In this post-dissolution appeal, the former husband challenges an order on the parties’ respective motions to enforce provisions of their marital settlement agreement concerning distribution of their tax refund from their 2017 joint income tax returns, among other issues. The former husband argues the trial court erred by entering a written order that was inconsistent with its oral pronouncement regarding distribution of a portion of the refund attributable to an overpayment made in 2016. We agree with this point, and we reverse. We affirm as to all other issues without discussion.
Background
The parties divorced in 2018. They filed a joint income tax return for 2017, from which they received a refund. The refund, which totaled $150,123, was deposited into the former wifes attorneys trust account. The refund included a $27,408 credit for an overpayment that was carried forward from the parties’ 2016 joint return. At the evidentiary hearing below, the former husband argued that he was entitled to half of the 2016 overpayment because it was marital property subject to equal distribution. The parties also litigated entitlement to the portion of the refund attributable to overpayments made in 2017, the details of which are irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.
At the hearing, the trial court orally ruled that the former husband was entitled to half of the 2016 overpayment (half of $27,408 = $13,704). However, because the amount in the trust account was insufficient to distribute the collective amounts awarded to each party, the trial court reduced each partys award by one-half of the deficit, for an award of $12,305.50 to the former husband.
The courts written order, however, reflected a different outcome. Before reaching the issue of the 2016 overpayment, the trial court allocated all funds within the attorneys trust account to other portions of the entitlement award. The trial court maintained its oral ruling that the former husband was entitled to half of the overpayment from 2016, but wrote that nothing would be distributed as to that amount because no funds remained in the trust account after the other portion of the refund was distributed.
Analysis
When a trial courts written order is inconsistent with its earlier oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement generally controls and the written order must be reversed. See Soldatich v. Jones, 290 So. 3d 497, 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Cappola v. Cappola, 280 So. 3d 102, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); Glick v. Glick, 874 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Here, the courts written order is inconsistent with its earlier oral pronouncement as to the former husbands distribution from the trust account representing his share of the overpayment from 2016. The court orally ruled that the former husband was entitled to $12,305.50, after adjusting for the apparent deficit in the trust account. In its written order, however, the court ruled that nothing would be distributed as to the overpayment from 2016 because all the funds in the trust account were to be distributed to account for the parties’ separate and distinct entitlement to the 2017 overpayment. This ruling was entered without an intervening evidentiary hearing.
We therefore reverse the written order as to this issue. On remand, the court shall amend the written order to conform to its prior oral pronouncement stating the former husband is entitled to a distribution of $12,305.50, representing his share of the overpayment from 2016.
Although the parties have not raised the issue, our reversal on this point will result in an order that directs disbursement of more funds than are held in the trust account. This is because neither party argued on appeal that the written order was inconsistent with the oral pronouncement as to the share awarded to the former wife. We leave it to the parties to raise the appropriate motions on remand to resolve this issue. Cf. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 583 So. 2d 398, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (where reversal of certain portions of order necessarily affected overall plan for equitable distribution, remanding for reconsideration of the equitable scheme “in an effort to do equity and justice to both parties”).
Attorneys Fees
Both parties’ briefs included requests for appellate attorneys fees. We deny both requests because neither party filed a separate motion nor cited a substantive basis for an attorneys fees award. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(b); Garcia v. Collazo, 178 So. 3d 429, 430 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); McCreary v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Assn, 758 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. Requests for attorneys fees denied.
Per Curiam.
Ciklin, Forst and Kuntz, JJ., concur.