Relators/plaintiffs, Families and Friends of Louisianas Incarcerated Children, Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and her minor child, John Doe, and Mary Roe, on behalf of herself and her minor child, Joseph Roe, seek review of the district courts November 9, 2021 judgment granting the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants, the City of New Orleans and Latoya Cantrell, in her official capacity as Mayor of New Orleans. In addition, the district courts judgment dismissed the petition without prejudice and transferred the matter to juvenile court, but issued a stay of its judgment pending review by this Court. Based upon our review of the writ application and the applicable law, this Court finds plaintiffs’ petition does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile court pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 303. Accordingly, we reverse the district courts judgment granting the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand this matter to Civil District Court for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus naming the City of New Orleans and Mayor Latoya Cantrell as defendants. Plaintiffs are Families and Friends of Louisianas Incarcerated Children, a nonprofit organization, along with two parents on behalf of themselves and their minor children, who were in continued custody at the Juvenile Justice Intervention Center (“JJIC”) when an emergency evacuation policy was implemented by defendants. Plaintiffs assert that the defendants created and implemented an emergency evacuation policy that violates the statutory provisions of La. Ch. C. art. 822,
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concerning the place of continued custody of juveniles prior to adjudication, and the special juvenile procedures guaranteed by La. Const. Art. 5, § 19. Plaintiffs’ petition seeks: judgment declaring the defendants’ policies pertaining to the evacuation of detained juveniles unconstitutional and in violation of La. Ch. C. art. 822; an injunction prohibiting defendants from implementing the evacuation policies; and a mandamus ordering defendants to develop an evacuation policy that does not violate the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to juvenile continued custody.
In response to plaintiffs’ petition, defendants filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants argue that the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction, pursuant to La. Ch. C. arts. 302 and 303(11), to adjudicate whether “JJICs temporary housing arrangement during a declared disaster” violated La. Ch.C. art. 822.
At the hearing on defendants’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court found that juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ petition pursuant to La. Ch. C. arts. 302 and 303(11). Subsequently, the district court rendered judgment sustaining defendants’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissing plaintiffs’ petition without prejudice, and ordering the matter transferred to juvenile court.
Plaintiffs now seek review of the district courts November 9, 2021 judgment.
DISCUSSION
La. Ch. C. art. 302(1) confers exclusive original juvenile jurisdiction to special juvenile courts created by law for certain parishes, including Orleans Parish. La. Ch. C. art. 303 outlines the specific matters that “[a] court exercising juvenile jurisdiction shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over,” which in pertinent part includes:
(1) Delinquency proceedings pursuant to Title VIII, except when a child either:
a. Is subject to the jurisdiction of criminal courts for prosecution and liability as an adult pursuant to Chapter 4 of the Title.
b. Has been transferred by the juvenile court for criminal prosecution and liability as an adult pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title VIII.
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(11) Such other jurisdiction over children as may be provided by law.
Defendants contend that La. Ch.C. art. 303(11) confers exclusive original jurisdiction to the juvenile court over this matter because relators have alleged a violation of La. Ch. C. art. 822. We find no merit in this argument.
Plaintiffs have not alleged a specific violation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 concerning a courts order for continued custody of a specific juvenile in a delinquency proceeding. Rather, plaintiffs allege that the policy created and implemented by defendants is a direct violation of the statutory provisions and constitutional requirements for protecting the rights of all juveniles who are in continued custody prior to delinquency adjudication. At issue in this petition is the Citys policy for evacuation of the JJIC and the agreement between the JJIC and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for housing juvenile detainees in adult facilities during an emergency evacuation. Although plaintiffs’ petition does involve the interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822, this is primarily a civil rights action, which does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Thus, in consideration that the plaintiffs’ petition does not involve a violation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 by the juvenile court in a delinquency proceeding, and in consideration of the particular relief sought against the named defendants in plaintiffs’ petition, we find that La. Ch. C. art. 303 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction over this matter to juvenile court, and we find no merit to defendants’ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we grant the writ, reverse the district courts judgment, and remand the matter to Civil District Court for further proceedings.
WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED
I respectfully dissent.
