¶1. Tai Curry Fox (Curry) appeals the Rankin County Chancery Courts denial of her request to modify the child-custody agreement between Curry and her ex-husband, John Fox III (Fox). Finding error, we reverse the chancellors judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶2. Curry and Fox divorced in 2012. The parties were awarded joint legal and physical custody of their minor child, G.F.,
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who was born in 2010. Curry and Fox eventually agreed to share physical custody of G.F. on a week-to-week basis. In April 2018, an order was entered reflecting the new week-to-week custody agreement.
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¶3. In December 2018, Curry began working periodically as an emergency room veterinarian at a friends practice in Florida. Due to the higher salary, Curry eventually began working full-time in Florida on the weeks when she did not have physical custody of G.F. In February 2021, Curry moved her permanent residence to Florida, but she maintained her apartment in Rankin County.
¶4. Curry eventually received an opportunity to buy the veterinary practice in Florida and open her own emergency room, which would require Curry to be in Florida full-time. On December 8, 2021, Curry filed a complaint for modification of custody, requesting sole physical custody of G.F.
¶5. At the hearing on Currys complaint, the chancellor heard testimony from Curry, G.F., and Currys mother, Kathy. Curry testified that her new employment as the owner of a veterinary clinic required her to be in Florida full-time; as a result, the week-to-week custody schedule would no longer be workable. G.F., who turned twelve years old on the day of the hearing, expressed his desire to live with Curry in Florida. G.F. also executed a “Childs Election Affidavit” stating his preference to live with Curry.
¶6. At the close of Currys case-in-chief, Fox moved to dismiss Currys complaint pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). After hearing arguments, the chancellor ultimately granted Foxs motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2022, the chancellor entered an order denying the relief requested in Currys complaint for modification and ruling that the parties would continue sharing joint legal and physical custody of G.F.
¶7. On August 8, 2022, Curry filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification of the chancellors July 29, 2022 judgment. The chancellor entered an order denying Currys motion for reconsideration. However, the chancellor clarified that Fox shall be required to pay one-half of the cost of sixth-grade tuition at St. Richards Catholic School for the year 2021-2022 as his contribution to the financial cost of G.F.’s education.
¶8. Curry now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. We employ a limited review of a chancellors denial of a request for modification of child custody based on a material change in circumstances. Page v. Graves, 283 So. 3d 269, 274 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). We “will affirm findings of fact by chancellors when they are supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused [his] discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. We review a chancellors interpretation and application of the law de novo. Smith v. Smith, 318 So. 3d 484, 491 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).
¶10. Additionally, “[w]e review a chancellors decision to grant a Rule 41(b) dismissal in a modification of child custody action under the deferential substantial-evidence/manifest-error standard.” Page, 283 So. 3d at 274 (¶22). We have stated that “[a] judge should grant a motion for involuntary dismissal if, after viewing the evidence fairly, rather than in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the judge would find for the defendant.” Id. at (¶21). “The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiffs evidence were all the evidence offered in the case.” Id.
DISCUSSION
¶11. Curry argues that the chancellor erred by finding that her permanent move to Florida failed to constitute a material change in circumstances that would warrant modification of the parties’ joint physical custody arrangement. Curry asserts the evidence shows that her permanent move to Florida would make the current joint custody arrangement impossible and impractical. Curry also argues that her permanent moves effect on the current custody arrangement would adversely affect G.F., and therefore modification was warranted. Curry further submits that the chancellor failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, including G.F.’s testimony, in determining whether a material change in circumstances had occurred.
¶12. When determining whether custody modification is warranted, Mississippi courts utilize a three-prong test. Hammons v. Hammons, 289 So. 3d 1214, 1218 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). First, the party seeking modification must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the home of the custodial parent since the most recent custody decree. Id. Second, “the moving party must show that the change in circumstances has an adverse effect on the minor child.” Id. at (¶17). Finally, “[m]odification must be in the best interest of the minor child.” Id. at (¶18). “Determination of the childs best interest is based on an application of the Albright[
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] factors to the facts of the case.” Id. at 1219 (¶18).
¶13. We first turn to examine whether Curry met her burden of proving that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custodial decree. “A change in circumstances is a change in the overall living conditions in which the child is found ․” Gainey v. Edington, 24 So. 3d 333, 336 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984)). “In analyzing whether a material change of circumstances has occurred, the chancellor must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Domke v. Domke, 305 So. 3d 1233, 1240 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Events which would not, alone, be a sufficient material change may in combination provide a basis for modifying custody.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 12.12[a], at 453 (3d ed. 2020). “A move by one joint custodian will almost always be a material change in circumstances warranting a change to sole physical custody in one parent.” Id. § 12.12[5][a], at 468; see also Elliott v. Elliott, 877 So. 2d 450, 455 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that “the moving of one party is sufficient grounds for modification because it makes joint custody impractical or impossible”).
