OPINION
Under federal immigration law, a non-citizen may be removed from the country if he has been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT). 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A). The question before us is whether voluntary manslaughter under California law qualifies as a CIMT. We hold that it does because voluntary manslaughter requires the defendant to cause the death of a person with intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life. We thus deny Jose Ortiz Narezs petition challenging the Board of Immigrations (BIA) final order of removal.
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BACKGROUND
Ortiz entered the United States from Mexico as a lawful permanent resident at a young age. While in this country, Ortiz amassed an extensive juvenile and adult criminal history. Relevant here, he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of California Penal Code (CPC) § 192(a) in 1984 and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.
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Ortiz was also later convicted of corporal punishment or injury of a child in violation of CPC § 273d in 2002.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A), the Attorney General can order the removal of a non-citizen who either (i) was convicted within five years of entering the United States of a CIMT that may be punishable by a sentence of one year or longer, or (ii) was convicted of two or more CIMTs not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Ortiz with a Notice to Appear charging him with removability because he committed crimes of moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. DHS alleged that Ortiz was convicted of manslaughter in violation of CPC § 192(a) and corporal punishment or injury of child in violation of CPC § 273d.
Ortiz moved to terminate his removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Ortiz was removable because his convictions for child abuse and voluntary manslaughter were categorically CIMTs. She rejected Ortizs argument that voluntary manslaughter is not a CIMT, explaining that the BIA “has consistently found voluntary manslaughter to be a CIMT.” Because both convictions involved different victims and occurred nearly twenty years apart, the IJ determined that the convictions did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal conduct.
Ortiz appealed the IJs decision to the BIA. The BIA denied Ortizs motion to terminate and dismissed his appeal, reiterating that voluntary manslaughter under CPC § 192(a) is a CIMT. Relying on California state cases, the BIA held that voluntary manslaughter—despite not requiring a specific intent to kill—qualifies as a CIMT because it involves moral depravity. See People v. Lasko, 23 Cal.4th 101, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666 (2000); People v. Coad, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1107–08, 226 Cal.Rptr. 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Parrish, 170 Cal. App. 3d 336, 350, 217 Cal.Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). Ortiz then timely petitioned for review with this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo whether a state conviction constitutes a CIMT for removal purposes. Romero-Mendoza v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011).
ANALYSIS
I. Voluntary Manslaughter Under California Law Qualifies as a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.
This court uses a two-step categorical approach to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a CIMT. Fugow v. Barr, 943 F.3d 456, 458 (9th Cir. 2019). First, the court determines the elements of the state crime, reviewing de novo the BIAs conclusions. Vinh Tan Nguyen v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014). Second, the court “compare[s] the elements of the statute of conviction to the generic [federal] definition of a crime of moral turpitude and decide[s] whether the conviction meets that definition.” Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We give some deference to the BIAs assessment under this second step because of its expertise with this issue.
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A. California requires a culpable mental state—an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life—for voluntary manslaughter.
The first step of our analysis requires determining the elements of voluntary manslaughter under California law. See Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). California defines voluntary manslaughter as the “unlawful killing of a human being without malice ․ upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” CPC § 192(a). The California Supreme Court, in turn, has construed the voluntary manslaughter statute as requiring some form of culpable mental state—an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life. People v. Bryant, 56 Cal.4th 959, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d 1136, 1141 (2013).
Latching onto the “without malice” language in the statute, Ortiz argues that Californias voluntary manslaughter statute—unlike the federal definition of a crime of moral turpitude—has no scienter or intent requirement. If California does not require scienter for voluntary manslaughter, then it cannot be a CIMT because those crimes generally require some culpable intent. See Leal, 771 F.3d at 1146. But California courts have rejected Ortizs interpretation of the statute. As the California Supreme Court put it, it has “never suggested that [voluntary manslaughter] could be committed without either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life.” Bryant, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d at 1141. The statutes reference to “without malice” merely explains that voluntary manslaughter involves mitigating circumstances (e.g., adequate provocation) that negate the malice aforethought required for murder. It does not mean that voluntary manslaughter lacks any culpable mental state. To the contrary, a conscious disregard for life or specific intent to kill is still required. See id., 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d at 1142.
