MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Russell Glover, Sr., appeals from a separate and final judgment entered pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), 365 Mass. 820 (1974), dismissing his amended complaint against defendant Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). We affirm.
In March 2019, Glover filed a discrimination complaint with MCAD alleging discrimination by Venture Café (Venture) in a place of public accommodation in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 92A, which was dismissed in April 2019. In March 2021, Glover filed another discrimination complaint with MCAD against Venture and Kevin Wiant alleging a violation of G. L. c. 272, § 92A. On August 26, 2021, a single investigating commissioner dismissed the second complaint. On October 15, 2021, Glover appealed
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the dismissal pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 5, and 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.08(4)(b) (2020). The investigating commissioner affirmed the dismissal of the second complaint.
On November 12, 2021, Glover filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking judicial review of MCADs decision to dismiss the second discrimination complaint. A judge of the Superior Court allowed MCADs motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Acting on MCADs motion, a second judge ordered the entry of a separate and final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b). This appeal followed.
This case is controlled in all material respects by Grandoit v. Massachusetts Commn Against Discrimination, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 603 (2019). Glovers complaint for judicial review is barred by G. L. c. 151B, § 5, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Grandoit, supra at 606. See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). Put differently, a request for judicial review under G. L. c. 30A is reserved for MCAD decisions that are final and adjudicatory. See Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass. 815, 818 (1988). The decision at issue here was an informal review of the MCAD complaint at a preliminary hearing, and thus not reviewable on appeal. See Grandoit, supra at 605-607. There was no error.
Glovers request for certiorari review pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, fares no better. “To be entitled to certiorari review, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or injustice arising from the proceeding under review” (quotation and citation omitted). Grandoit, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 607. Even if the preliminary hearing at issue in this case is a quasi-judicial proceeding, Glover retained his right to file a private civil action against Venture and Wiant under G. L. c. 151B, § 9, and therefore, had another remedy available to him precluding certiorari review. See Grandoit, supra at 607-608.
Glover also challenges entry of the separate and final judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b). The judge concluded that “the interests of justice will be served by confining all future litigation regarding [Glovers] claims against the MCAD ․ to one, case appropriate, forum.” There was no error as the judge had the discretion to allow entry of a separate and final judgment “in light of judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved” (citation omitted). Barbetti v. Stempniewicz, 490 Mass. 98, 103 (2022).
Finally, “[t]o the extent that we have not specifically addressed other points made ․ in [Glovers] brief, they have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 163, 168 n.3 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
The separate and final judgment entered pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
So ordered.
FOOTNOTES
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. This appeal is referred to as a preliminary hearing. See 804 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.08(4)(b) (2020).