This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Georgia. In the original case, Golden Peanut Company, LLC v. Miller (“Miller I”),
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we granted the application for interlocutory appeal filed by defendants Golden Peanut Company, LLC, and its parent company, Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”) (Case Number A21A1269). Plaintiffs Ross Miller, individually and as next friend and natural guardian of his minor son and the administrator of Kristie Millers estate, and Hayden Miller, Kristies adult son, (collectively “Miller”) filed a cross-appeal (Case Number A21A1270). We affirmed the denial of Millers motion to exclude certain evidence in Case Number A21A1270 and reversed the denial of Golden Peanuts and ADMs motions for summary judgment and related motions for reconsideration and clarification in Case Number A21A1269. In Miller v. Golden Peanut Company, LLC (“Miller II”),
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the Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to consider:
1. Under what circumstances must a law enforcement officer who conducts an investigation of an accident in the course of his official duties be qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) if called to testify in a civil case resulting from the accident as both a fact witness and an expert witness? How is the portion of the testimony considered to be expert testimony to be determined?
2. If such a law enforcement officer must be qualified as an expert under OCGA § 24-7-702 (b), did the trial court properly deny the motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony and part of the officers report in this case?3
The Supreme Court held that the portion of the investigating officers testimony that was disputed constituted expert testimony within the meaning of OCGA § 24-7-702 (“Rule 702”)
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and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to fully exercise its gatekeeping function under Rule 702.
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“Specifically, the trial court did not consider either the reliability or helpfulness of [the officers] testimony.”
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In directing us to vacate the trial courts order and remand the case for further proceedings, the Supreme Court reiterated that “an appellate court should not conduct the analysis of the experts methodology in the first instance.”
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Now that the case is before us on remand, we vacate Division 4 (addressing Case Number A21A1270) of our opinion in Miller I. The Supreme Courts opinion in Miller II is adopted and made the judgment of this Court for Division 4. We therefore vacate the trial courts order denying Millers motion to exclude certain portions of the investigating officers testimony and the Georgia State Patrols Specialized Collision Reconstruction Team (“SCRT”) report. The Supreme Court of Georgia did not address or consider Divisions 1 through 3 of our earlier opinion, in which we reversed the orders denying Golden Peanuts and ADMs motions for summary judgment and related motions for reconsideration and clarification. Because Divisions 1 through 3 (addressing Case Number A21A1269) are consistent with the Supreme Courts opinion, those divisions become binding upon the return of the remittitur. 8
Judgment reversed in Case no. A21A1269. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings in Case No. A21A1270.
FOOTNOTES
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. 363 Ga. App. 384, 870 S.E.2d 511 (2022).
2
. ––– Ga. ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (S22G0905 decided Aug. 21, 2023).
3
. Id. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (S22G0905 at *4).
4
. Miller II, ––– Ga. at –––– (1) (a), ––– S.E.2d –––– (S22G0905 at *8-*10).
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. Id. at –––– (2), ––– S.E.2d –––– (S22G0905 at *14 (2)).
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. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)).
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. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller II, ––– Ga. at –––– (2), ––– S.E.2d –––– (S22G0905 at *15-*16 (2)).
8
. See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563 (1), 554 S.E.2d 465 (2001).
Watkins, Judge.
Doyle, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.