24–25 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied) (concluding that eight-inch drop-off along shoulder of a road was a special defect because it prevented a cars wheels from reentering the roadway); Morse v. State, 905 S.W.2d 470, 475–76 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (same but concerning six-inch drop-off). Further, the condition presents an unusual quality apart from the ordinary course of events because it is unusual that a divot on the street on which motorcycles travel would allow for a motorcycle tire to become lodged in an area of a lane of traffic.
These facts make this case distinguishable from the line of cases relied on by the majority, which concern accidents that did not pose a risk to ordinary users of the road or to their normal course of travel. Cf. Perches, 388 S.W.3d at 656 (“Here, the concrete guardrail became an impediment only when Perches missed his turn and proceeded off the road and therefore does not pose a risk to ordinary users of the road.”); Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116 (“Hayes did not take the normal course of travel. Road users in the normal course of travel should turn back or take an alternate route when a barricade is erected to alert them of a closed roadway.”); Denton County v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. 2009) (“Our cases rest on the objective expectations of an ‘ordinary user,’ and such a driver would not be expected to careen uncontrollably off the paved roadway and into the adjoining grass, as [the driver] admitted when he stated that the ‘normal course of travel for [Old Alton Road] would be the asphalt pavement.”). The majority also states that the divot is not a special defect because a motorcyclist may simply go around and avoid the divots, but that conclusion is not supported by the record, which includes an aerial photograph of the scene.
As evidenced by this aerial photo, the light-rail tracks are almost parallel with the left lane of traffic on Rusk Street for a brief portion of the road before gradually making their way across all lanes of traffic on Rusk Street at a slight angle. See Harris County v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. 1978); see also City of Weston v. Gaudette, 287 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Contrary to the majoritys conclusion, a motorcyclist does not have the option of crossing over the tracks that intersect Rusk Street at a ninety-degree angle, nor does a motorcyclist have the ability to simply go around the tracks. For motorcyclists, such as Kownslar, the light-rail tracks on Rusk Street obstruct their travel on the road in a way similar to a ditch. See Reyes, 335 S.W.3d at 607 (“ ‘A ditch across the highway’ is a special defect.” (quoting Eaton, 573 S.W.2d at 178–79)). Accordingly, I would conclude that the divot here is an obstruction on the road, and thus, a special defect. See Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116; Beynon, 283 S.W.3d at 331.
I would further conclude that the other bases asserted by the City in its plea are unmeritorious, and thus, the trial courts order granting the plea to the jurisdiction should be reversed. In its plea, the City also argued that Kownslar had not pleaded a waiver of the Citys sovereign immunity because: (1) the City did not design or build the light-rail tracks, nor does the City own or maintain the light-rail tracks; (2) the light-rail tracks are not unreasonably dangerous; and (3) Kownslar was warned of the condition of the light-rail tracks. In essence, these three bases argue that the City did not owe a duty to Kownslar. But whether the City owed a duty to Kownslar goes to the merits of Kownslars claim.
When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas, 544 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the plaintiffs favor. Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492; see Tex. Dept of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
Here, there is evidence in the plea-to-the-jurisdiction record that supports a conclusion that: (1) the City played a role in the design and approval of the design of the light-rail tracks and that the City plays a role in the operation and maintenance of the tracks; (2) the light-rail tracks can be unreasonably dangerous because they allow a motorcycle tire to become lodged in the tracks without the ability for a motorist to remove it; and (3) although there was a rail-road crossing sign, the sign did not warn of the danger posed to motorcyclists by the light-rail tracks. Therefore, issues of fact existed that should have prevented the trial court from granting the Citys plea to the jurisdiction. See Ahmed v. Metro. Transit Auth., 257 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, we cannot affirm dismissal based upon the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue must be resolved by the fact finder.” (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28)). Because of these foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1
. The other exceptions do not apply to the alleged facts that are the basis of Kownslars suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022.
2
. The photographs in evidence show that this part of Rusk Street is a one-way street, so there was no lane of oncoming traffic nearby.
3
. Kownslar testified at his deposition that he had the ability to choose the next lane over from the far-right lane, but Kownslar said he did not choose this lane because it is a turn lane. The photographs in evidence show that this lane goes straight ahead and is not a turn lane.
4
. When, as in this case, the order sustaining a plea to the jurisdiction does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court relied, we must affirm if any of the independent grounds in the jurisdictional plea has merit. See Shannon v. Meml Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., 476 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). Thus, we need not and do not address the other grounds that the City asserted in its jurisdictional plea as to why its governmental immunity was not waived as to the Special Defect Claim.
Randy Wilson, Justice
(Poissant, J., dissenting).