MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiff, Melissa Poirier, challenges both the dismissal of her complaint against the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission) and the denial of her motion for postjudgment relief under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). In the absence of any showing that the plaintiff had a private right of action against the commission, we affirm.
Briefly summarizing the background facts, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that the commission violated its own regulations when it failed to (1) complete its investigation into her gender discrimination claim against her employer within eighteen months, and (2) provide her with required notice of its failure to meet that deadline. See 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.13(3) (1998).
The plaintiff filed a charge of gender-based discrimination with the commission against her employer in January 2010. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5. Under the commissions regulations then in effect,
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the commission was required to complete its investigation of the complaint within eighteen months. See 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.13(3). Where it did not do so, the regulations required the commission to “notify the Complainant and Respondent of the reasons therefor.” Id. According to the complaint, the commission did not complete its investigation for over three years and did not provide the plaintiff with the required notice of the delay.
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Although the plaintiff ultimately filed suit against her employer in the Federal court, she did not do so within the statute of limitations period, and the case was dismissed as untimely. Representing herself, the plaintiff brought this action in the Superior Court alleging that had the commission notified her as it was required to do, she would have had time to file a claim in the Massachusetts State court.
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The commission responded by moving to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and, after a hearing, a judge allowed that motion.
In denying the plaintiffs subsequent motion for relief from the dismissal,
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the judge concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the regulations created a contract between herself and the commission, or that she had a private right of action against the commission. The plaintiff appealed from both rulings and, as we have noted, the appeals were consolidated.
Reviewing the motion to dismiss de novo, see A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 419, 424 (2018), we find no support for the plaintiffs claim to a private right of action against the commission, and thus no claim on which relief could be granted. Neither G. L. c. 151B nor any of the commissions regulations create such a right. Our appellate courts “have ‘been reluctant to infer a private cause of action from a statute in the absence of some indication from the Legislature supporting such an inference.’ ” Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 463 Mass. 447, 454 (2012), quoting Loffredo v. Center for Addictive Behaviors, 426 Mass. 541, 544 (1998). Additionally, “[w]here a private right of action inferred from a statute would permit a claim against the Commonwealth, the Legislature must also waive sovereign immunity.” Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., supra. The plaintiff has failed to show that the Legislature did so here. See Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 43 (1981). In the absence of a private right of action against the commission, the plaintiff had no actionable claim. See Nordberg v. Commonwealth, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 239 (2019), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). There was no error in the dismissal of her complaint; it follows that the judge was within her discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment. See Owens v. Mukendi, 448 Mass. 66, 72 (2006) (abuse of discretion standard); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
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Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Order denying rule 60 (b) motion affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The regulations were amended in 2020.
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. On July 25, 2013, the commission issued a “Finding of Lack of Probable Cause” with regard to the plaintiffs charge. That finding was affirmed after an internal appeal. See G. L. c. 151B, § 5.
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. The plaintiff sought to recover only monetary relief against the commission, specifically, lost wages, punitive damages, and costs and fees.
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. The plaintiff retained counsel before that motion was heard.
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. Although the plaintiffs brief refers to potential claims under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, she did not raise any such claims in her complaint. Regardless, those claims would fail because the plaintiff did not present them in accordance with the statute. See G. L. c. 258, § 4.