In sum, the elements of voluntary manslaughter in California require: (1) a human was killed; (2) the killing was unlawful; (3) the perpetrator of the killing either intended to kill the alleged victim or acted in conscious disregard for life; and (4) the perpetrators conduct led to the unlawful killing. See id. 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d at 1141–42.
B. Voluntary manslaughter meets the federal definition of a CIMT because it involves the most serious harm—the unlawful death of a person.
The second step of our categorical analysis requires comparing Californias elements of voluntary manslaughter with the federal definition of a CIMT. Fugow, 943 F.3d at 458. While there is no federal statutory definition of a CIMT, we have defined it as involving “either fraud or base, vile, and depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience.” Id. (citation omitted).
And when comparing a state statute with the federal definition of a CIMT, we consider the requisite state of mind as well as the resulting harm in tandem. Leal, 771 F.3d at 1146. “[A]s the level of conscious behavior decreases, i.e., from intentional to reckless conduct, more serious resulting harm is required in order to find that the crime involves moral turpitude.” Id. (quoting Ceron, 747 F.3d at 783). A crime committed only recklessly thus requires a more serious harm to qualify as a CIMT.
Contrary to Ortizs assertions, a crime committed recklessly can still qualify as a CIMT. In Leal, for example, this court upheld the BIAs determination that an Arizona law barring “recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death” constitutes a CIMT. 771 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1201). Even though the offense only required a state of mind of recklessness, the court found that the “creation of a substantial, actual risk of imminent death is sufficiently reprehensible” to establish a CIMT. Id. at 1146. Here, too, Californias voluntary manslaughter only requires recklessness, but the harm—the unlawful killing of a human—stands at the apex. We thus agree with the BIAs determination that Californias voluntary manslaughter statute qualifies as a CIMT.
Our decision tracks the BIAs prior decisions holding that other states voluntary manslaughter statutes qualify as CIMTs. For example, in Matter of Rosario, the BIA held that Puerto Ricos voluntary manslaughter statute is a CIMT. 15 I. & N. Dec. 416, 416–17 (BIA 1975). Puerto Ricos statute required the “unlawful killing of a human being without malice” for a conviction. Id. Rejecting the respondents argument that “without malice” did not make the offense a CIMT, the BIA reasoned that, under Puerto Ricos law, voluntary manslaughter qualifies as a CIMT. Id. at 417.
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While we had not directly addressed this issue before, we now hold what is obvious: voluntary manslaughter in California qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A).
PETITION FOR REVIEW IS DENIED.
FOOTNOTES
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. We address and reject Ortizs other claims in a separate memorandum disposition.
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. The documents in the record cite California Penal Code § 192.1, but the actual voluntary manslaughter provision at the time of Ortizs conviction was § 192(1). See People v. Thomas, 43 Cal.3d 818, 239 Cal.Rptr. 307, 740 P.2d 419, 423 n.3 (1987). It has since been renumbered to § 192(a), but the text “has remained constant since 1872.” Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 2015). For clarity, we use the current citation throughout this opinion.
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. The court gives Chevron deference to the BIAs conclusion “if the decision is published or directly controlled by a published decision.” Ceron, 747 F.3d at 778. Otherwise, we afford only Skidmore deference. See Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 524–25 (9th Cir. 2011). Under Skidmore, the measure of deference varies “depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). Because the BIA dismissed Ortizs appeal in an unpublished order and did not rely on a directly controlling decision, we only afford Skidmore deference to the BIAs second step analysis.
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. See also, e.g., Matter of Sanchez-Linn, 20 I. & N. Dec. 362, 366 (BIA 1991) (noting that voluntary manslaughter is a CIMT); Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111, 113 (BIA 1981) (holding that New Yorks voluntary manslaughter statute is a CIMT); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269, 269 (BIA 1975) (holding that Ohios voluntary manslaughter statute is a CIMT); Matter of Ptasi, 12 I. & N. Dec. 790, 791 (BIA 1968) (holding that Connecticuts voluntary manslaughter statute is a CIMT).
LEE, Circuit Judge: