MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary and Issue
[1] J.S. (“Mother”) and D.L.S. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of A.S., D.S., T.S., and Z.S. (collectively, “Children”). In late 2019, the Children were each adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and in January 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Parents’ parental rights. On September 27, 2021, the juvenile court issued an order making findings and concluding Parents’ parental rights should be terminated. Mother now individually appeals, raising one issue which we restate as whether sufficient evidence supported the termination of Mothers parental rights. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In September 2019, DCS received a report that the Children were victims of neglect and that Parents were using drugs in their home. DCS visited Parents’ home and observed that it lacked electricity; electrical wires were exposed; the floors, walls, and ceiling were in disrepair; food in the refrigerator and freezer was spoiled; and Mother exhibited signs of domestic violence. DCS told Parents that repairs had to be made and gave them a deadline for those repairs to be completed. Prior to the deadline, DCS returned to Parents’ home on three separate occasions, but many of the repairs were never made. During the final two visits, DCS believed that Parents were under the influence, however, Parents refused to submit to a drug screen. As a result, DCS did not believe the safety of the Children could be ensured and the Children were removed from Parents’ care.
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Subsequently, DCS filed a verified petition alleging the Children to be CHINS.
[3] In December 2019, Parents entered an admission, and the juvenile court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. A dispositional hearing was held in early 2020, and the juvenile court ordered Parents, among other things, to: enroll and participate in programs recommended by the family case manager (“FCM”) or service providers; complete recommended assessments; keep all appointments with any service provider, DCS, or the court appointed special advocate (“CASA”); not use or consume any illegal controlled substances; take prescribed medications in doses and frequencies specified by a valid prescription; not permit the possession, use or consumption of any illegal controlled substances in the home or presence of the Children; obey the law; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatments and successfully complete all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; attend all scheduled visitations with the Children and comply with visitation rules and procedures; provide the Children with a safe, secure and nurturing environment free from abuse and neglect; and be effective caregivers who possess the necessary skills to provide the Children with permanency. The permanency plan was reunification.
[4] Following the dispositional hearing, Parents routinely failed to comply with the Childrens case plan. Parents did not schedule appointments with their home-based case manager which led them to being discharged from those services for noncompliance. Despite being referred to multiple individual services, Parents either did not engage or engaged sporadically. Father was referred for a domestic violence assessment and a psychological evaluation which he did not complete. Meanwhile, Mother was referred for outpatient services, individual and group therapy, recovery coach services, and medication management, but infrequently participated with those services. Parents refusal to interact with their providers regularly led to them being discharged from services.
[5] Although Parents did initially attend visitations, their performance was concerning. Father missed visits and Mother brought inappropriate food for the Children, attempted to isolate individual children in order to discuss the case with them, and needed to be redirected to focus on the Children. Parents would also sneak prohibited items to the Children during visits. At multiple visits, Parents appeared to be under the influence, but Parents refused to submit to drug screens to demonstrate their sobriety. Additionally, Parents stalked the Childrens placement families, sat outside their placement homes, and as a result, had unauthorized contact with the Children. In March 2020, Parents’ visitations with the Children were suspended.
[6] Parents’ issues with substance abuse went beyond appearing to be under the influence while at visits. Parents were inconsistent with taking drug screens and when they did submit screens, frequently tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. Mother also regularly tested positive for a prescription drug, Tramadol. Mother had a valid prescription for Tramadol, but the amount of the drug in her system demonstrated that she was greatly exceeding the prescribed dosage. Despite these drug related problems, Parents refused to acknowledge a need for substance abuse treatment. In particular, Mother often indicated that “she can get sober on her own, she didnt need services to do that” and as a result, would disengage from her substance abuse services. Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 46.
[7] In June 2020, due to Parents’ lack of compliance in the CHINS proceedings, the permanency plan was changed from reunification to reunification with a concurrent plan for adoption. After the permanency plan was changed, Parents’ participation in the Childrens case plan did not improve. Parents continued to test positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. Mothers inability to stay sober was particularly alarming in that by November 2020, Mother had completed forty-one drug screens and tested negative for all drugs on only one screen. Parents did not complete any of their recommended services, did not ask for help with services, never had visitations reinstated, and remained adamant that they did not need help attaining sobriety. In late 2020, all of Parents’ services and recommendations were suspended by the juvenile court and the permanency plan was changed to adoption only.
