MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Ranjana Jha, brought this action pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, seeking judicial review of a decision of the Department of Early Education and Care (EEC), to impose sanctions on, and the subsequent decision to suspend and not renew, Jhas Family Child Care License (the 2020 case). A judge of the Superior Court allowed EECs cross motion for judgment on the pleadings and judgment entered dismissing Jhas complaint. On appeal Jha contends (1) it was error for the judge to deny as moot her complaint in an earlier action (the 2019 case) because she was entitled to a hearing before the imposition of sanctions, and (2) the decision to suspend and not renew her license was not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
1. Mootness. In 2019, Jha sought judicial review of EECs imposition of sanctions that reduced the number of children enrolled in her program and prevented her from accepting new enrollees. The judge dismissed the case as moot because, by the time the case was filed and considered, subsequent events occurred that resulted in the suspension and nonrenewal of Jhas license.
Jha contends that the judge erred in dismissing her complaint as moot because she was entitled to a hearing before the EEC imposed sanctions, the failure to hold a hearing violated her due process rights, and the case was not moot. Jha did not appeal the dismissal of the 2019 case, so that issue is not properly before us. See DeLucia v. Kfoury, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 170 (2018) (“notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite” to consideration of matter on appeal).
Even if we were to consider her arguments, the claim that EEC failed to hold a hearing is unavailing. After the EEC suspended her license, Jha received an evidentiary hearing before the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA), at which time Jha and EEC presented evidence about the entire case, including the circumstances leading up to the 2019 sanctions. Thus, Jha received a hearing at which she presented evidence pertaining to the sanctions, suspension, and nonrenewal.
2. Suspension and nonrenewal. Jha further maintains that EECs refusal to renew her license was an abuse of discretion because the emergency suspension was not supported by the evidence. However, because Jha has not provided us with a full transcript of the evidentiary hearing before DALA; she provided a partial transcript in the trial court and no transcript on appeal, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of her claims. “That a transcript must be submitted to support a claim that the evidence was insufficient is not some hypertechnical requirement, but a reflection of the fact that resolution of such a claim requires the reviewing court to see the entirety of the evidence that was presented.” Covell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 766, 782 (2003).
Jha argues that the full transcript was not required because, according to her, the only claim that was contested was whether the children were taken upstairs or outside, and the other evidence supported her argument that she was in compliance with agency regulations. Nevertheless, submission of a portion of the transcript, as opposed to the entire transcript, is only allowed if both parties have agreed to limit the record on appeal. See Covell, 439 Mass. at 783. EEC has not stipulated to the limited record, and “[o]n this ground alone, the department should prevail.” Id.
Even if reviewed on the merits, based on the record provided, the evidence fully supports DALAs finding that Jhas failure to comply with agency regulations resulted in an emergency situation endangering the life, health, or safety of the children enrolled in her program.
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Jhas violations of the regulations, as found by DALA, include: Jha was observed caring for eight children alone; individuals were present in the day care without the required background checks; children were sleeping behind closed doors; and, Jha provided misleading information to EEC staff. That is, she said she called parents to pick up their children but in fact had not contacted the parents. She could not recall the name of an unidentified woman helping her care for the children. She attempted to hide two infants from agency employees during an unannounced visit to her program. In addition, she ignored the enrollment reduction and freeze order; records concerning the children were missing; Jha and her assistant had outstanding requirements to complete professional education hours; a childs Epi-pen had expired; and Jha was not present at the program while ten children were supervised by an assistant who had an expired certification and had not completed a background check. DALA was entitled to assess the credibility of the parties and weigh the evidence in making these findings. See Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 336 (2012). Jhas argument in essence minimizes the seriousness of the observed conduct.
Conclusion. The judgment of dismissal on the order granting EECs cross motion and denying Jhas cross motion is therefore affirmed.
So ordered.
affirmed
FOOTNOTES
2
. We give “substantial deference” to credibility determinations made by the hearing officer who heard the witnesses testify. See Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 Mass. 333, 336 (2012).