¶1 Tracy
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appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her two sons, Derek and Drew, based upon a continuing need of protection or services.
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Tracy argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it failed to consider whether Derek and Drew had substantial relationships with their older siblings and whether terminating Tracys parental rights would be harmful to those relationships. We disagree and therefore affirm the courts ruling.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In January 2020, Derek and Drew were removed from Tracys care. The circuit court ordered that Derek and Drew be placed in a foster home. Due to the childrens behavior, Derek and Drew were moved to their current level four treatment foster home, in November 2020.
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The current foster family has been providing children with foster care for over ten years and they have specialized training in caring for traumatized children.
¶3 In December 2020, and as relevant here, the circuit court suspended contact between Tracy and Derek and Drew. The Chippewa County Department of Human Services petitioned for the termination of Tracys parental rights, on grounds that her children were in a continuing need of protection or services (CHIPS). In October 2022, following a bench trial, the court found grounds to terminate Tracys parental rights to both boys, and further found Tracy unfit to parent Derek and Drew pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4). The court then scheduled a dispositional hearing to determine Dereks and Drews best interests. At the dispositional hearing, the Department called two witnesses to testify concerning Dereks and Drews best interests.
¶4 The Departments first witness was Sara Torrence, Derek and Drews social worker. Torrence testified that Derek and Drew did not have a substantial relationship with Tracy, neither boy had any contact with Tracy for over two years, and no one in Tracys family other than the boys’ siblings had substantial relationships with the boys. Torrence stated that Derek and Drew had relationships with their siblings and that they still had contact with their siblings. Torrence also testified that, in her opinion as a social worker, it was in Dereks and Drews best interests to terminate Tracys parental rights.
¶5 The Departments second witness was Derek and Drews foster mother. She testified that Derek and Drew did not refer to Tracy as “mom” and had never asked to see Tracy. She also stated that Derek and Drew had relationships with their siblings. The foster mother further testified that she had to temporarily stop contact between Derek and Drew and their sister, Dina, due to Dinas mental health issues, and because the foster parents felt that contact with her was not currently safe.
¶6 The foster mother testified that she and her husband, however, had tried to maintain visits between Derek and Drew and all of their siblings. The foster parents had: hosted a family feast, and all of Derek and Drews siblings were invited to attend; they took Derek and Drew to a restaurant to meet with their siblings, Adam and Stacy; and they invited Dina to their home multiple times. The foster mother stated that it was “[a]bsolutely” their intention to continue to maintain a relationship among Derek, Drew, and their siblings as “its important to have that biological connection because otherwise the children really struggle to find a place in the world.”
¶7 Tracy testified that, among other things, she wanted all of her children to be together in the same home. The circuit court then weighed each of the six factors in WIS. STAT. § 48.426 to determine each childs best interests. The court found the following: (1) there was a high likelihood that Derek and Drew would be adopted; (2) Derek and Drew had been living with their foster parents for over two years and had been thriving under their care; (3) none of Tracys relatives had substantial relationships with Derek and Drew, and Tracy had not contacted her children in over two years; (4) Derek and Drew wished to have their last name changed to their foster parents’ last name; (5) Derek and Drew had been out of Tracys home for three years; and (6) Derek and Drew were in a strong, positive support system where their needs were being met.
¶8 After making these findings, the circuit court stated that all six factors indicated that it was in Dereks and Drews best interests to terminate Tracys parental rights. The court terminated Tracys parental rights to Derek and Drew. Tracy now appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶9 On appeal, Tracy argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at the dispositional hearing when it terminated her parental rights. Specifically, Tracy contends that the court failed to sufficiently consider, as required by statute, whether Derek and Drew have a substantial relationship with their siblings and whether terminating Tracys parental rights would be harmful to Dereks and Drews relationships with their siblings. We disagree.
¶10 A circuit courts ultimate decision of whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary. Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1996). We will not reverse the courts decision unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶32, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. A court “properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d at 152.
¶11 A contested proceeding for the termination of parental rights involves a two-step procedure. Only the second step is at issue here.
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Having found that grounds exist to terminate Tracys parental rights and that Tracy was unfit to parent Derek and Drew, the circuit court was required to determine whether to terminate Tracys parental rights at a dispositional hearing. See Sheboygan Cnty. Dept of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶¶26, 28, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. The court must consider the best interests of the child at this stage of the proceedings. WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2). To determine the best interests of the child, the court must consider, but is not limited to, the following six factors:
(a) The likelihood of the childs adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other family members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the conditions of the childs current placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of prior placements.
