DECISION & ORDER
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (IDV Part) (Sherri I. Eisenpress, J.), dated March 25, 2021. The interlocutory judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon a decision of the same court dated December 9, 2020, made after a nonjury trial, awarded the plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ child and permitted her to relocate with the parties’ child to Ireland. By decision and order on motion dated May 12, 2021, this Court granted that branch of the defendants motion which was to stay enforcement of so much of the interlocutory judgment as permitted the plaintiff to relocate with the parties’ child to Ireland pending the hearing and determination of the appeal.
ORDERED that the interlocutory judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff, who is a dual citizen of the United States and Ireland, and the defendant, who is a citizen of Ireland, married in 2015, and lived and worked in New York. They have one child, who was born in 2016. Both parties have traveled frequently to Ireland to visit extended family. In October 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, a judgment of divorce, sole legal and physical custody of the child, and permission to relocate with the child to Ireland. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child and permitted her to relocate with the child to Ireland. The defendant appeals.
“ ‘The courts paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child’ ” (Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208, quoting Matter of Julie v. Wills, 73 A.D.3d 777, 777, 899 N.Y.S.2d 669; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260). In determining a childs best interests, the court must consider, among other things, “(1) which alternative will best promote stability; (2) the available home environments; (3) the past performance of each parent; (4) each parents relative fitness, including his or her ability to guide the child, provide for the childs overall well being, and foster the childs relationship with the noncustodial parent; and (5) the childs desires” (Matter of Supangkat v. Torres, 101 A.D.3d 889, 890, 954 N.Y.S.2d 915). Custody determinations depend to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, and therefore, deference is accorded to the trial courts findings in this regard (see Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d at 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208). Such findings will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see id.; see also Matter of Frankiv v. Kalitka, 105 A.D.3d 1045, 963 N.Y.S.2d 393). Here, the Supreme Courts determination that the childs best interests would be served by awarding sole legal and physical custody to the plaintiff has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed (see Matter of Mahoney v. Ramos–Ortiz, 184 A.D.3d 564, 123 N.Y.S.3d 525; Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208; Matter of Gasby v. Chung, 88 A.D.3d 709, 930 N.Y.S.2d 471).
Additionally, the Supreme Courts determination permitting the plaintiff to relocate with the child to Ireland is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record. “ ‘A parent seeking ․ to relocate with a child bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed move would be in the childs best interests’ ” (Matter of Hall v. Clas, 144 A.D.3d 801, 802, 40 N.Y.S.3d 557, quoting Matter of Ventura v. Huggins, 141 A.D.3d 600, 600, 34 N.Y.S.3d 599 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “In determining whether relocation is appropriate, each ‘request must be considered on its own merits with due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances and with predominant emphasis being placed on what outcome is most likely to serve the best interests of the child’ ” (Matter of Estevez v. Perez, 123 A.D.3d 707, 708, 998 N.Y.S.2d 413, quoting Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 739, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575, 665 N.E.2d 145; see Matter of Rizvi v. Shah, 126 A.D.3d 984, 984, 6 N.Y.S.3d 139). “[T]he court must consider a number of factors, including the childs relationship with each parent, the effect of the move on contact with the noncustodial parent, the potential economic, emotional, and educational enhancement to the lives of the custodial parent and the child due to the move, and each parents motives for seeking or opposing the move” (Matter of Barker v. Rohack, 173 A.D.3d 1173, 1174, 105 N.Y.S.3d 478 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d at 740–741, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575, 665 N.E.2d 145). “The weighing of these various factors requires an evaluation of the testimony, character, and sincerity of all the parties involved,” and “deference is accorded to the Family Courts findings in this regard” (Matter of Feery v. Feury, 168 A.D.3d 729, 730, 92 N.Y.S.3d 146; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173–174, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260).
Here, the Supreme Court found credible the plaintiffs testimony that she was the childs primary caregiver, that the defendant had engaged in alcohol abuse and subjected the plaintiff to instances of domestic violence and verbal abuse, and that if she were permitted to relocate with the child to Ireland, the childs quality of life would be improved. In Ireland, the plaintiff and the child could live cost free in a guest house on the maternal grandparents’ property, the cost of living in the town was less than it is in New York, where the parties were struggling financially, and in Ireland the plaintiff had been offered a job as a clerical administrator in a nursing home. In addition, the plaintiff would have her parents, siblings, and cousins in the vicinity to offer her support, as well as the defendants extended family. The court properly concluded that, while relocation would disrupt the defendants regular contact with the child, meaningful extended vacations could compensate for the loss of regular visitation (see Matter of Yu Chao Tan v. Hong Shan Kuang, 136 A.D.3d 933, 935, 25 N.Y.S.3d 339; Matter of Ceballos v. Leon, 134 A.D.3d 931, 21 N.Y.S.3d 353; Matter of Tracy A.G. v. Undine J., 105 A.D.3d 1046, 963 N.Y.S.2d 383; Tsui v. Tsui, 99 A.D.3d 793, 951 N.Y.S.2d 882; Matter of Harrsch v. Jesser 74 A.D.3d 811, 902 N.Y.S.2d 183).
DILLON, J.P., ROMAN, MALTESE and GENOVESI, JJ., concur.