Petitioners/Relators, Family and Friends of Louisianas Incarcerated Children, Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and her minor child, John Doe, and Mary Roe, on behalf of herself and her minor child, Joseph Roe (“Relators”), seek appellate review of the November 9, 2021 judgment (“the Judgment”) granting an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants/respondents, the City of New Orleans’ and its mayor, Latoya Cantrell (collectively referred to as “the City”), and remanding the matter from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (“District Court”) to the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans (“Juvenile Court”).
The City filed a declinatory exception arguing that District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. La. C.C.P. art. 925(A)(6). The court must accept the allegations set forth in Relators’ petition as true for the purpose of ruling on the exception, particularly if no evidence is introduced, which is determinative of the issues. See State v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 04-1789, p. 13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 60, 68; Banks v. Carl Ott Poles & Piling, Inc., 440 So.2d 803, 805 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983). However, the court is not required to accept conclusory factual allegations or allegations of law as true for purposes of the exception if they are contrary to the record or the law. See Kirby v. Field, 04-1898, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 131, 135, writ denied, 05-2467 (La. 3/24/06), 925 So.2d 1230. The determination of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is subject to de novo review. In re D.C.M., 13-0085, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/11/13), 170 So.3d 165, 169; TD*X Assocs., LP v. Louisiana Dept of Envt Quality, 2020-0081, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/20), 2020 WL 6557758, at *2.
Based on my de novo review and, for purposes of the exception only, my acceptance of certain factual allegations and allegations of law set forth in Relators’ petition as true, I would vacate the judgment and allow Relators time to amend their petition as I find that Relators are able to cure certain jurisdictional deficiencies discussed infra through amendment or dismissal of certain claims. When the grounds pleaded in the declinatory exception “may be removed by amendment of the petition or other action of plaintiff, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order the plaintiff to remove them within the delay allowed by the court․” La. C.C.P. art. 932(A). I find vacating the judgment and granting Relators a delay to amend their pleadings the appropriate remedy in the interest of expedited justice for the following reasons:
Pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 302, District Court is strictly prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over “juvenile matters” because Orleans Parish has a specially created juvenile court.
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Juvenile Court enjoys not only Article 303(1) exclusive, original juvenile jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings, but also Article 303(11) jurisdiction over children as may be provided by law.
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La Const. art. V, § 19 mandates that Juvenile Court shall make all determinations relative to “the detention, and the custody of a person who is alleged to have committed a crime prior to his seventeenth birthday.” I find that Article 303(11) was enacted not only to address disputes arising out of adoption proceedings but also to address disputes arising out of delinquency proceedings. Article 303(1)’s grant of exclusive, original jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings “is crippled unless the juvenile court also possesses the exclusive authority to resolve ancillary disputes arising out of”
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delinquency proceedings. Such ancillary disputes include all disputes arising out of the detention and the custody of unadjudicated youth who are detained pursuant to a continued custody order of a juvenile court during the pendency of their delinquency proceedings.
The majority finds, inter alia, that Relators’ petition is “primarily a civil rights action” relative to the emergency removal of unadjudicated youth who are detained pursuant to a continued custody order of Juvenile Court at the New Orleans Juvenile Justice Intervention Center (“JJIC”) during the pendency of their delinquency proceedings (“the Detained Youth”). The majority further finds and I agree that the subject matter of Relators’ petition and claims is not only the legality of the emergency detainment of the Detained Youth at an “adult prison” but also the legality of any Cooperative Endeavor Agreement(s) (“CEA”) between the City and the State of Louisiana, through its Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“the State”), relating to JJICs emergency evacuation policy, particularly the CEA dated May 7, 2021 and entitled “Local Level Emergency Evacuation and Housing Partnership” (“the Policy”).
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Thus, District Courts jurisdiction in the case sub judice is limited to only those disputes that relate to the Citys authority to adopt and enforce the Policy. Juvenile Court maintains jurisdiction not only over the delinquency proceedings and modifications of continued custody orders of the Detained Youth but also over all ancillary disputes arising out their delinquency proceedings or detainment orders. I find that a portion of Relators’ allegations involves the direct violation of the continued custody orders and ancillary disputes arising out to their delinquency proceedings.
The majority finds and I agree that Relators’ petition “does involve the interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822.” Article 822 provides:
A. Following the hearing required by Article 819, the court may order a child alleged to have committed a delinquent act or alleged to have violated probation or parole for a delinquent act, continued in custody in a licensed public or private facility for juveniles, if licensure is required by law for such a facility, or in a private home subject to the supervision of the court or in a juvenile detention center.
