MEMORANDUM DECISION
Statement of the Case
[1] A.B. (the “Child”) is the biological child of B.B. (“Father”) and S.P. (“Mother”). In July 2019, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from Mothers care due to concerns about Mothers substance abuse. After years of Father failing to engage or otherwise meaningfully engage in services, Fathers parental rights to the Child were terminated. Father now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial courts decision to terminate Fathers parental rights was clearly erroneous.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 20, 2011, the Child was born. Father established paternity by affidavit soon thereafter. In the summer of 2018, DCS alleged the Child and her half-sister
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(“Half-Sister”) were children in need of services (“CHINS”). In support of its claim that the Child was a CHINS, DCS alleged that the Child had missed approximately 90 days of school during the 2017–2018 school year; Mother had used illegal drugs in the Childs presence; Mother had left drug paraphernalia within the Childs reach; on at least one occasion Mother had been unconscious or asleep and the Child had not been able to wake her; Mother had recently tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl; and Father had recently tested positive for marijuana.
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[4] After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Child a CHINS. The trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to participate in certain services, follow the recommendations of service providers, and cooperate with DCS, among other requirements. At that time, the Child was living with Father. In early December 2018, the Child was removed from Fathers care because, among other things, Father had allowed Mother to visit the Child unsupervised even though Mother was only supposed to have therapeutic supervised visitation at an agency, Father had refused to produce the Child for home visits, Father had refused to take the Child to her therapy appointments, and Father had refused to take drug screens. On July 9, 2019, the trial court changed the Childs permanency plan to reunify the Child with Father “with a concurrent plan to grant custody to a fit and willing relative.” Appellants App. Vol. II at 61. On July 7, 2020, the trial court changed the Childs permanency plan to termination of parental rights with adoption.
[5] On February 21, 2023, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Fathers parental rights to the Child.
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The trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on this petition over the course of four days in August and October 2023.
[6] On January 8, 2024, the trial court terminated Fathers parental rights to the Child. In its order, the trial court found that Father did not participate in services; for the services in which he did attend, he did not successfully complete those services; he failed to attend other services completely; he was dishonest with multiple service providers; and, ultimately, his counselors terminated his care because of his failure to attend, dishonesty, and combative and aggressive behaviors towards them. The trial court further found that
[o]n one occasion during the proceedings, he permitted the child to go to [M]others home without supervision despite the fact that the child had been molested while in [M]others care. He was opposed to the childs participation in visitations with her siblings, even though she had had a relationship with them and bonded with them.
Appellants App. Vol. II at 165. Additionally, the trial court found that the Child and Father had not seen one another in approximately four years, Father exhibited “extreme levels of manipulation and dishonesty,” and Father lacked empathy for the Child. Id. at 167. Father now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
The Trial Courts Decision to Terminate Fathers Parental Rights to the Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous
[7] Father challenges the trial courts termination of his parental rights over the Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.
[8] To terminate Fathers parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things,
(B) one of the following is true:
(i) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childs removal or the reasons for placement outside Fathers home will not be remedied,
(ii) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Fathers relationship with the Child poses a threat to the well-being of the Child, or
(iii) the Child has, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the Child; and
(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child.
See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023); id. § 31-37-14-2.
[9] We will affirm a trial courts termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial courts termination decision is clearly erroneous if the courts findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the courts decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.
[10] On appeal, Father argues that the evidence “did not show any ‘care, treatment, or rehabilitation’ that he needed to address” and that the termination of his parental rights “was based upon prejudicial and unsubstantiated allegations.” Appellants Br. at 19. In making these arguments, Father does not specifically challenge any of the trial courts findings; consequently, we take all the trial courts findings as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Fathers arguments can be read to challenge particular findings or conclusions, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Therefore, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial courts decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for the Childs removal, that the continuation of Fathers relationship with the Child is a threat to the Childs well-being, that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Childs best interests, and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Childs care and treatment. We affirm the trial courts termination decision.
[11] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The Childs half-sister is not Fathers biological child.
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. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, we have taken judicial notice of the filings in the underlying CHINS case because Father did not provide file stamped copies of those documents in his appendix.
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. Mother died before DCS filed this petition.
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. Father includes many statements of fact in the Argument section of his brief that he does not include in either the Statement of Case or Statement of Facts, which is a violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). Father also fails to include in his Argument the applicable standard of review, which is a violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). Fathers noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 does not substantially impede our review of his claim, so we choose to address its merits. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).
Felix, Judge.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.