DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Randy Sue Marber, J.), entered September 26, 2019. The order granted the defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
Christopher Yerry (hereinafter Yerry) commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell on a puddle of liquid inside the defendants supermarket. The Supreme Court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and Yerry appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Yerry died, and Judith Yerry, as administrator of Yerrys estate, was substituted for Yerry.
“A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it” (Sloane v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 A.D.3d 522, 523, 855 N.Y.S.2d 155 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “ ‘Once a defendant has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, the defendant has a reasonable time to undertake remedial actions that are reasonable and appropriate under all of the circumstances’ ” (Generoso v. Millers Ale House, Inc., 185 A.D.3d 791, 792, 125 N.Y.S.3d 569, quoting Friedman v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 302 A.D.2d 491, 491–492, 755 N.Y.S.2d 412). “The courts function on a motion for summary judgment is not to resolve issues of fact or to determine matters of credibility but merely to determine whether such issues exist” (Doize v. Holiday Inn Ronkonkoma, 6 A.D.3d 573, 574, 774 N.Y.S.2d 792 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Yerry as the nonmovant, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the accident was not the result of the defendants failure to take appropriate remedial measures within a reasonable period of time after acquiring actual notice of a hazardous condition (see Generoso v. Millers Ale House, Inc., 185 A.D.3d at 792, 125 N.Y.S.3d 569). The evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants employees made the condition “more hazardous by incomplete remedial measures” (Ruic v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 51 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 858 N.Y.S.2d 761).
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the defendants, including, inter alia, Yerrys deposition testimony, failed to establish, prima facie, that the subject condition was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Rosenman v. Siwiec, 196 A.D.3d 523, 525; Robbins v. 237 Ave. X, LLC, 177 A.D.3d 799, 800).
Contrary to Yerrys contention, in deciding the motion, the Supreme Court properly considered the unsigned but certified transcript of the deposition of the defendants employee (see Siyunova v. 5420 Mgt. Corp., 203 A.D.3d 975; David v. Chong Sun Lee, 106 A.D.3d 1044, 1045, 967 N.Y.S.2d 80), as well as the unsigned but certified transcripts of the plaintiffs deposition (see Celestin v. 40 Empire Blvd., Inc., 168 A.D.3d 805, 808).
Accordingly, since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, the Supreme Court should have denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint without regard to the sufficiency of Yerrys opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).
DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, ROMAN and FORD, JJ., concur.