MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.A.H. (“Father”) is the biological father of J.C.H. (“Child”). Child was removed from Fathers care on July 29, 2021. The next day, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) due to alleged abuse and drug use by Father. After Child was determined to be a CHINS, the juvenile court ordered Father to participate in certain services. Father, however, failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services and DCS eventually petitioned to terminate Fathers parental rights to Child. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Fathers parental rights to Child.
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Father challenges the juvenile courts determination that termination of his parental rights was in Childs best interests. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child, who was born on March 29, 2009, was removed from Fathers care on July 29, 2021, after DCS had received reports of neglect with Child indicating that “he was afraid of [Father] who had been cursing at him in the night, breaking things, and was possibly impaired on methamphetamine.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 12. The next day, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS, finding as follows:
[Child] is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder; [Child] is fearful of Father; [Child] is having nightmares regarding his experiences with, and fear of [Father]; [Child] will use the bathroom as often as possible to avoid spending time with Father during visits; Father stated that Child was the Devils Son, that he would burn the house down, and that he would break Childs skull; Father stated bugs were coming out of Childs back and hit Childs back so hard Child bled from the mouth stating God made Father do this; [and] Father has pointed a gun at Child.
Appellants App. Vol. II p. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted, brackets added). Following a dispositional hearing, Father was ordered to “complete assessments (for parenting, substance abuse, and mental health), complete all recommended services, submit to drug screens, stay in communication with DCS, obtain/maintain housing and employment, participate in visits, and care for the Child in addition to other terms in the dispositional decree.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 13. Father, however, did not comply with the terms of the dispositional decree.
[3] DCS petitioned to terminate Fathers parental rights on May 19, 2023. During the evidentiary hearing on DCSs petition, Fathers sister, Rebecca Hacker Pike, testified that Father had suffered from mental illness since childhood, with his condition getting “significantly worse with time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 151. Father had previously been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia but was not medically compliant. At one point, Father had had to be taken to a mental hospital for treatment after having threatened both himself and Child. Pike further testified that Father was not employed; had, at times, exhibited erratic behavior; and had struggled with substance abuse, including methamphetamine use, throughout his life. Pike did not believe that Child was safe in Fathers care or that Father was capable of caring for Child or meeting his needs.
[4] DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Cameron Wingler testified that DCS had become involved with Father and Child after Child had been identified as a victim of neglect, with Child having claimed to be afraid of Father, who had referred to Child as “the devil[’]s child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 211. FCM Wingler further testified that Father had not complied with the dispositional order that was entered after Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS. For instance, Father had refused “a great number” of drug screens; had tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC on numerous occasions; and had not been consistent with meeting with service providers. Tr. Vol. II p. 215. FCM Wingler indicated that Father had not demonstrated an ability to maintain sobriety and had not participated in mental-health treatment. Father had also refused to participate in mental-health focused services, claiming that “there was no need for him to take part in” the services. Tr. Vol. II p. 227.
[5] FCM Wingler opined that termination of Fathers parental rights to Child was in Childs best interests because throughout DCSs involvement with Father, “theres been a constant cycle” of Father “not following through” with or being consistent with services. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. In addition, Father had failed to refrain from illegal drug use and had failed to make “any progress with working with services to [ ] get himself in a better place.” Tr. Vol. II p. 224. FCM Wingler also indicated that he believed that Childs safety would be threatened if he were to be returned to Fathers care. Child has made progress in both his mental health and education since being placed with maternal grandmother, who provides a safe and stable environment and meets all of Childs needs. Based on Fathers lack of progress, FCM Wingler did not believe that Father could provide a safe and stable environment for Child or adequately provide for his needs. FCM Wingler indicated that DCSs plan for Child was adoption by maternal grandmother.
[6] Childs court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Laurie Carr testified to Childs improvement since being removed from Fathers care, stating that
[Childs] very conversational now.․ [N]o more timidity. No longer does he have to be chaperoned to different areas, to the bathroom or, or during showering.․ [H]es making plans for his future. He enjoys school, socially․. Enjoys making friends. And sports, enjoys sports. So, yeah hes, hes like a different child.
Tr. Vol. II p. 250. CASA Carr indicated that she did not believe that Father had made significant progress in treating either his mental-health or substance-abuse issues. CASA Carr opined that termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests, stating that
because of the, the, the trauma that [Child] has already suffered and been diagnosed with is a very good reason why he needs to stay where he is and the fact that [F]ather who does acknowledge mental[-]health concerns and issues is refusing to get help for those issues. So now that [Child] has issues based on what he has experienced from [F]ather who has mental[-]health issues, if [F]athers not well then [C]hild will only continue to be sick.
