MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI) and negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
1
On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence of operation. We affirm.
Discussion. When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty we consider “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). “The inferences that support a conviction need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133 (2018).
In order to prove an indictment for OUI, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) operated a vehicle, (2) on a public way, and (3) had a blood alcohol content percentage of .08 or greater or was impaired by intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509-510 (2016). For negligent operation of a motor vehicle, “the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way, and (3) ․ negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered.” Commonwealth v. Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 255 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 (2004). The defendant contests the element of operation as to each offense.
The defendant admitted to medical personnel that he was the driver of a car that slipped on ice, rolled over, and hit a telephone pole. Corroborating this account, a witness testified that she came upon the defendant standing alone outside a vehicle flipped on its side in the middle of the road at approximately 2:30 A.M. When she asked him whether anyone else was inside the vehicle, the defendant replied, “no.” Police officers who responded to the scene testified that the vehicle had struck a telephone pole and that the pole was broken at the base. Photographs showed the car and the telephone pole with damage consistent with the defendants description of the crash. Officers also indicated that the only footprints on the roadway near the crash site appeared to be from first responder boots, and a search of the area gave no indication that anyone “had left the vehicle and had gone through the woods.”
On this record, we conclude that the defendants admission met the requirements of the “corroboration rule,” see Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984) (“The corroboration rule requires only that there be some evidence, besides the confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that is, that the crime was real and not imaginary”), and that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant operated the vehicle.
2
See Commonwealth v. Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 199-201 (2016) (“Direct evidence that the defendant operated the vehicle is not required”; rather, proof of operation may rest on circumstantial evidence).
3
The defendants motion for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied.
Judgments affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. After trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to indictments charging him with a subsequent offense, and OUI with a license suspended for OUI in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 23.
2
. Because we find the predicate convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, we need not address the defendants argument that his subsequent pleas be vacated if we concluded there was insufficient evidence that he operated the vehicle.
3
. The jury were not required to credit testimony from the defendant and his wife that she was the driver. See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005) (“If, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province”).