MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] William Smith IV appeals his conviction for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a Level 6 felony.
1
He presents the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence documents disclosing his predicate conviction for Criminal Deviate Conduct, as a Class B felony,
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which documents bore a seal and initials but lacked full-name signatures. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In September of 2010, Smith pled guilty to Criminal Deviate Conduct in Cause 49G01-1005-FB-041663 (“FB-041663”). On October 8, 2010, he was sentenced to one and one-half years imprisonment, with a one-year probationary period to follow. After his release from incarceration, Smith registered as a sex offender until November 27, 2022.
[3] On September 6, 2023, the State charged Smith with Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. On December 18, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The State proffered its Exhibit 1, consisting of materials related to FB-041663, as a self-authenticating document. Smith objected that there was “no basis for the foundation of that document,” as there was “no witness here testifying.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 18.) After the States argument on self-authentication was heard, Smith contended:
I only see one persons initials there. I dont even see a full signature. Also, Your Honor, I was never discovered [sic] any keeper of the record by name. I dont know who the Sheriffs Office keeper of the records is. The only think [sic] that I have been discovered was an authentication of those records on this Thursday before trial. They were discovered in the charging information. Im not sure and didnt have an opportunity to talk with that person as to whether or not what they are. I looked them up and it said they were a sergeant, but I dont know anything beyond that.
(Id. at 18-19.) The trial court clarified that Exhibit 1 would not be admitted as a business record, but was being admitted, over Smiths objection, as a self-authenticating document pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 902(1) (domestic public documents that are sealed and signed). At the conclusion of the trial, Smith was found guilty as charged. On December 18, he was sentenced to 210 days incarceration, which was equivalent to the time he had served. Smith now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] A trial courts decision on the admission of evidence is afforded great deference on appeal. Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind. 2003). We will not reverse the trial courts decision unless it represents a manifest abuse of discretion that denied the defendant a fair trial. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial courts decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or it has misinterpreted the law. Id. at 703.
[5] The State points out that a trial court can take judicial notice of records of a court of this state, pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(C). But in this case, the State did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice and the court gave no indication that it was doing so; rather, the court stated that Exhibit 1 was admissible under Evidence Rule 902(1). The State also observes that judicial notice may be taken “at any stage of the proceeding.” Evid. R. 201(d). However, “judicial notice may not be used on appeal to fill evidentiary gaps in the trial record.” Banks v. Banks, 980 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We will not take judicial notice of Smiths prior conviction to satisfy the States burden of showing that Smith is a sex offender required to register as such. See I.C. § 11-8-8-17.
[6] Evidence Rule 901(a) provides: “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Rule 902 sets forth items of evidence that are self-authenticating, meaning “they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted.” Self-authentication is not a hearsay exception and does not guarantee admissibility; rather, it “merely relieves the proponent from providing foundational testimony.” Reemer v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 n. 4 (Ind. 2005).
[7] As relevant here, among the self-authenticating documents listed in Rule 902 are “domestic public documents that are sealed and signed.” Evid. R. 902(1). Such a document bears:
(A) a seal purporting to be that of the United States; any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular area of the United States; a political subdivision of any of these entities; or a department, agency, or officer of any entity named above; and
(B) a signature purporting to be an execution or attestation.
(Id.) States Exhibit 1 – facially consisting of documents of the Marion County Superior Court, Criminal Division – bears a seal of Kate Sweeney Bell, Clerk of Courts. There is no corresponding full signature, only initials K.W. and G.P. Those individuals are not otherwise identified in States Exhibit 1.
[8] Evidence Rule 902 does not define what constitutes a signature. And the parties do not direct our attention to any other authority determining whether initials are an adequate signature under Rule 902. However, “[a] signing may be accomplished in a number of ways.” Brewer v. State, 605 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ind. 1993). A panel of this court has found that Bureau of Motor Vehicle documents bearing a stamped signature and computer-generated initials were properly authenticated under Trial Rule 44(A). Coates v. State, 650 N.E.2d 58, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
When a person intends for the mark or name to represent his signature on a document, it meets the requirements of the law. Moreover, in certain instances, initials may constitute a legal signature.
Id. (quoting Brewer, 605 N.E.2d at 183).
[9] We need not decide here whether the initials constitute a legal signature. We are persuaded by the States argument that, if the trial court erred by admitting States Exhibit 1 into evidence, the error was harmless. “Any error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial, and therefore harmless, if the same or similar evidence has been admitted without objection or contradiction.” McCovens v. State, 539 N.E.2d 26, 30 (Ind. 1989). States Exhibit 1 is not the sole evidence of record tending to show that Smith is a sex offender with a registration requirement. Smith testified that he had been registering as a sex offender until he came to believe that he had no such registration requirement. Smith admitted that, despite his belief, he had not received “paperwork” notifying him of the lifting of the registration requirement. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 36.) Marion County Sheriffs Sergeant Joshua Tyler also testified that Smith had registered as a sex offender, with his last registration taking place in late 2022. From this testimony, the factfinder could infer that Smith is subject to registration as a sex offender. Thus, Smith has shown no reversible error.
Conclusion
[10] Any error in the admission of States Exhibit 1 for failure to meet self-authentication requirements is harmless.
[11] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(1).
2
. I.C. § 35-42-4-2 (2014) (now repealed).
Bailey, Judge.
Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.