¶14. The record reflects that in April 2018, Curry and Fox entered an agreed order reflecting that they would share joint physical custody of G.F. on a week-to-week basis. At this time, Curry worked at a small animal practice in Jackson, Mississippi. Curry testified that in December 2018, a friend asked Curry to come to Florida and help out at her veterinary practice there. Curry initially began working in Florida on the weeks that she did not have physical custody of G.F. On the weeks when she had physical custody of G.F., Curry worked part-time in Jackson.
¶15. Curry testified that she fell in love with her work in Florida and that it paid more than her job in Mississippi. In December 2020, Curry bought a house in Florida, but she still maintained her apartment in Rankin County. Curry filed a change-of-address form with the Rankin County Chancery Court in February 2021, stating that she legally moved her residence to Florida.
¶16. Curry testified that she eventually had the opportunity to open her own emergency veterinary clinic in Florida. Curry explained that opening her own clinic required her to be in Florida every week, so it was impossible for her to maintain the current week-to-week custody schedule. As a result, Curry filed her complaint for modification of custody in December 2021, requesting sole physical custody of G.F. Curry testified that the lease agreement for her apartment in Rankin County expired in May 2022 and that her new clinic was scheduled to open in August 2022.
¶17. Curry also testified that she and G.F. have a close relationship. Curry explained that in her household, G.F. is an only child, so she is able to focus more time on him. Curry stated that her new employment rendered the current custody arrangement unworkable, and she opined that keeping the current arrangement would not be in G.F.’s best interest.
¶18. Kathy, Currys mom, also testified regarding Currys relationship with G.F., describing it as close. Kathy explained that G.F. talks to Curry about his feelings and that G.F. and Curry communicate well with each other. Kathy testified that she and Currys father live with Curry in Florida, and they help Curry care for G.F. when needed.
¶19. The chancellor also heard testimony from G.F. On the day of the hearing, G.F. executed his Childs Election Affidavit stating his preference to move to Florida and live with Curry. G.F. testified that he preferred to live with Curry because he felt that she loved him and treated him fairly. G.F. explained that he could talk openly with Curry.
¶20. As for his relationship with Fox, G.F. testified that he loved his father, but G.F. stated that he felt like an outsider at Foxs home. G.F. also testified that Fox makes G.F. “feel bad about [his] decisions sometimes,” and G.F. gave the example of when he told Fox he wanted to move to Florida and live with Curry. According to G.F., Fox responded to the news by telling G.F. that he would miss out on time with his fathers side of the family and doubting that Curry would let G.F. return to Mississippi and visit.
¶21. The record reflects that Fox is remarried, and G.F. has a paternal half-sister and half-brother whom he sees on the weeks when Fox has physical custody. G.F.’s half-sister is approximately eleven weeks older than him, and G.F. testified that he is not as close to his half-sister as he would like to be. G.F. testified that he enjoys playing with his three-year-old half-brother. G.F. also testified that he gets along “pretty well” with his stepmother. When asked if he would like to live with Fox for ten months out of the year and with Curry for only two months, G.F. stated that it would be “okay,” but he clarified that this hypothetical custody arrangement would not be “perfect.”
¶22. G.F. also testified about his relationship with his grandparents. G.F. stated that he enjoyed spending time with his fathers mother in the summer. As stated, Currys parents moved to Florida and lived with Curry at her new home. G.F. testified that he gets along “very well” with his maternal grandparents. Kathy also testified and confirmed that she and G.F. “have a great relationship.”
¶23. At the close of Currys case-in-chief, Fox moved to dismiss Currys complaint. Fox argued that Curry failed to show a material change in circumstances other than “the fact that [Curry] has decided to buy a house in Florida and move full time down in Florida[.]” Fox further claimed that Currys employment opportunity was not “new” because Curry had already been living and working in Florida every other week for the past two years.
¶24. Foxs attorney also referenced an October 2020 hearing on the parties’ motions for contempt, and he argued that the October 2020 hearing would have been the appropriate time for Curry to move to modify custody rather than waiting until December 2021. The chancellor agreed. However, Currys attorney responded that at the time of the October 2020 hearing, Curry was still working in Florida every other week, and she still maintained her residence in Rankin County. Currys attorney explained that the opportunity to purchase and open the emergency clinic did not arise until after the October 2020 hearing.
¶25. As stated, the parties’ week-to-week custody arrangement was established in April 2018. The only document relating to the October 2020 hearing in the record before us is the chancellors October 23, 2020 “Order of Contempt,” which provides that the October 2020 hearing addressed the following motions: (1) Currys motion requesting the chancellor to find Fox in contempt for failing to pay his half of G.F.’s tuition, (2) Foxs motion for modification of child custody, and (3) Foxs motion requesting that the chancellor find Curry in contempt as a result of Currys inability (due to COVID-19 travel restrictions) to return G.F. to Mississippi from Florida in time for Fox to have his week of custody. The order reflects that the chancellor ultimately found Fox in contempt for failure to pay his half of G.F.’s tuition and dismissed Foxs motion for modification and motion to find Curry in contempt.
