MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Bonnie Katherine Joslin appeals her aggregate sentence of sixty-five years for murder,
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Level 6 felony auto theft,
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Level 6 felony identity deception,
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and Class B misdemeanor false informing.
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Joslin argues the trial court abused its discretion when it did not properly consider her proffered mitigators. Additionally, she contends her sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offenses and her character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History 5
[2] On June 5, 2019, Joslin went to the apartment of her mother, Mona Davis, in Anderson, Indiana. While at the apartment, Joslin and Davis smoked “Katy[
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]” together. (Tr. Vol. I at 166.) Joslin and Davis began to argue because Davis told Joslin that Joslins children were “tainted,” which Joslin took to mean that “her children had been sexually abused.” (Id. at 195-6.) Joslin became upset, “took a pillow from the couch and held it over, uh, [Daviss] face, um, and held it there until she suffocated.” (Id. at 196.) Joslin reported she “watch[ed] television” while she held the pillow over Daviss face and until Joslin heard a “death gurgle.” (App. Vol. II at 33.) Joslin realized Davis was dead and “moved the body from the couch to the floor.” (Tr. Vol. I at 196.)
[3] Prior to her death, Davis had borrowed a vehicle from her friend, Peggy Coryn. After killing Davis, Joslin drove from Daviss apartment in Coryns vehicle. On June 12, 2019, Joslin called the Madison County Central Dispatch and told the operator that “she was [Davis] and was near Springfield IL ․ and said she [Davis] was moving to Tallahassee Florida. She [Davis] had a new job with Florida INDOT, and that she [Davis] was okay.” (App. Vol. II at 32.) Around the same time, Daviss co-workers texted Daviss phone, and Joslin responded to them, posing as Davis. Joslin also called Daviss employer, posing as Davis, and indicated Davis had moved to Florida.
[4] Around the same time, police located Coryns vehicle at Joslins address in New Castle. Police arrested Joslin for auto theft and placed her in the Madison County Jail pending trial. On June 20, 2019, the police conducted a welfare check at Daviss apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment police smelled what they believed to be a dead body. Officers obtained a search warrant, and inside the apartment they discovered:
There were some, one (1), white surgical masks, uh, laying very close to the body there. This was before COVID protocol so, that was a, a [sic] odd find for us. There was [sic] some cleaning supplies, um, and rags. Looked like there had been intent to clean up, um, a mess of some kind. There was also a very strong odor of a decomposed body coming from the apartment. Uh, the air conditioning was found turned on high. Uh, the windows were, were cracked open to allow odor to escape. Um, just the, the scene was, was very clear that they were trying to mask, uh, the odor that was coming from the apartment.
* * * * *
The body was located, uh, just inside the little, uh, just inside the little, uh, kitchen area on the kitchen linoleum. The body had been folded with the knees drawn up to the chest, um, wrapped and placed inside of large, uh, what I would describe as plastic garbage, almost like the ones that you would use to bag leaves. They were extra large size.
* * * * *
Yes. There, there were uh, there was a towel that was in there that was soiled. Um, it appeared that the body had been moved because there were other items in the apartment itself that were soiled. There was a pillow that had, um, bodily fluids on it, a rug that had some bodily fluids on it. So, it was evident that the body had been in several locations inside of the apartment prior to when we, the location we found it.
(Tr. Vol. I at 189-90.) In the trash can at Daviss apartment, officers also found a Walmart receipt indicating someone sold a cell phone at a kiosk there on June 16, 2019. After an investigation, police discovered Joslin sold Daviss work-issued cell phone at the kiosk.