Sec. 48.426(3).
¶12 In this case, Tracy contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c) by not considering Dereks and Drews relationships with their biological siblings. Tracy concedes that the court properly considered the five other statutory factors.
¶13 The record belies Tracys argument. The circuit court considered whether the children had a substantial relationship with their mother or other family members, stating “[t]here was testimony that none of the relatives of [Tracy] have a substantial relationship with [Derek and Drew] and, additionally, that [Tracy] hasnt had contact with the children in over two years.” The court further found that it would not be harmful to the children to sever their relationships with their mother and her relatives.
¶14 Tracy correctly states that the circuit court did not specifically mention Dereks and Drews relationships with their siblings and that Dereks and Drews relationships with their siblings were severed by the termination of her parental rights. See Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶¶19-21. However, we conclude that the record supports the courts implicit finding that severance of Tracys parental rights would not be harmful to Dereks and Drews relationships with their siblings. See Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737 (“Although the proper exercise of discretion contemplates that the [court] explain its reasoning, when the court does not do so, we may search the record to determine if it supports the courts discretionary decision.”).
¶15 The circuit court heard how the foster parents supported the childrens relationships with their siblings. They invited Dina over to their house multiple times and took Derek and Drew to meet their siblings at a restaurant. Additionally, their foster mother stated that they had held a family feast, inviting Derek and Drews siblings to attend, and they intended to do so again. The foster mother stated that future contact was “[a]bsolutely” the foster familys intention. There was no testimony or evidence in the record to suggest that severing Tracys parental rights would be harmful to Dereks and Drews relationships with their siblings.
¶16 Tracy argues that the foster mothers testimony regarding her desire to continue contact with Derek and Drews siblings should not be considered evidence that it would not be harmful to sever Tracys parental rights because “[a] promise of continued contact ‘made today may be broken in the future.’ ” See Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶28. Tracy argues that instead, this court should interpret the foster mothers testimony to show that severing Tracys parental rights would harm the emotional and psychological bonds between Derek, Drew, and their siblings. We disagree.
¶17 While the circuit court is not required to rely on an adoptive parents promises to continue contact with a childs birth family, “[i]n its discretion, the court may afford due weight to an adoptive parents stated intent to continue visitation with family members.” Id., ¶29. Here, we can reasonably infer that the court relied on the foster mothers promises to continue contact. The court heard that the foster parents had extensive training regarding traumatized children, had been fostering children for over ten years, and that they believed it was important for Derek and Drew to “have a biological connection” so that they would not “struggle to find a place in the world.” Further, the court heard the various ways that the foster parents maintained contact between Derek, Drew, and their siblings, as well as their plans to host future family gatherings. Thus, the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c) when it ultimately found it in Dereks and Drews best interests to terminate Tracys parental rights.
¶18 Tracy argues that her case is like State v. Bolstad, 2021 WI App 81, 399 Wis. 2d 815, 967 N.W.2d 164, where this court concluded that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by failing to consider a mandatory statutory factor when sentencing the appellant. We disagree. Unlike the court in Bolstad, the court here explicitly addressed the statutory factor of whether Derek and Drew have substantial relationships with their parent or other family members and whether it would be harmful to sever those relationships. While the court focused its analysis on Dereks and Drews relationships with Tracy and Tracys family members, we can infer that the court relied on the foster mothers promises to continue contact between Derek, Drew, and their siblings. The court could, therefore, reasonably find that termination of Tracys rights would not be likely to harm Derek and Drew.
By the Court.—Orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
2
. For ease of reading and to protect confidentiality, we refer to the appellant in this confidential manner using a pseudonym, rather than her initials, and we do the same for any of the appellants family members referenced in this opinion.
3
. Cases appealed under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.107 are “given preference and shall be taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the appellants reply.” RULE 809.107(6)(e). Conflicts in this courts calendar have resulted in a delay. It is therefore necessary for this court to sua sponte extend the deadline for a decision in this case. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2)(a); Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D., 191 Wis. 2d 680, 694, 530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, we extend our deadline to the date this decision is issued.
4
. To qualify as a level four treatment foster home, a foster family must meet heightened requirements including being foster parents for a specified number of years and receiving specialized training for traumatized children.
5
. Tracy does not challenge the circuit courts findings with respect to the grounds phase of the proceedings. Rather, Tracy challenges only the courts findings during the dispositional phase.
GILL, J.1
FN1. These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.