MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, J.B., appeals from the one-year extension of an abuse prevention order issued in 2021 pursuant to G. L. c. 209A. He contends that a judge of the Fitchburg District Court erred in granting the 209A order because (1) there was insufficient evidence of abuse; and (2) the grounds for issuance were inadequate under the totality of the circumstances. We affirm.
Background. Plaintiff and defendant began a romantic relationship in 2013 in South Carolina. Although they never married, they remained together for approximately eight years and have two young children. In June 2021, the plaintiff ended her relationship with the defendant and, shortly thereafter moved to Massachusetts, bringing their children with her. On August 2, 2021, she obtained an emergency ex parte 209A order in Fitchburg District Court. In applying for that order, the plaintiff provided an affidavit stating that the defendant had yelled at her, been physically aggressive, and coerced her into sexual relations on three occasions.
The initial ex parte order expired on August 16, 2021, two weeks after it was issued. On the same day, the court held an extension hearing at which the defendant was present via remote videoconferencing and both parties testified. At that hearing, the plaintiff reiterated her claims about being coerced into intercourse. She also stated that the defendant had physically intimidated and threatened to harm her, that she feared him, and that she believed he was going to strike her on at least one occasion. That said, on cross-examination, the plaintiff conceded that during the forced intercourse, she never told the defendant “no” but insisted that sometime prior to those incidents she had made it clear to the defendant that she did not want to have intercourse with him. She also stated that on other occasions, they had thrown things at each other while arguing. The judge credited the plaintiffs testimony and extended the 209A order for one year. This appeal followed.
Discussion. 1. Insufficient evidence of abuse. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs affidavit and testimony do not allege instances of abuse necessary to sustain a 209A order. We disagree.
We review the issuance of an extension order “for an abuse of discretion or other error of law.” G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 393 (2018), quoting E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 562 (2013). We accord the “utmost deference” to the credibility determinations made by the judge who “heard the testimony of the parties ․ [and] observed their demeanor” (citation omitted). Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020). “A plaintiff seeking the extension of an abuse prevention order must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ․ that the defendant has caused or attempted to cause physical harm, committed a sexual assault, or placed the plaintiff in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm” (quotation and citation omitted). G.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 393.
Here, the plaintiff provided sufficient testimony to allow the judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had both put her “in fear of imminent serious physical harm” and caused her “to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress.” G. L. c. 209A, § 1. She testified that the defendant had threatened to hurt her and that she thought he would strike her. She further testified that he had physically intimidated her
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and thrown things during their arguments. She also stated that the defendant had coerced her into intercourse on multiple occasions after she informed him that she did not want to have sex with him.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff provided contradictory testimony during the hearing and that these contradictions support a finding that she did not establish a substantial likelihood of physical harm or sexual duress. He also asserts that the plaintiff is using the order “as a tool to advance her interests in a probate dispute that is [being] discussed and dealt with in South Carolina․ And, there is simply no basis to think that she has a legitimate and credible fear of anything.” We are not persuaded. Where, in extending the 209A order, the judge gave greater weight to some portions of the plaintiffs testimony than others, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judges determination that the plaintiff was in actual fear of serious imminent physical harm or suffered sexual coercion. See G.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 393 (abuse of discretion need “fall[ ] outside the range of reasonable alternatives” [quotation and citation omitted]). See also Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006).
2. Totality of the circumstances. The defendant further argues that the judge failed to consider the totality of the circumstances in extending the 209A order. He argues, inter alia, that because he lives and intends to remain in South Carolina, and because the plaintiff stated that she did not believe he would hit her, that the judge should not have extended the 209A order. We disagree.
“In evaluating whether a plaintiff has met her burden, a judge must consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties’ relationship. Such consideration furthers the Legislatures purpose to establish a statutory framework to ‘preserve ․ the fundamental human right to be protected from the devastating impact of family violence.’ ” Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005), quoting Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 327 (1999). Factors that the judge should consider include, but are not limited to, “the defendants violations of protective orders, ongoing child custody or other litigation that engenders or is likely to engender hostility, the parties’ demeanor in court, the likelihood that the parties will encounter one another in the course of their usual activities, the parties’ demeanor in court, ․ and significant changes in the circumstances of the parties. No one factor is likely to be determinative.” Id. at 740.
Here, at a minimum, the plaintiff provided testimony that the defendant had threatened her and that she feared he would strike her. Subsequent to these occurrences, the plaintiff fled South Carolina, moved to Massachusetts, and now hopes that the defendant will not learn her address. Taken together with the plaintiffs testimony regarding sexual coercion, the judge was well within his discretion to determine that the totality of the circumstances suffice to show that the plaintiff continues to suffer from fear of abuse under G. L. c. 209A. The judge heard the plaintiffs testimony, and thus, was best able to observe her demeanor. See S.V. v. R.V., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 813 (2019). See also Yahna Y. v. Sylvester S., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 185 (2020). While it is true that the plaintiffs assertions, at times, were contradictory, as discussed supra, and at odds with the defendants testimony, the judge was in the best position to evaluate the totality of her testimony. See Ginsberg, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 140 n.3. We discern no error.
Order dated August 16, 2021, extending abuse prevention order affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The plaintiff testified that the defendant had “gotten in [her] face” on at least one occasion.