MEMORANDUM DECISION
Statement of the Case
[1] Kevin L. Martin appeals from the trial courts order dismissing his complaint after review under Indianas Screening Statute, Indiana Code section 34-58-1-1 (2004). Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Kevin L. Martin is an inmate currently housed in the Pendleton Correctional Facility, serving sentences for battery and murder, with an earliest possible release date of August 18, 2046. See Indiana Dept of Correction Incarcerated Search at https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs [https://perma.cc/DQQ9-RWJW] (last visited August 7, 2024).
[3] Martin filed a complaint against three defendants in a separate cause of action, Cause Number 71D07-2305-CT-237 (the “Westerhausen Case”), alleging the defendants’ corrupt acts contributed to his conviction in a criminal proceeding. Kathryn Hough is counsel for the Westerhausen Case defendants. The trial court in the Westerhausen Case granted the Westerhausen Case defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Martins complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) without holding a hearing on July 25, 2023. Martin appealed that decision and another panel of this Court affirmed the trial courts decision. See Martin v. Westerhausen, et al., No. 23A-CT-1836 (Ind. Ct. App. June 27, 2024) (mem.), trans. pending.
[4] In the current matter, Martin has filed a complaint against Hough, contending that she failed to mail a copy of the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the Westerhausen Case defendants to Martin. He alleges that Houghs failure to mail a copy of the motion violated his Fourteenth Amendment right of due process and deprived him of fundamental fairness. The trial court found Martins complaint against Hough lacked an arguable basis in the law and was frivolous for purposes of Indiana Code section 34-58-1-1.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Martin appeals from the trial courts order dismissing his complaint. We begin by noting that Martin proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Pro se litigants are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). And Hough has filed a Notice of Noninvolvement, which this Court accepted.
[6] A motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Price v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 2017). The rule requires that we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. We review 12(B)(6) motions de novo. Id. We will affirm a dismissal if the decision is sustainable on any basis in the record. Id.
[7] The trial court was not required to hold a hearing on the Westerhausen Case defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6). See Saylor v. State, 81 N.E.3d 228, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting “[t]here is no requirement in the [12(B)(6)] rule requiring the court to conduct a hearing or oral argument upon, or to receive a response to[,] a motion to dismiss when the motion is addressed to the face of the complaint”) (quoting Cobb v. Owens, 492 N.E.2d 19, 20 (Ind. 1986)), trans. denied. Consequently, Martins due process rights were not compromised by Houghs failure to mail a copy of the motion to him. See Brodnik v. Cottage Rents LLC, 165 N.E.3d 126, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), (12(B)(6) dismissal without opportunity to respond did not compromise right to due process), trans. denied.
[8] Thus, accepting as true, the allegations in Martins complaint against Hough, namely that she did not serve him with a copy of the motion, he has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.
[9] The trial courts review in this case was conducted under the Indiana Screening Statute. Indiana Code section 34-58-1-2(a)(2) (2004) provides that an offenders claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim is not a claim upon which relief may be granted. Such is the case here. Additionally, an offenders claim may not proceed if the court determines the claim lacks an arguable basis in law. Ind. Code § 34-58-1-2(b)(2)(A). Such is also the case here. We find no error in the trial courts judgment. And on these grounds the trial court also correctly found that Martins complaint was frivolous under Indiana Code § 34-58-1-2(a)(1).
Conclusion
[10] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed Martins claim under Indianas Screening Statute because it both failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was frivolous because it lacked an arguable basis in the law.
[11] Affirmed.
Robb, Senior Judge.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.