MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the defendants, Sarah E. Dwyer (Dwyer) and Mollie E. Vitale (Vitale), were each convicted of one count of assault and battery.
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On appeal, they contend that the judge erred by failing to “consider the substantial, credible and material evidence that established reasonable doubt.” We affirm.
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Background. We briefly summarize the facts, as a jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
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On June 18, 2020, the defendants separately arrived at the home of the victims mother, who is also Vitales mother-in-law.
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The victim also resided at that home. At some point, Dwyer told the victim that she owed Dwyers fiancé forty dollars. The conversation escalated, and Dwyer threatened to punch the victim in the face. Subsequently, Vitale tried to grab a glass “bong” from the victims hand, “and pulled it back and crushed it.” Vitales hand bled as a result. Vitale then rubbed the blood in the victims face, grabbed her hair, and “started dragging her up the deck” of the home. Next, both defendants attacked the victim, punched her, and “kept beating on her.” They struck her multiple times. Once on the deck, the defendants tried to smash the victims head into a glass table. After the defendants stopped the attack, the victim and her mother ran into the house and locked the door. Meanwhile, the defendants ran down the driveway, put their children in the car, and “took off.”
A police officer arrived at the home and spoke with the victim and her mother who described the incident to him. He saw injuries to the victims head or forehead and “redness on her face.” The same officer spoke later that day with the defendants who presented a different version of events and described the victim as the aggressor. The officer also viewed the cut on Vitales hand. At trial, the victim and the defendants each testified to the injuries they had sustained from the incident. The case hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.
Discussion. The defendants argue that the judge erred in rendering guilty verdicts because the evidence demonstrated that the victim had been the aggressor.
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Although not framed as such, it appears that the defendants claim that the judge should have allowed their motions for a required finding of not guilty. The argument is unavailing.
In determining whether a motion for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied, the reviewing court “must consider whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the contrary evidence presented by the defendant, ․ any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 648 (1997). See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 140 (2001); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). Under Massachusetts law, “assault and battery is the intentional and unjustified use of force upon the person of another, however slight, or the intentional doing of a wanton or grossly negligent act causing personal injury to another.” Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 203 (1931). In the present case, the Commonwealth presented more than sufficient evidence to show that the defendants intentionally and without justification used force upon the victim. The victims mother, an eyewitness to the attack, testified that the defendants repeatedly battered the victim. That testimony was corroborated by that of the victim and, in part, the responding police officer. Thus, any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails as a matter of law because a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of assault and battery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Latimore, supra.
Assuming, in the alternative, that the defendants challenge the substance or weight of the evidence, they fare no better. “The defendant[s] arguments are in substance directed toward the weight and credibility of the evidence, ‘a matter wholly within the province of the [factfinder].’ ” Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 311 (1992), quoting Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 272 (1992). It is black letter law that “[i]f, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the [factfinder] to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within [its] province.” Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005). See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 370 Mass. 192, 203 (1976) (evidence need not require factfinder to draw an inference; sufficient that it permits inference to be drawn). Where, as here, the parties asserted conflicting accounts of the altercation, it was within the judges exclusive province, as sole factfinder in a jury-waived trial, to resolve those conflicts.
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Accordingly, there was no error.
Judgments affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The judge found the defendants not guilty of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
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. We note that the attorney representing both defendants in the instant appeal likewise represented both defendants at trial.
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. The defendants testified at trial, disputed the version of events described by the victim and her mother, and continue to dispute that version of events on appeal.
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. When Dwyer arrived with her young son, Vitale had already arrived and was visiting with her children at the home.
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. The judge allowed the defense to introduce evidence that the victim had a history of violent behavior and “mental health issues.”
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. Indeed, the judge explicitly credited the “level of detail and consistency” of the mothers testimony, which he found to be “persuasive” and “credible.”