DECISION & ORDER
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Stephen M. Clair, Jr., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (John H. Rouse, J.), dated November 1, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant, to strike his answer and counterclaims, and for an order of reference, and denied that branch of that defendants cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On January 26, 2007, the defendant Stephen M. Clair, Jr., executed a note in favor of First Franklin Financial Corp., an op. sub. of MLB & T Co., FSB. The note was secured by a mortgage on real property in Kings Park.
The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage in March 2017, alleging that Clair had defaulted under the loan terms by failing to make the payment due on May 1, 2011. The complaint stated that the plaintiff was electing to declare the entire principal balance due. In his answer, Clair asserted several affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations, and counterclaims.
The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Clair, to strike his answer and counterclaims, and for an order of reference. Clair opposed the plaintiffs motion and cross-moved, among other things, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred. Clair submitted evidence that in July 2008, the plaintiffs predecessor in interest commenced an action to foreclose the subject mortgage, alleging that Clair defaulted on making payments on the loan on April 1, 2008, and electing to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage (hereinafter the 2008 action). Clair also submitted evidence that, following his default in appearing, the 2008 action was discontinued by a stipulation of discontinuance. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion and denied that branch of Clairs cross motion. Clair appeals.
An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4]). Separate causes of action accrue for each unpaid installment, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date each installment becomes due (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Joseph, 159 A.D.3d 968, 970, 73 N.Y.S.3d 238). Once a mortgage debt is accelerated, however, the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt (see Milone v. U.S. Bank N.A., 164 A.D.3d 145, 151, 83 N.Y.S.3d 524; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Joseph, 159 A.D.3d at 970, 73 N.Y.S.3d 238). Acceleration occurs, among other possibilities, by “the filing of a verified complaint seeking foreclosure and containing a sworn statement that the noteholder is demanding repayment of the entire outstanding debt” (Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d 1, 22, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912; see Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472, 476, 180 N.E. 176). A lenders revocation of its election to accelerate the mortgage can be accomplished by an “ ‘affirmative act’ ” of the noteholder within six years of the election to accelerate (Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d at 29, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912, quoting NMNT Realty Corp. v. Knoxville 2012 Trust, 151 A.D.3d 1068, 1069, 58 N.Y.S.3d 118). “[W]here acceleration occurred by virtue of the filing of a complaint in a foreclosure action, the noteholders voluntary discontinuance of that action constitutes an affirmative act of revocation of that acceleration as a matter of law, absent an express, contemporaneous statement to the contrary by the noteholder” (Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d at 32, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912).
Here, in opposing the plaintiffs motion and in support of his cross motion, Clair established, prima facie, that the mortgage debt was accelerated when the 2008 action was commenced (see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d at 22, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Baquero, 192 A.D.3d 660, 661, 143 N.Y.S.3d 400). However, his evidence also established that the acceleration of the debt was revoked when the 2008 action was voluntarily discontinued in November 2012 (see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d at 32, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912). Since the 2008 action was voluntarily discontinued less than six years after the initial acceleration, the statute of limitations had not run on the entire debt when the instant action was commenced (see id. at 34, 146 N.Y.S.3d 542, 169 N.E.3d 912; Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Heampstead Prop. Ventures II, LLC, 205 A.D.3d 843, 165 N.Y.S.3d 896, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 03142 [2d Dept.]).
Accordingly, Clair failed to demonstrate that the instant action was time-barred.
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., RIVERA, CHAMBERS and DOWLING, JJ., concur.