[5] Around July 14, 2019, while in the Madison County Jail, Joslin told her cellmate, Stacy Butler, that Joslin had killed Davis and “had folded [Davis] in half and placed in her a bag.” (Id. at 194.) Butler reported Joslin told her information about Daviss murder “almost in a um, a proud manor [sic], kind of a joking manner that, uh, she felt like the police didnt have all the information and hadnt figured things out yet uh, and was really kinda bragging about how she had done some things to [Davis] at the time.” (Id. at 194-5.) Butler told police that Joslin told her that
[Joslin] left, uh, [Daviss] body there for three (3) days, returned three (3) days later and found that [Davis] at that time had, uh, started some decomposition of the body. Some fluids had started leaking onto the floor, so [Joslin] moved [Daviss] body from that location to the kitchen. [Joslin] had tried to clean up the fluids that were on the carpet in a um, in the living room area. The odor had began to, to stick a little bit and ․ [Joslin] had to open up the windows, turn the air conditioning on high․ [Joslin] left for another three (3) day period and returned after that and found this time that [Daviss] body had, um, completely decomposed. [Joslin] described ․ that [Daviss] skin had blisters all over it that were seeping and leaking, that [Davis] was, um, leaking from the head, that [Daviss] skin and, um, color of her body had turned completely black.
(Id. at 196-7.)
[6] On July 30, 2019, the State charged Joslin with murder, Level 6 felony auto theft,
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Level 6 felony identity deception, and Class B misdemeanor false informing. On October 5, 2020, Joslin filed a notice of defense of mental disease, defect, and/or competency. On October 20, 2020, the trial court appointed Dr. George Parker to examine Joslin and report findings and conclusions regarding any mental disease or defect. On November 9, 2020, the trial court also appointed Dr. Carrie Dixon to examine Joslin and report findings and conclusions regarding any mental disease or defect.
[7] After the evaluations, Joslin told her cellmate Butler that, when she was assessed by mental health providers, she tried “to make that doctor believe she was suffering from a mental illness.” (Id. at 198.) Joslin claimed to have no memory of killing Davis because she “blacked out[.]” (Id. at 200.) While in jail awaiting trial, Joslin was prescribed Seroquel to “control[ ] the voices” and Lithium to “stabilize[ ] her moods.” (Ex. Vol. II at 54.) When evaluating Joslin and preparing their recommendations, Dr. Parker and Dr. Dixon investigated Joslins past diagnosis and treatment. They discovered Joslin had been hospitalized for mental illness on multiple occasions, she had been diagnosed with bipolar I disorder and intermittent explosive disorder in the past, and she had engaged in mental health treatment over the years, though seemingly not in a consistent manner. At the time of the alleged crime, Joslin was prescribed Wellbutrin, Prozac, and Buspar, but had stopped taking them just prior to the incident because she “felt like [she] didnt need them.” (Id. at 47.)
[8] Dr. Parker diagnosed Joslin with cannabis use disorder, alcohol use disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and possible post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. Parker opined
with reasonable medical certainty, that the primary influence on Ms. Joslins behavior at the time of the alleged offenses was her anger, possibly exacerbated by a voluntary intoxication on Katie [sic]. It is further my opinion with reasonable medical certainty, that Ms. Joslin did appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions at the time of the alleged offenses.
(Id. at 51.) Dr. Dixon reported Joslin was “deemed competent to stand trial” and “[i]n reference to her state of mind at the time of the alleged crime, [Joslin] was, more likely than not, mentally competent.” (Id. at 56.) Dr. Dixon additionally noted:
[Joslin] exhibited signs of good reality contact. Although she complained of auditory hallucinations, psychosis was not evident during this evaluation. [Joslin] did not exhibit signs of experiencing auditory hallucinations․ [Joslin] complains of memory lapse recalling the events of the alleged crime. [Joslin] did not exhibit recall problems during this evaluation.
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[Joslin] complained of rage related homicidal attempts associated with amnesia episodes. This examiner could not find clinical evidence to substantiate this claim. [Joslins] mental health records from Kane Loveridege Wellness Group gave no diagnosis of nor mentioning of a memory problem. [Joslins] description of her memory lapse symptoms only remotely suggest a Dissociative Amnesia Disorder as listed in the DSM-5. Clinically, [Joslin] does not appear to fit the specific criteria of “significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other areas of functioning”. [sic] According to the police records, [Joslin] was capable of purposeful thoughts, conversations and behaviors throughout the days following the alleged crime. The DSM-5 also indicates that “Many, especially those with localized amnesia, minimize the importance of their memory loss and may become uncomfortable when prompted to address it”. [sic]
During this evaluation, [Joslin] repeatedly complained of experiencing episodes of rage related memory loss, without any prompting from this examiner; and, she made no attempts to avoid the subject.
