MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] Sam Vaghani appeals the trial courts grant of summary judgment to William Dankert III and Pamela Dankert on their claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In April 2022, Vaghani and the Dankerts entered into a verbal agreement under which the Dankerts loaned Vaghani $25,000, which Vaghani was to use to buy a home from a third party. Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 9; Appellants Br. pp. 8-9; Appellees’ Br. p. 9. In September 2022, the Dankerts sued Vaghani for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, claiming that Vaghani failed to buy the home or repay the loan. Vaghani, proceeding without counsel, answered the complaint in February 2023. He claimed, primarily, that the parties had not agreed to a timeframe for repayment.
[3] In April 2023, the Dankerts moved for summary judgment. A week later, Vaghani filed a document called “Motion to Dismiss” that appeared to be his response to the Dankerts’ motion. Appellees’ App. Vol. II pp. 27-31. The document was largely incomprehensible but included several references to Indianas Statute of Frauds, Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1, which provides that certain types of agreements must be in writing to be enforceable in court. Though the document apparently served as Vaghanis response to the Dankerts’ motion for summary judgment, he didnt designate any evidence or material issues of fact under Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) (providing that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate “all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion” and “each material issue of fact which that party asserts precludes entry of summary judgment and the evidence relevant thereto”).
[4] On May 10, the trial court scheduled a hearing for September 6. Vaghani failed to appear, and the court held the hearing without him. (Vaghani didnt have the hearing transcribed for this appeal.) On September 8, the court issued an order denying Vaghanis “Motion to Dismiss” and granting the Dankerts’ motion for summary judgment. Regarding the Statute of Frauds, the court explained, “The allegation of a violation of Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense which is required to be contained in the Responsive Pleading and same was not raised by VAGHANI.” Id. at 8. The court further found that there are no genuine issues of material fact and ruled that the Dankerts are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court ordered Vaghani to pay the Dankerts $25,000 plus costs and post-judgment interest.
[5] The same day the trial court issued its order, Vaghani filed a “Motion for Continuance on Motion to Dismiss.” Vaghani, who lives in Illinois, claimed he was “not able to appear” at the hearing on September 6 “for unavailable transportation reasons.” Id. at 37. He alleged, “On the days of 09/05/2023-09/06/2023 his borrowed vehicle was not available, and his volunteered ride was canceled for the 6-HR commute travel he had scheduled. That morning he was not able to attend the court date and he called in as soon as he could.” Id. Vaghani asked for an “immediate rescheduled court date.” Id. The court, having already entered final judgment, never ruled on Vaghanis motion to continue. Vaghani filed a “Motion to Correct Error, Vacate, and Set Aside Judgment Order.” Id. at 39-45. The court held a hearing and then denied the motion. (Vaghani didnt have the hearing transcribed for this appeal.)
[6] Vaghani now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Vaghanis appellate briefs, like his trial-court filings, are hard to follow. Whats more, they dont include a single citation to the record on appeal. For example, at one point Vaghani tells us the $25,000 “was not a Loan but rather a paid-into-business partnership for the purchase and sale of land and real estate in California,” Appellants Br. p. 9, but he doesnt direct us to any record evidence of such a “paid-into-business partnership.” An appeal is not a fresh start or a second bite at the apple where the appellant can present new or additional evidence. It is a review of what happened in the trial court. That is why our appellate rules expressly require record citations throughout a brief—in the statement of the case, the statement of facts, and the argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), (6), (8). By failing to provide any such citations, Vaghani waived his appellate claims. See Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 681 n.1 (Ind. 1996) (holding that when the appellant fails to cite the record “this Court will not search the record to find grounds for reversal”).
[8] Waiver notwithstanding, Vaghani hasnt shown anything even approaching reversible error. From what we can decipher, he makes three arguments. First, he claims the Dankerts arent entitled to summary judgment because their action is barred by the Statute of Frauds. But in response to the Dankerts’ motion for summary judgment, Vaghani didnt designate any evidence showing that the parties’ agreement is one covered by the Statute of Frauds. He didnt designate any evidence at all. In any event, the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the defendants answer. Ind. Trial Rule 8(C); Jernas v. Gumz, 53 N.E.3d 434, 447-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Vaghani didnt raise the Statute of Frauds in his answer.
[9] Second, Vaghani contends he was entitled to a jury trial under Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution (“In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”). Setting aside the fact that Vaghani never requested a jury trial, this case was decided by summary judgment, a procedure specifically devised to bring an early end to cases that dont warrant trial. See Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 2003). To the extent Vaghani asserts that the very existence of summary-judgment procedure is unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 20—that any litigant who wants a jury trial is absolutely entitled to one—he failed to develop a cogent argument supported by relevant authority, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[10] Third, Vaghani argues the trial court should have granted his motion to continue the September 6 hearing—a motion he filed two days after the hearing was completed. A party seeking a continuance must show good cause. See T.R. 53.5. Here, Vaghani alleged that on “09/05/2023-09/06/2023 his borrowed vehicle was not available, and his volunteered ride was canceled for the 6-HR commute travel he had scheduled,” and that “he called in as soon as he could.” The trial court wasnt required to believe these claims, but even if they were true, Vaghani didnt specify (1) when he learned he didnt have a ride (by his own account, it may have been a full day before the hearing) or (2) when he “called in,” with whom he spoke, or what he said. Absent these details, Vaghani didnt show good cause to continue a hearing that had already been held.
[11] Affirmed.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Vaidik
Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.