[8] In January 2021, DCS filed a verified petition to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights. Subsequently, Father consented to termination and a fact-finding hearing was held as to Mother in July 2021. At the hearing, DCS presented extensive testimony detailing Mothers failure to adhere to the Childrens case plan. Former FCM Kalaina Baker, current FCM Danielle Haney, CASA Scott McDill, and the Childrens therapist testified that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Haney reasoned that the Children deserve permanency. Haney articulated that over the course of the Childrens case plan, Mother had addressed “[n]one of the concerns” that initiated DCS’ involvement with the Children. Id. at 79. When asked if Mother could remedy the reasons for DCS’ involvement, McDill testified, “[a]bsolutely not.” Id. at 93. Mothers attorney cross-examined nearly all of DCS’ witnesses, but before Mother could provide her own testimony, she disconnected from the hearing and would not answer phone calls and text messages from her attorney and Haney asking her to reconnect to the hearing.
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Mothers attorney did not request a continuance or object to continuing the hearing in Mothers absence and the fact-finding hearing was concluded.
[9] On September 27, 2021, the juvenile court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[10] The right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. S.S. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Nevertheless, the law provides for termination of these constitutionally protected rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the juvenile court. Id.
[11] In deference to the juvenile courts opportunity to assess the evidence, we will not set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship unless clearly erroneous. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts or inferences to support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when the findings do not support the juvenile courts conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
II. Termination
[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides DCS must prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
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(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child
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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
[13] DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231; see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2. If the juvenile court finds that the allegations are true, the parent-child relationship shall be terminated. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[14] On appeal, Mother only challenges the juvenile courts conclusion that termination is in the best interest of the Children.
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In deciding to terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must look at the totality of the evidence and must subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005. Ultimately, a child has a paramount need for permanency, which is a central consideration in determining a childs best interest. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647-48.
[15] In the present case, the Children have been in foster care for over two years. During that same timeframe, Mother has rarely participated in the services required by the Childrens case plan. In March 2020, only five months after the Children were removed from her care, Mothers visitation rights were suspended, and those rights have never been reinstated. Mother sparingly engaged in her recommended individual and group therapy, recovery coach services, and medication management program. As a result, Mother had all of her services discontinued in November 2020. Mothers failure to engage in services designed for reunification is not reflective of an ability to provide the Children with permanency.
[16] Further, the record is replete with examples of Mothers inability to address her substance abuse issues. Despite being ordered by the juvenile court to not use or consume any illegal controlled substances as well as adhere to the proper dosage of her prescriptions, Mother tested positive on forty out of forty-one drug screens. The drug screens also showed that Mother was consuming her prescription for Tramadol at dosages far exceeding the prescribed amount. Nevertheless, Mother has never engaged in help offered by DCS and was adamant that she could get sober on her own. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1006 (reasoning that a mothers failure to address her substance abuse issues, which was also the reason for her childrens removal from her care, demonstrated that mother could not provide her children with the necessary permanency and therefore, termination was in her childrens best interest). Accordingly, Mothers pattern of extensive substance abuse throughout the duration of the CHINS case, despite the fact the Children were originally removed due to substance use in the home and multiple services were offered by DCS to help her achieve sobriety, does not indicate that Mother is capable of providing permanency for the Children any time soon.
[17] Moreover, testimony from the FCM and CASA has regularly been used to support a juvenile courts determination that termination is in a childs best interest. See In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; see also K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235-36. Here, two FCMs, the CASA, and the Childrens therapist each testified that termination of Mothers parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Due to Mothers failure to engage in services designed for reunification, address her substance abuse issues, and provide the Children with permanency, we cannot say the juvenile court erred in determining that termination was in the Childrens best interest.
Conclusion
[18] We conclude sufficient evidence showed that termination of Mothers parental rights is in the Childrens best interest. Therefore, the juvenile courts decision was not clearly erroneous, and we affirm.
[19] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The Children have never been returned to Parents.
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. The hearing was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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. Mother also alleges that she was deprived of due process because she did not have a meaningful opportunity to participate in the termination hearing. See Appellants Brief at 11. However, Mother was present for the majority of the hearing, her attorney cross-examined nearly all of DCS’ witnesses, and the juvenile court gave Mother multiple opportunities to speak privately with her attorney after Mother interrupted the testimony of several witnesses. After Mother disconnected from the hearing and her attorney and DCS were unable to contact her, Mothers attorney agreed to proceed with the hearing in her absence and had the opportunity to present evidence and additional testimony. Mother acknowledges that her attorney agreed to proceed without making a due process challenge and as a result, her due process challenge is waived on appeal. See id.; see also McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that failure to bring a due process challenge in the juvenile court results in waiver on appeal). Accordingly, we need not address Mothers argument.
Robb, Judge.
Riley, J., and Molter, J., concur.