(Id. at 56-7.)
[9] On April 27, 2021, Joslin pled guilty as charged without benefit of a plea agreement and asked the trial court to find her guilty but mentally ill. On June 2, 2021, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied Joslins request to find her guilty but mentally ill and found Joslin guilty as charged on all four counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found Joslins criminal history, specifically her “pattern of violent behavior” and her being “under Court supervision under an unrelated case at the time she committed these offenses” were aggravators. (Tr. Vol. I at 245.) The trial court found the fact that Joslin pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement as a mitigator. The trial court sentenced Joslin to 65 years for murder, 2 years and 180 days for Level 6 felony auto theft, 2 years and 180 days for Level 6 felony identity deception, and 180 days for Class B misdemeanor false informing. The court ordered all sentences be served concurrent to one another for an aggregate sentence of 65 years.
Discussion and Decision
1. Abuse of Discretion
[10] Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review them on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on rehg 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). One way a court abuses its discretion is by failing to address mitigating circumstances that are advanced for consideration and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 490-491. A trial court is not, however, required to accept a defendants claim as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance. Harman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 209, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Rather, the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. The trial court is not obligated to explain why it did not find a circumstance to be mitigating. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. Joslin argues the trial court abused its discretion because it did not find Joslins childhood trauma, mental illness, and substance dependence as mitigating factors when sentencing her. We address each contention in turn.
A. Childhood Trauma
[11] “[E]vidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013). In closing argument during her sentencing hearing, Joslin summarized some of her childhood trauma, arguing Joslins “life is measured from tragedy to tragedy to tragedy, unrelatedly.” (Tr. Vol. I at 239.) In the pre-sentencing report, Joslin reported “her childhood was emotionally, mentally and physically violent.” (App. Vol. II at 247.) She reported to Dr. Dixon that her childhood relationship with her mother was “unstable, walking on eggshells, intense, violent, abusive emotional and physical.” (Ex. Vol. II at 52) (mistakes in original). She indicated her biological father was incarcerated since her early childhood and her stepfather was “violent, abusive emotionally and physically ․ on drugs, an alcoholic ․ killed [her] dog in front of [her], shot him.” (Id.) (ellipses in original). Joslin also reported she was the victim of sexual abuse on multiple occasions. While we are sympathetic to the unsettling and difficult childhood Joslin reported, childhood trauma does not excuse a defendants decision to engage in criminal behavior or eliminate her responsibility for committing criminal offenses, and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find it as a mitigator when sentencing Joslin. See Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 10623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (childhood trauma not a significant mitigator).
B. Mental Illness
[12] “[M]ental illness, especially if it has some connection to the crime involved, must be given some, and occasionally considerable, weight in mitigation.” Ousley v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, in cases wherein mental illness warrants significant mitigating weight, the evidence of the mental illness must be “so pervasive throughout the proceedings that the defendant was found to be guilty but mentally ill.” Id. “[I]n order for a [defendants] mental history to provide a basis for establishing a mitigating factor, there must be a nexus between the defendants mental health and the crime in question.” Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied.
[13] Regarding its consideration of Joslins mental illness as a possible mitigating factor, the trial court stated:
In determining any weight that the Court would give to her mental health history, the Court finds that it is diminished by the fact that shes had multiple interventions by the criminal justice system and opportunities to work on those issues and develop other skills to deal with anger which appears to be the primary driving emotion that both the doctors believe led to the commission of the offense, repeatedly noted throughout her time at Centerstone with the anger issue and multiple interventions given to her and how to cope, how to recognize that, how to deal with that and again, continuing to either ignore, refuse to have insight s [sic] to that or attempt to correct the behavior after again, shes been in the system multiple times with similar issues and understands that there are consequences to those actions.
