MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] L.Z. appeals his adjudication as delinquent for committing dangerous possession of a firearm. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 18, 2023, an incident involving firearms occurred at a gas station in Marion County. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Jacob Chestnut assisted with the firearms investigation. On July 19, 2023, Officer Kurt Spivey observed two male subjects who were suspects in the gas station incident walking in an apartment complex. The two subjects looked at Officer Spivey and “took off running” around the corner of a building. Transcript Volume II at 17. Officers set up a perimeter around the apartments in the area for about an hour. Officer Chestnut conducted surveillance of a Chevrolet Malibu, eventually observed several juveniles matching the description of the suspects exit one of the apartment buildings which had been previously surrounded by police, and saw the juveniles walk along a tree line toward Raymond Street. The Malibu traveled on Raymond Street, and Officer Chestnut temporarily lost sight of the juveniles. Officer Spivey observed that the Malibu “abruptly stopped in the middle of Raymond Street.” Id. at 19. The officers concluded that the juveniles had entered the Malibu.
[3] Officer Spivey initiated a stop, and officers instructed the occupants to exit the Malibu. An adult female exited the driver seat, an adult male exited the front passenger seat, and two or three individuals, including L.Z., exited the backseat of the vehicle. “Officers went up to the car to make sure there was no one else inside and they observed firearms in plain view.” Id. at 29. Officer Chestnut observed “[h]andguns and rifles” in “the back and front seats.” Id. at 30. The police obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. The officers recovered “several firearms from the vehicle as well [as] firearms accessories such as magazines, ammunition[,] and fired cartridge casings.” Id. at 31. The officers also recovered a firearm “commonly referred to as a AR pistol” from the backseat of the Malibu. Id. at 34.
[4] On July 21, 2023, the State alleged that L.Z. committed dangerous possession of a firearm. On February 1, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing. L.Z. indicated that he was born in May 2006. The court admitted several photographs of the backseat of the Malibu depicting the position of the “AR pistol” on the floorboard behind the front passenger seat. Id. The court found that L.Z. committed the alleged delinquent act and placed him on probation with special conditions including that he complete a gun violence prevention class.
Discussion
[5] L.Z. asserts the evidence is insufficient to show that he possessed the firearm recovered from the backseat. He argues that he “was one of either two or three teenaged boys squeezed into the backseat of a mid-sized sedan where a firearm was found on the far side, near one of the car doors” and “the State failed to elicit any testimony establishing where [he] was seated.” Appellants Brief at 19. He also argues that “[w]hat is relevant was whether [he] knew a firearm was present in the car” and “on the record presented, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was in plain view of L.Z. when he was in the car.” Id. at 21.
[6] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006). Rather, we look only to the evidence most favorable to the trial courts judgment and to the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. We will affirm if there is substantial probative evidence to support the conclusion. Id.
[7] Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5(a) provides: “A child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor.”
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[8] It is well-established that possession of an item may be either actual or constructive. See Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on rehg, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997). Constructive possession occurs when a person has the capability and intent to maintain control over the contraband. Id. The capability element is met when the State shows the defendant is able to reduce the contraband to his personal possession. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). To show the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendants knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive control over the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence. Id. Some possible examples of such circumstances include (1) incriminating statements; (2) attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the items proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendants plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011). The issue is not ownership but possession. See Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6.
[9] The record reveals that L.Z. exited the backseat of the Malibu. The photographs of the backseat admitted into evidence depict the position of the “AR pistol” on the floorboard directly behind the front passenger seat and in the area where the feet of the occupant seated in the backseat behind the front passenger seat would be positioned. Transcript Volume II at 34. The firearm was large with a “barrel foregrip” and a “short stock.” Id. The police also recovered firearms accessories such as magazines and ammunition. The State presented testimony regarding the firearms investigation and the flight of the suspects prior to their detainment. In light of the record, including the proximity of the firearm to, and its position relative to, L.Z. in the backseat, irrespective of which seat he occupied, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that he had the capability to maintain control of the contraband and knew of its presence. Based upon the record and mindful of our standard of review, we conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that L.Z. committed dangerous possession of a firearm.
[10] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the courts adjudication of L.Z. as a delinquent.
[11] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. L.Z. did not assert that he possessed a firearm for a purpose described in Ind. Code § 35-47-10-1.
Brown, Judge.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.