MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Timothy N. Hatton appeals the trial courts denial of his petition for the expungement of a traffic infraction. Hatton raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied his petition. As the expungement statute applies only to criminal offenses and juvenile proceedings, we affirm the trial courts judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In August 2006, Hatton was found to have committed the traffic infraction of speeding. In November 2023, Hatton petitioned the court for expungement of his speeding infraction. The trial court denied his petition, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[3] Hatton appeals the trial courts denial of his petition for expungement. Hattons issue on appeal turns on the interpretation of a statute, which we review de novo. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Assn v. Ind. Educ. Emp. Rels. Bd., 174 N.E.3d 601, 604 (Ind. 2021). As our Supreme Court has made clear:
When construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine and effectuate the legislatures intent. To discern that intent, we first look to the statutory language and give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. We presume the legislature intended the statutory language to be applied logically and consistently with the statutes underlying policy and goals, and we avoid construing a statute so as to create an absurd result.
Id. at 604-05 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
[4] In his petition for expungement, Hatton relied only on Indiana Code section 35-38-9-1 (2023). That statutes first provision makes clear that it “applies only to a person who has been arrested, charged with an offense, or alleged to be a delinquent child.” I.C. § 35-38-9-1(a). And, throughout the statute, the statutory language makes clear that its expungement provisions apply only to the records of that prior arrest, charge, or allegation. I.C. § 35-38-9-1.
[5] Traffic infractions are not criminal offenses. See, e.g., Schumm v. State, 866 N.E.2d 781, 792 (Ind. Ct. App.), clarified on rehg on other grounds, 868 N.E.2d 1202 (2007). Nor, of course, are they juvenile proceedings. Accordingly, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-1 did not authorize the relief Hatton sought here. The trial court therefore properly denied his petition.
[6] Affirmed.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Mathias
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.