(Tr. Vol. I at 249.) Joslin contends the trial courts imposition of the maximum sentence for murder “shows it did not find her mental illness to be mitigation. If it had found her mental illness to be a mitigator, Ms. Joslins sentence would not have been the maximum, though it may have still been close.” (Br. of Appellant at 22.)
[14] Regarding the nexus between Joslins mental illness and her crime, Dr. Parker diagnosed Joslin with intermittent explosive disorder, though he noted:
Though memory lapses may occur as a dissociative response to trauma, Ms. Joslins description of her blackouts was more consistent with an unwillingness to recall her anger outbursts; significantly, her report of a blackout for the alleged offenses was contradicted by her behavior in the hours and days after the death of [Davis].
(Ex. Vol. II at 49.) Dr. Dixon made similar observations about Joslins alleged blackouts and the authenticity thereof. While the record contains evidence Joslin suffered from mental illness in some form, there is no evidence her mental illness had any nexus to her crime and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Joslins mental illness to be a mitigator. See Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (mental illness not a mitigator when defendant could not demonstrate a nexus between his mental illness and brutally beating his stepfather, leaving his stepfather permanently disabled and legally blind), trans. denied.
C. Substance Abuse
[15] A trial court is not required to consider substance abuse a mitigating circumstance, James v. State, 643 N.E.2d 321, 323 (Ind. 1994), and in fact may find it to be an aggravator. Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Joslin argues she “had a longstanding and severe substance abuse problem” that had a “direct nexus to the crime” because she committed Daviss murder “with a mind clouded by intoxication.” (Br. of Appellant at 26.) She reported she began smoking synthetic marijuana seven years ago on a daily basis and she was intoxicated on synthetic marijuana at the time she killed Davis. Joslin reported she began drinking alcohol at thirteen years old, became a heavy drinker at nineteen years old, and was drinking a case of beer a day at the time she murdered Davis. However, the State presented evidence of Joslins therapy reports collected as part of a Department of Child Services proceeding concerning Joslins children, and the majority of those reports did not mention a substance dependence issue, did not indicate that Joslin was to be treated for substance abuse prior to reunification with her children, and did not indicate Joslin tested positive for any substances as part of those reports.
[16] Over fifty years ago, our Indiana Supreme Court noted that
[m]ere voluntary drunkeness or intoxication does not excuse crime and a defendant cannot escape punishment for a crime on the ground that he did an alleged unlawful act while drunk: and such drunkeness and/or intoxication does not lessen or abate the severity of punishment prescribed by law. In other words, mere voluntary drunkeness or intoxication is no excuse for crime, nor does it in any degree mitigate or palliate an offense actually committed.
Wilson v. State, 253 Ind. 585, 590, 255 N.E.2d 817, 820 (1970). Joslins voluntary intoxication cannot excuse her criminal behavior, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find Joslins substance abuse as a mitigator. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (no abuse of discretion in failing to find substance abuse as a mitigator “when a defendant is aware of a substance abuse problem but has not taken appropriate steps to treat it”), trans. denied.
2. Inappropriate Sentence
[17] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial courts decision, we find the sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We defer to the trial courts decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendants sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012), rehg denied. Joslin, as the appellant, bears the burden of demonstrating her sentence is inappropriate. See Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006) (appellant bears burden of demonstrating sentence inappropriate). “[A]ppellate review should focus on the forest - the aggregate sentence - rather than the trees - consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).
[18] Joslin first argues her sentence is inappropriate because “in sentencing Ms. Joslin to the maximum allowable sentence under the law, the trial court found Ms. Joslin to be among the very worst offenders.” (Br. of Appellant at 27.) Indeed, it is well established that “the maximum enhancement permitted by law ․ should ․ be reserved for the very worst offenses and offenders.” Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 802 (Ind. 1997). However, it is also well-established that this principle is not to be taken as an opportunity “to determine whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario.” Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 929-30 (Ind. 2008). Therefore, we will focus on the nature of the offense and Joslins character to determine if her sentence was inappropriate.