¶26. After hearing arguments, the chancellor granted Foxs Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss and denied Currys request for modification. The chancellor held that he did not find that “any material change adverse to the welfare of this child occurring in Mr. Foxs home ․ [that would] justify me changing the custody or me going ․ into an Albright analysis, because other than [Curry] living in Florida, ․ nothing has changed[.]” The chancellor explained that as of the October 2020 hearing, the parties’ circumstances had not changed “other than that instead of coming back up here every other week, [Curry is] staying there full time now.” The chancellor also stated that Curry was already living in Florida when the October 2020 order was entered.
¶27. However, the record reflects that the October 2020 hearing addressed the parties’ motions for contempt and Foxs motion for modification and did not establish or modify the custody arrangement. Our caselaw is clear that the moving party must prove that “a material change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody decree.” Powell v. Powell, 976 So. 2d 358, 361 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Neither party disputes that the April 2018 agreed order is the order that sets forth the current week-to-week custody arrangement. At the time the April 2018 order was entered, Curry was living in Mississippi full-time. Curry testified that she did not begin working in Florida until December 2018.
¶28. As acknowledged, “[a] move by one joint custodian will almost always be a material change in circumstances warranting a change to sole physical custody in one parent.” Bell, supra ¶13, § 12.12[5][a], at 468. However, “the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child-custody modification purposes.” Domke, 305 So. 3d at 1240 (¶18) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dispositive issue is “the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement.” Id. This Court has held that “the moving of one party is sufficient grounds for modification because it makes joint custody impractical or impossible.” Elliott, 877 So. 2d at 455 (¶18).
¶29. At the hearing, Curry testified that she was no longer employed in a capacity that allowed her to spend half of her time in Mississippi as she had done since December 2018. Curry explained that her new employment as the owner of an emergency veterinary clinic would require her to be in Florida full-time. We find that Currys testimony shows that the parties’ week-to-week custody arrangement would become impractical and difficult for Curry to maintain. See Porter v. Porter, 23 So. 3d 438, 447 (¶24) (Miss. 2009) (affirming chancellors finding that a mothers move to Tennessee made the joint custody arrangement impractical and accordingly constituted a material change in circumstances adverse to the childrens best interest); Lackey v. Fuller, 755 So. 2d 1083, 1088-89 (¶¶25-30) (Miss. 2000) (finding that a mothers move to New York made exchange of custody every two weeks impractical); Rinehart v. Barnes, 819 So. 2d 564, 566 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming chancellors modification of joint physical custody to sole physical custody after finding that “shared custody agreement between parents of a child of school age, living in two different states, would be quite difficult to maintain”); Massey v. Huggins, 799 So. 2d 902, 906 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing that in some cases, modification in custody is warranted when a joint custody arrangement becomes impractical after one or both parents moved); McRee v. McRee, 723 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (¶¶5-8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a mothers move to Texas made a month-to-month custody agreement impractical).
¶30. We also find that the chancellor failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, including how Currys inability to maintain the current custody arrangement would affect G.F. See Lackey, 755 So. 2d at 1088 (¶24); see also Culver v. Culver, No. 2021-CA-01108-COA, 2023 WL 3594128, at *4 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. Ct. App. May 23, 2023) (affirming chancellors finding that a mothers move to Virginia constituted a material change in circumstances adverse to the welfare of the minor children where the chancellor considered the totality of the circumstances and based his decision on the impact of the move on the children). As stated, the dispositive factor in determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred is not the move itself but, rather, “the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement.” Domke, 305 So. 3d at 1240 (¶18). In finding no material change in circumstances adverse to G.F., the chancellors bench ruling reflects that he largely based his determination on the fact that Curry was the one who made the decision to obtain full-time employment in Florida, rather than continuing to work there part-time, and that Fox should not be “punished” for Currys choices by having his custody arrangement modified. The chancellor did not make any express findings as to how Currys full-time residence in Florida, which would make the current custody arrangement difficult and impractical, would affect G.F. However, it is clear from the record that when considering the totality of circumstances, Currys move renders the current joint custody arrangement unworkable and constitutes a material change in circumstances adverse to G.F.
¶31. After our review, we find that Curry presented sufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances adverse to G.F. to survive the Rule 41(b) dismissal. As stated, the standard for granting a Rule 41(b) dismissal is “if, after viewing the evidence fairly, rather than in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the judge would find for the defendant.” Page, 283 So. 3d at 274 (¶21). We therefore reverse the chancellors judgment denying Currys complaint for modification and remand this case to the chancellor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because Curry met her burden of showing an adverse material change, “the next step is to apply the Albright factors to determine whether modification is in the childs best interest.” Id. at 287 (¶76) (quoting White v. White, 26 So. 3d 342, 351 (¶28) (Miss. 2010)).
¶32. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FOOTNOTES
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. To protect the minor childs privacy, we will refer to the child throughout this opinion as “G.F.”
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. The parties’ April 2018 agreed order is not in the record before us.
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. Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.