Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief, raising five assignments of error. In the underlying criminal case, petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of compelling prostitution (Counts 1, 3, and 5), ORS 167.017, after nonunanimous verdicts of the jury, and three counts of promoting prostitution (Counts 2, 4, and 6), ORS 167.012, after unanimous verdicts of the jury. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and, in his second amended petition, alleged nine claims for relief. The post-conviction court denied petitioners claims.
On appeal, petitioner raises five assignments of error. The first three of those assignments concern petitioners claims for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his criminal trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance with respect to jury unanimity issues (fourth and fifth post-conviction claims) and a standalone claim that his convictions were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment jury unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020) (sixth post-conviction claim). The superintendent concedes that the post-conviction court erred in its conclusion that Ramos does not apply retroactively and that we should reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings concerning Counts 1, 3, and 5. Relying on Jones v. Brown, 370 Or. 649, 652 n 2, 523 P.3d 82 (2022), the superintendent nevertheless asks us to affirm the post-conviction courts denial of relief on petitioners third and ninth claims for post-conviction relief (fourth and fifth assignments of error on appeal) because “resolution of [those] claims for relief could implicate all petitioners convictions, including those that arose from unanimous verdicts[.]”
The Oregon Supreme Court recently concluded that a conviction obtained in violation of the jury unanimity rule constitutes a “substantial denial” of a constitutional right and “renders the conviction void”—even when the conviction became final before the unanimity rule was announced—and requires post-conviction relief under ORS 138.530(1)(a), unless a procedural defense in the Post-Conviction Hearings Act (PCHA) has been successfully raised and sustained. Watkins v. Ackley, 370 Or. 604, 633, 523 P.3d 86 (2022). Because petitioner was denied his constitutional right to a conviction that was based on a unanimous verdict on Counts 1, 3, and 5, as the superintendent concedes, and because the superintendent has not raised any of the procedural defenses set out in the PCHA, we agree that it was error for the post-conviction court to deny petitioner relief based on his sixth claim for relief. See Marshall v. Myers, 324 Or App 126, 524 P.3d 992 (2023) (holding same). Resolution of petitioners standalone claim renders all other challenges moot as to Counts 1, 3, and 5. See Huggett v. Kelly, 370 Or. 645, 648 n 3, 523 P.3d 84 (2022) (relying on Watkins to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief for nonunanimous jury verdicts on multiple counts, and concluding that it was, therefore, not necessary to address petitioners other claims on those counts because the claims were moot).
Defendant was convicted by unanimous verdict on three counts, Counts 2, 4, and 6, so we turn to petitioners fourth and fifth assignments of error, both of which are unrelated to the jury unanimity rule and neither of which have been rendered moot by our resolution of the standalone claim. See Jones, 370 Or. at 652 n 2, 523 P.3d 82 (relying on Watkins to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to those convictions that had been reached by nonunanimous jury verdicts, while rejecting various other assignments with respect to those convictions reached by unanimous jury verdicts).
We review the denial of post-conviction relief for legal error, and we are bound by the post-conviction courts factual findings when they are supported by evidence in the record. Green v. Franke, 357 Or. 301, 312, 350 P.3d 188 (2015).
In his fourth assignment, petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in denying his third post-conviction claim that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to object to improper vouching testimony. “Vouching” is the expression of ones personal opinion about the credibility of a witness. State v. Sperou, 365 Or. 121, 128, 442 P.3d 581 (2019). Witnesses are not permitted to give vouching testimony. Id. That prohibition is designed to serve “the policy goals of ensuring that the jury remains the sole arbiter of witness credibility and that the jurys role in assessing witness credibility is not usurped by another witnesss opinion testimony.” State v. Chandler, 360 Or. 323, 330, 380 P.3d 932 (2016). Whether testimony constitutes improper vouching is a legal question, State v. Smith, 309 Or App 268, 282, 482 P.3d 174 (2021), and each statement must be considered in the context in which it was made, Sperou, 365 Or. at 128, 442 P.3d 581.
At issue is Detective Opitzs testimony that, when he first contacted the victim, she “wasnt very cooperative,” she was “very closed,” and she was “very guarded.” He also testified that, as the investigation progressed, the victim became more “cooperative” and “open” as she answered all his questions. Opitz further testified that in his experience, sex-trafficking victims tend to be uncooperative at first. They tend “to have deception or youre going to have—usually youre going to have victims that arent going to tell the truth.” As the investigation proceeds, however, “the victim will come full circle,” and begin to cooperate. Defendant argues that that testimony amounts to vouching. The post-conviction court concluded that the detectives testimony was not vouching and, therefore, that trial counsel had not been ineffective in not objecting to it.
The post-conviction court did not err. Opitz did not offer his opinion that the victim was or was not telling the truth. At most, he offered testimony about the dynamics of sex-trafficking investigations that might have been helpful to the jury in reaching its own determination about the victims credibility, but he did not testify either directly or indirectly that the victim was or was not credible. See State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436-37, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) (court held that, although no witness may give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth, an expert may testify generally about the dynamics of recantation and he may give his opinion as to whether the victims conduct was consistent with that dynamic); State v. Remme, 173 Or App 546, 558, 23 P.3d 374 (2001) (“[I]t is one thing to educate the jury about an unusual phenomenon bearing on credibility, but it [is] quite another to ‘connect the dots’ explicitly * * *. * * * At least the last ‘dot’ must be left ‘unconnected.’ ”). Opitz did not vouch for the victims credibility. There was no vouching testimony to which petitioners counsel should have objected. Petitioner has, thus, not demonstrated that his lawyer failed to exercise objectively reasonable professional skill and judgment by not raising a vouching objection. Davis v. Cain, 304 Or App 356, 363, 467 P.3d 816 (2020); see also Mandell v. Cain, 315 Or App 471, 473, 500 P.3d 762 (2021) (concluding that trial counsels lack of vouching objection was reasonable given that testimony was not vouching and therefore the petitioner was not prejudiced by the omission of any such objection). The post-conviction court did not err in denying relief as to petitioners third post-conviction claim.
Petitioners fifth assignment of error is based on a cumulative error theory. Oregon courts have yet to recognize such a theory and we accordingly reject that assignment. Monica v. Myers, 319 Or App 376, 386-87, 510 P.3d 238 (2022).
Reversed and remanded as to petitioners sixth post-conviction claim; otherwise affirmed.
MOONEY, J.