[19] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point for determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. The advisory sentence for murder is fifty-five years, with a sentencing range of forty-five to sixty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. The trial court sentenced Joslin to sixty-five years for murder. The advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony is one year, with a sentencing range of six months to two and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court sentenced Joslin to 2 years, 180 days for Level 6 felony auto theft and 2 years, 180 days for Level 6 felony identity deception. A Class B misdemeanor does not have an advisory sentence, but a person who commits a Class B misdemeanor shall not be imprisoned for more than 180 days. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3. The trial court sentenced Joslin to 180 days for Class B misdemeanor false informing. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to one another, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years.
[20] Joslin killed her mother, Davis, after an argument regarding Joslins children. She held a pillow over Daviss face until Davis stopped moving and Joslin heard a “death gurgle.” (App. Vol. II at 33.) Joslin “watch[ed] T.V.” while she suffocated Davis. (Tr. Vol. I at 196.) She then reportedly “sat there on the couch with [Davis] at her feet and made some phone calls from [Daviss] phone.” (Id.) Joslin then took a vehicle Davis had borrowed from a friend and drove it home.
[21] Joslins offense was particularly egregious. She impersonated Davis when she called Madison County dispatch and indicated she, that is, Davis, had moved to Florida. Joslin also impersonated Davis when she responded to Daviss coworkers via text, knowing that Davis was dead. The first time Joslin visited Daviss apartment after killing her, Joslin noticed “[s]ome fluids had started leaking on the floor, so she moved [Daviss] body to the kitchen” and attempted to clean the fluids from the carpet. (Id.) Joslin let Daviss body decompose in the June heat, turning the air conditioner in Daviss apartment on high and opening windows in an attempt to remove the stench of Daviss rotting body. Joslin “folded [Davis] in half and stuck [Davis] into a plastic bag[,]” (id. at 197), which is how investigators found Davis when they performed a welfare check on her eleven days after Joslin killed her. Based on the nature of the crimes, we cannot say Joslins sentence is inappropriate. See Spitler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (maximum sentence not inappropriate based on egregiousness of offense), trans. denied.
[22] When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendants criminal history. Johnson, 986 N.E.2d at 857. The significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense, id., and Joslins criminal history is significant. It spans almost fifteen years, starting with lower-level offenses such as misdemeanor convictions involving a bad check and escalating to multiple convictions of battery and drug-related crimes. Over the course of her criminal history, Joslin has been convicted of seven misdemeanors and three felonies. At the time she killed Davis, Joslin was on probation for Level 6 felony invasion of privacy
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as a result of violating a protective order.
[23] Additionally, Joslins family reported during the sentencing hearing that Joslin had a history of violent behavior. Joslins sister testified:
[Joslin] would hurt people, um, anybody that was close to her that cared about her. She would lash out and hurt them and think it was funny. Um, I have watched [Joslin] stab somebody. I have seen her pour gasoline on one (1) of her baby daddys [sic] and throw matches at em [sic] tryin [sic] to set him on fire. She has tried to run somebody over with a car.
(Tr. Vol. II at 213.) Further, as the State pointed out during its sentencing argument, “the record is devoid of any remorse ․ for her actions, remorse for the hardship that shes caused her family.” (Id. at 233.) We cannot say Joslins sentence is inappropriate based on her character. See George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (sentence not appropriate based on defendants violent disposition and criminal history), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Joslins childhood trauma, mental illness, and substance abuse to be mitigating circumstances. Additionally, Joslins aggregate sentence of sixty-five years is not inappropriate based on the nature of her offenses and her character. Accordingly, we affirm.
[25] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
2
. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
3
. Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a).
4
. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1).
6
. Joslin testified “Katy” is “Spice. Fake weed, I guess.” (Tr. Vol. I at 166.)
7
. The State had charged Joslin with auto theft in June, but the State dismissed that original charge and added the auto theft allegation to the charges filed on July 30, 2019.
8
. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1.
May, Judge.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.