B. The court shall not place a child alleged to be delinquent in the custody of either the department of Children and Family Services or the department of Public Safety and Corrections prior to adjudication.
C. No child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be held in an adult jail or lockup.
La. Ch. C. art. 822 (emphasis added). The majority finds that District Court enjoys jurisdiction over this matter because Relators did not allege “a specific violation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 concerning a courts order for continued custody of a specific juvenile in a delinquency proceeding.” The majority accepts as true Relators’ allegation of fact that the City “created and implemented” the Policy. The record is void as to whether Juvenile Court, as required by law, authorized the adoption and implementation of the Policy of JJIC to house the Detained Youth at an “adult prison”
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in an emergency. It is unclear whether the majority even considered this fact and associated laws. However, a review of these omitted facts and applicable laws is crucial to perform a complete and efficient appellate review of this matter and to allow for expedited justice; thus, I will make a brief review of the applicable law.
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La Const. art. V, § 19 mandates that “[t]he determination of guilt or innocence, the detention ․ of a person who is alleged to have committed a crime prior to his seventeenth birthday shall be pursuant to special juvenile procedures which shall be provided by law.” La Const. art. V, § 19 (emphasis added). The constitution and aforementioned statutory law affords Juvenile Court the exclusive authority to enforce or reject an emergency housing policy at a juvenile detention facility that places unadjudicated children subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a detention facility during an emergency. Thus, Juvenile Court has the exclusive authority to enforce the detainment of the Detained Youth, not the City. Although the City has the authority to create an emergency housing policy for its facilities and to negotiate with the State to partner with the City to utilize State facilities, the law does not authorize the City to unilaterally determine the detention and the custody of the Detained Youth in an emergency. Only Juvenile Court has the exclusive authority to make such detainment decisions for unadjudicated youths during the pendency of their delinquency proceedings. This is supported by the fact that the Detained Youth are not in the custody of “either the department of Children and Family Services or the department of Public Safety and Corrections prior to adjudication.” La. Ch. C. art. 822(B).
I find that the majority erred in conflating the creation of the CEAs and emergency policies between the City and the State with that of its enforcement by Juvenile Court as it relates to the Detained Youths detainment. Taking into consideration the effects of the relief sought (declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunction), I find that the analysis into the subject matter of Relators petition must be performed in a two-step process. The creation of the Policy between the City and the State must be separately analyzed from its enforcement and implementation. Regarding the City, Relators can seek a declaratory judgment in District Court declaring that the Citys enforcement of the Policy without Juvenile Courts approval is illegal and request the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the unilateral enforcement of the Policy by the City and a mandamus ordering the City to develop a new emergency evacuation policy prior to the 2022 hurricane season. If District Court declares that the enforcement of the Policy was without proper Juvenile Court authorization, then the court may grant injunctive and mandamus relief. This type of relief sought pertaining to the City is subject to the jurisdiction of District Court, as it does not involve the interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 or a juvenile matter. It involves interagency agreements and providers’ Emergency and Safety Plans,
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and the scope of the Citys authority in its operation of JJIC during an emergency.
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If District Court finds that Juvenile Court properly authorized the Policy, then District Court is without jurisdiction to grant further mandamus or injunctive relief as requested by Relators. Juvenile Court retains jurisdiction over all disputes requiring the interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 and involving a delinquency proceeding or any ancillary disputes arising out of the proceeding. La. C.C.P. art. 1878 provides that “[f]urther relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.” Id. (emphasis added).
Any other relief sought with respect to the actual detainment of the Detained Youth, a continued custody order, or an interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822 is subject to Juvenile Court jurisdiction. The nature of all emergency evacuation policies at detention centers is such they attach to and are applicable to all detainees at a detention facility. Thus, if it is declared that Juvenile Court authorized the adoption and enforcement of the Policy, then the Policy in effect and by operation of law modifies all continued custody orders of the Detained Youth existing at the time of the authorization and supplements all continued custody orders rendered after the authorization. In other words, when the Detained Youth are detained at JJIC through a continued custody order of Juvenile Court, JJICs policies are made a part thereof.
