MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[1] Markco M. Lee (“Lee”) appeals from the trial courts order revoking his probation. He raises one issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 20, 2018, the State charged Lee in Delaware County under cause number 18C02-1808-F6-585 (“F6-585”) with four counts: Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement; Class B misdemeanor criminal recklessness; Class C misdemeanor reckless driving; and Class C misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without a license. On September 5, 2019, Lee entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and, in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges. Lee was sentenced to 18 months suspended to supervised probation, to be served consecutively to his sentence under a separate Madison County case (48C06-1702-F5-446). While Lee was on probation in F6-585, Lee was charged with committing numerous felonies and misdemeanors in Madison County in three separate cases filed in October 2021 (48C06-2110-F6-2789), November 2021 (48C06-2111-F3-003224), and February 2022 (48C06-2202-F5-000568). Across those three cases, Lee pleaded guilty to the following eight offenses: Level 5 felony escape; Level 6 felony strangulation; Level 6 felony domestic battery; Level 6 felony criminal confinement; Level 6 felony attempted unauthorized entry of a vehicle, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; and two counts of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
[3] In light of Lees eight new criminal convictions, the State petitioned to revoke Lees probation in the F6-858 cause. On September 25, 2023, a hearing on the petition was held. The trial court found that Lee violated the terms of his probation and ordered Lee to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence of eighteen months in the DOC. Lee now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] On appeal, Lee does not dispute that he violated a condition of his probation by committing new offenses. Rather, Lee challenges the sanction imposed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked the balance of his previously suspended sentence and ordered him to serve time in the DOC.
[5] “Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial courts discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if those conditions are violated. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs “when the trial courts decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court misinterprets the law.” Ind. State Police v. Estate of Damore, 194 N.E.3d 1147, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). In general, if the defendant violated a single condition of probation, the trial court has adequate grounds to revoke the balance of the previously suspended sentence. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). Indeed, if a trial court determines that a person has violated a term or condition of probation within the probationary period, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) specifically authorizes the trial court to impose one or more of the following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the persons probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
[6] In challenging the trial courts sanction, Lee points to testimony from his fiancée, with whom he had been in a relationship with for one year, stating that she relied upon him for financial support and that an executed sentence would impose a significant hardship on her. Lee also cites to his testimony that he had two children, a fiancée, and a community support system that motivated him to “stay strong for [his] family.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. Lee contends that his previous lack of support contributed to his accumulation of criminal offenses. Lee also focuses on favorable evidence indicating that, at the time of the hearing, he was in the process of obtaining his GED, had completed the Recovery While Incarcerated program, and was currently participating in a program called True Self. At the probation revocation hearing, Lee testified that, “This is [his] first time really dealing with the court.” Id. at 24. In light of these circumstances, Lee contends that the trial courts sanction was an abuse of discretion, and a more appropriate sanction would have been to order the balance of his sentence to continue to be served on supervised probation. We note however, that our review is limited to whether the sanction imposed constituted an abuse of the trial courts discretion.
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[7] We note that of the eight criminal offenses Lee plead guilty to committing while on probation, consisting of five felonies and three misdemeanors, that several of these offenses were crimes of violence and demonstrated a disregard for authority. The evidence demonstrated that Lee repeatedly refused to change his behavior, even when previously faced with the consequences of his criminal conduct and given the grace of probation. In fact, Lees behavior has demonstrated that he is not an appropriate candidate for community placement or probation. A court does not abuse its discretion by revoking the balance of a suspended sentence as a sanction for a defendants repeated probation violations. See Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188 (identifying no abuse of discretion in the revocation of the balance of a suspended sentence when the defendant “repeatedly violated his probation and repeatedly failed to complete the halfway house program”).
[8] In support of his contentions, Lee directs us to Johnson v. State. In Johnson, we identified an abuse of discretion in revoking the balance of a previously suspended sentence. Yet, in that case, the defendant engaged in relatively benign conduct involving, among other things, a technical violation for leaving his apartment by sitting on a bench outside the apartment building. See Johnson, 62 N.E.3d at 1231. In contrast, Lee committed a series of felonies, including strangulation, domestic battery, and resisting law enforcement. The technical violations in Johnson stand in stark contrast to Lees criminal offenses.
[9] To the extent Lee focuses on evidence that his fiancée would be negatively impacted by his incarceration, we note that the relatively short duration of that relationship tends to undercut Lees argument in favor of supervised probation. All in all, Lee focuses on evidence most favorable to his position, but our role is to consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment of the trial court without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. See Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112.
[10] Under the circumstances, the trial court was within its discretion to determine that Lee was not a suitable candidate to continue on probation and to revoke the balance of Lees previously suspended sentence. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Lee to serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC.
[11] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. We note that Lee also requests this court to engage in our independent review under Appellate Rule 7(B) and to find the trial courts sanction inappropriate in light of his character. However, Lees request for independent review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not available because we are not reviewing a criminal sentence, but instead a sanction after a probation revocation was found. See Benitez v. State, 199 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding that a trial courts action in a post-sentence probation violation proceeding is not a criminal sentence, and therefore the review and revise remedy of Appellate Rule 7(B) is not available on appeal).
Memorandum Decision by Judge Foley
Judges Vaidik and Weissmann concur.
Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.