This is, at least, the twenty-sixth appellate case in this Court that arises from the marital dissolution matter involving Noreen Singer and Jay Singer.
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In this appeal, former wife argues the court erred by awarding attorneys fees to former husband without allowing her to challenge the former husbands entitlement to fees. We agree and reverse.
Background
The issue in this appeal relates to attorneys fees, and we begin with Singer IV. In Singer IV, the former husband appealed because “the trial court failed to reserve jurisdiction or even address the former husbands request for overpayment of alimony and attorneys fees.” Singer IV, 38 So. 3d at 889. We concluded the “court also should have reserved jurisdiction to consider the issue of the former husbands entitlement to attorneys fees.” Id. at 890. So we remanded “for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of retroactive payment of alimony and attorneys fees.” Id.
On remand, former wife filed a motion for contempt and included a request for attorneys fees. And, as instructed, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of retroactive payment of alimony. During the second day of the evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge said multiple times it was reserving on both parties’ requests for attorneys fees. The circuit judge stated, “Ill reserve on the attorneys fees. Well come back another time.” Later, before closing arguments, the judge asked if there was “anything else, folks? Anything you would like to reserve on?” Counsel for the former wife responded, “yes, entitlement to attorneys fees at a subsequent date.” The court responded “okay.” Finally, at the end of the hearing, the judge stated, “[o]n [former husband]’s attorneys fees, were reserving on that. [Former wife]’s attorneys fees, we reserve on that.”
But after the hearing, the court entered two orders. The first order found former husband entitled to an award of attorneys fees as a sanction for former wifes “frivolous, vexatious and litigious conduct. See Mettler v. Mettler, 519 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); § 57.105, Florida Statutes.” The second order denied former wifes contempt motion, including her request for attorneys fees.
Former wife appealed and, in Singer V, we declined to address the portion of the orders determining former husbands entitlement to fees. We concluded that without determining the amount of fees, the issue was not ripe for review. Singer V, 211 So. 3d at 155. We also held the circuit courts order erroneously failed to reserve jurisdiction on the former wifes fee motion after it reserved ruling on that issue at the hearing on remand from Singer IV. Id. at 154. So we again remanded for a hearing on whether former wife was entitled to an award of attorneys fees. Id.
On remand from Singer V, both parties again sought attorneys fees. But days before the fee hearing, the former wife filed a motion asking the circuit court in Broward County to relinquish jurisdiction over former husbands motion to execute on her real property to the circuit court in Palm Beach County. The court granted the motion and transferred the entire case to the circuit court in Palm Beach County, Florida. That led to Singer VII. In Singer VII, we reversed and held that the circuit court in Broward County, Florida closed the case and ordered change of venue without notice to former husband, denying him due process. Singer VII, 278 So. 3d at 80-81. We again remanded the case and directed the circuit court in Broward County to “hear and decide the former husbands pending motions pertaining to attorneys fees.” Id. at 81.
That background brings us to this appeal. On remand from Singer VII, former husband moved for attorneys fees based on the entitlement order we declined to review in Singer V. Former wife responded that at the hearing leading to the entitlement order, the court stated it was reserving on both parties’ requests for entitlement to fees. After briefing, the circuit court held a two-day hearing on former husbands fee motion. Throughout the hearing, former wife tried to challenge former husbands entitlement to fees, but the court repeatedly directed her not to do so because entitlement had been decided. After the hearing, the court entered an order awarding former Husband $226,449.53 in attorneys fees under the earlier entitlement order.
Analysis
This is the first appeal in which the award of attorneys fees is ripe for appellate review. In Singer V, “we decline[d] to address the portion of the other order on appeal determining the former husbands entitlement to attorneys fees because the order d[id] not determine an amount of fees.” Singer V, 211 So. 3d at 154. While we did remand in Singer VII to “hear and decide the former husbands pending motions pertaining to attorneys fees,” Singer VII, 278 So. 3d at 81, we did not decide whether former husband was entitled to fees. Nor could we have done so based on the decision by a panel of this Court in Singer V.
For the same reasons we reversed the circuit courts order denying former wifes motion for attorneys fees in Singer V, in this appeal, we must reverse the contemporaneously issued order granting former husbands motion for entitlement to attorneys fees. Before finding the former husband was entitled to attorneys fees, the court stated it was reserving the issue for a subsequent hearing. But it did not do so. As in Singer V, 211 So. 3d at 154, we note that “[w]here the parties stipulate that the court will reserve the issue of attorneys fees at a subsequent hearing, such an agreement is binding upon the court and ruling on the issue contrary to the stipulation is erroneous.” Jurasek v. Jurasek, 67 So. 3d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). So we reverse the courts judgment awarding the former husband attorneys fees and remand for further proceedings at which the former wife may challenge entitlement to attorneys fees.
Conclusion
The order and judgment awarding former husband attorneys fees and interest are reversed. The case is remanded to allow former wife an opportunity to challenge former husbands entitlement to attorneys fees and “for a hearing on whether the former wife is entitled to an award of attorneys fees” as directed in Singer V, 211 So. 3d at 154.
Reversed and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
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. See, e.g., Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Singer I”); Singer v. Cochran, 685 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“Singer II”); Singer v. Singer, 706 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“Singer III”); Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889, 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Singer IV”); Singer v. Singer, 211 So. 3d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Singer V”); Singer v. Singer, 219 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Singer VI”); and Singer v. Singer, 278 So. 3d 79, 80-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“Singer VII”).
Kuntz, J.
Klingensmith, C.J. and May, J., concur.