Relators allege that the Policy continues to be in effect at JJIC and that a family of a Detained Youth was unaware of the Policy until the morning of Hurricane Ida. Attorneys for the Detained Youth can file a motion for preadjudication relief in the delinquency proceeding of each of the Detained Youth under La. Childrens Code art. 865 and object to the continued custody of the Detained Youth in JJIC due to the Policy. Moreover, such a motion in Juvenile Court may be granted “without a contradictory hearing when mover is clearly entitled thereto without supporting proof.” La. Ch. C. art. 865(C). Additionally, attorneys for the Detained Youth can file discovery motions under La. Ch. C. art. 866 to ascertain the emergency housing policies in place at JJIC and whether Juvenile Court authorized the Policys enforcement at JJIC.
The law allows the Detained Youth to seek expedited juvenile justice relief not only in Juvenile Court through preadjudicated motion and discovery practice but also in District Court. District Court enjoys limited jurisdiction to decide Relators’ request for a declaratory judgment but only as to whether the City illegally enforced the Policy without a Juvenile Court order. Moreover, if so found, Relators can request District Court to compel the City to develop a new emergency housing policy prior to the 2022 hurricane season. All other claims for relief must be bought in Juvenile Court as they relate to the Detained Youths continued custody orders and interpretation of La. Ch. C. art. 822.
Thus, based upon my review of the writ application and the applicable law, I find that a portion of the Relators’ petition falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of Juvenile Court. I would vacate the judgment and allow Relators time to amend their petition. Relators are able to cure the aforementioned jurisdictional deficiencies through amendment or dismissal of certain claims. Therefore, I find granting Relators a delay to amend their pleadings the appropriate remedy.
FOOTNOTES
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. La. Ch. C. art. 822 provides:A. Following the hearing required by Article 819, the court may order a child alleged to have committed a delinquent act or alleged to have violated probation or parole for a delinquent act, continued in custody in a licensed public or private facility for juveniles, if licensure is required by law for such a facility, or in a private home subject to the supervision of the court or in a juvenile detention center.B. The court shall not place a child alleged to be delinquent in the custody of either the department of Children and Family Services or the department of Public Safety and Corrections prior to adjudication.C. No child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be held in an adult jail or lockup.
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. See La. R.S. 13:1566.
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. La. Ch. C. arts. 303(1) and 303(11).
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. La. Ch. C. art. 303, Comment-2001.
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. I note that the CEA dated May 7, 2021 refers to Dixon Correctional Institute while the affidavits submitted by Relators refer to Elayn Hunt Correctional Center. Nonetheless, the pertinent factual allegation of Relators accepted as true for the purpose of this exception by all parties is that JJICs emergency evacuation policy requires that during emergencies the Detained Youth would be housed in state run facility that also houses adults.
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. This dissent does not interpret the term “adult prison” as used in Article 822(C), which was enacted “to bring Louisiana law into compliance with the requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act” of 1993. La. Ch. C. art. 822, Comment-1991. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5039 (“No juvenile committed, whether pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency or conviction for an offense, to the custody of the Attorney General may be placed or retained in an adult jail or correctional institution in which he has regular contact with adults incarcerated because they have been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial on criminal charges. Every juvenile who has been committed shall be provided with adequate food, heat, light, sanitary facilities, bedding, clothing, recreation, counseling, education, training, and medical care including necessary psychiatric, psychological, or other care and treatment. Whenever possible, the Attorney General shall commit a juvenile to a foster home or community-based facility located in or near his home community.”).
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. The record is not fully developed, and I recognize that some inferences are improper to make when reviewing an exception. Courts have found that a remand to the district court is warranted to allow for an efficient determination of the facts upon evidence and testimony. See e.g. Beasley v. Nezi, LLC, 2016-1080, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/8/17), 227 So.3d 308, 315-16 (Holdridge, J., dissenting)(where the majority made an improper inference as to a factual determination that a managers actions were employment-related). Due to the severity of the allegations presented in this case and the fast approaching 2022 hurricane season, a remand is not appropriate to timely address the alleged infringements.
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. La. Admin Code. tit. 67, pt. V, § 6969 (“Emergency and Safety”).
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. La Const. art. V, § 19.
JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS
LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.