Tr. Vol. III p. 5. CASA Carr opined that adoption by maternal grandmother would be in Childs best interests, as maternal grandmother provides Child with a safe and stable environment and adequately provides for his needs. CASA Carr further opined that Childs safety would be threatened if he were to be returned to Fathers care.
[7] In addition, various service providers testified regarding Fathers lack of participation and progress. One of these service providers, Kudakwashe Mashindi, testified that Father had, on one occasion, threatened to kill him, after which he no longer felt safe working with Father. Various witnesses recounted that Child had reported being afraid of Father. Father testified, denying that he had abused Child, suffered from substance-abuse issues, or needed mental-health treatment or medication.
[8] Following the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted DCSs termination petition. In terminating Fathers parental rights to Child, the juvenile court made extensive factual findings supporting its conclusions that Child had been removed from Fathers care for the required amount of time; continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Childs well-being; termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests; and DCS had a satisfactory plan for Childs care, that being adoption by his then-placement with his maternal grandmother.
Discussion and Decision
[9] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the childs emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
[10] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile courts decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.
[11] In deference to the juvenile courts unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile courts findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
[12] In termination proceedings, DCS is required to prove the following:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.․ (iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services․
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Father argues only that the evidence is insufficient to prove that termination of his parental rights is in Childs best interests.
The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove that Termination of Fathers Parental Rights is in Childs Best Interests
[13] At the outset, we note that the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen determining what is in childrens best interests, trial courts may consider a variety of factors.” Matter of M.I., 127 N.E.3d 1168, 1171 (Ind. 2019). Father “respectfully requests that in light of the Indiana Supreme Courts instruction, this Court reconsider its reliance on its precedents suggesting that recommendations of FCMs and CASA/GALs[
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] are sufficient to establish that termination of parental rights is in the childs best interests.” Appellants Br. p. 13. While the juvenile court accepted the recommendations of FCM Wingler and CASA Carr regarding Childs best interests, its decision was not based solely on these recommendations but rather on the evidence as a whole.
[14] It is worth noting that Father does not challenge any of the juvenile courts factual findings, all of which are therefore accepted as true. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that unchallenged factual findings are accepted as true), trans. denied. The juvenile court made numerous factual findings relating to Childs best interests, including, inter alia, that Child had suffered trauma, with Child reporting that Father had abused him; Child had indicated that he was afraid of Father; Child had made progress with therapy during the course of the proceedings; Father had failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services, with Father testing positive for illegal drugs and having threatened a service provider; Father suffered from untreated mental-health issues; and Father had failed to make any progress towards reunification. As such, given the numerous factual findings relating to the question of whether termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests, we decline Fathers invitation to reconsider our prior precedent relating to the recommendations of a FCM, CASA, and/or GAL.
[15] Turning our attention to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile courts conclusion that termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests, we are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parents historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parents current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Moreover, “[t]ermination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the childs emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.
The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that [his] physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a childs need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the childs best interests.
Id.
[16] The juvenile court found that Child had suffered trauma as a result of abuse allegedly perpetrated by Father and was scared of him. Childs condition had improved, and he was doing well in his then-placement with his maternal grandmother. Father, on the other hand, continued to suffer from untreated mental-health and substance-abuse issues. He had not made any measurable progress in this area that would even suggest that he may, at some unknown point in the future, be capable of providing for and parenting Child. In summing up its extensive factual findings relating to Childs best interests, the juvenile court found as follows:
based upon the totality of the evidence, including ․ Fathers abuse and neglect of [Child], [Fathers] own serious mental health and substance abuse issues, [Fathers] failure to participate in services to resolve [his] own issues, and [Fathers] complete denial of any ongoing problems at all, in its totality the evidence demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Court that the termination of parental rights is in [Childs] best interests and the continuation of the parent-child relationship between [Father] and [Child] is contrary to [Childs] best interests.
Appellants App. Vol. II p. 33.
[17] Father has demonstrated a historical inability to provide a safe and stable environment for Child, which coupled with his inability to do so at the time of the fact-finding hearing, supports the juvenile courts determination that termination of his parental rights was in Childs best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373. Father acknowledges that he “is not in any position to have custody of” Child but argues that “it is unclear why [Childs] relative placement could not seek a permanent guardianship for [Child] to ensure permanency while allowing for the possibility that it may eventually be safe for the parent-child relationship to continue.” Appellants Br. p. 17. Father did not request a permanent guardianship below and, as the Indiana Supreme Court has noted, “on appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, even if a long-term guardianship had been appropriate or possible, reversal would not be warranted because the evidence is sufficient to prove that termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests. Fathers argument to the contrary effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Childs biological mothers parental rights were also terminated but she does not participate in the instant appeal.
2
. The abbreviation GAL stands for guardian ad litem.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judges Crone and Tavitas concur.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.