MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Zachary Archbold (Archbold), appeals his conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a), and his adjudications as a general habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8(b), and as a specific repeat sexual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-14.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instruction.
ISSUES
[3] Archbold presents this court with two issues, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor; and
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it enhanced Archbolds sentence with both the general habitual offender enhancement and the specific repeat sexual offender enhancement.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In July 2021, B.H., B.H.’s friends K. and D., and Archbold would spend time together at B.H.’s grandparents’ house, where B.H. was residing. The four would smoke marijuana together. Archbold showed B.H. and K. a picture of his penis and he would try to touch them on their thighs and bras. At the time, B.H. was fifteen years old, and, although he was twenty-eight years old, Archbold had misrepresented his age as eighteen or nineteen years old.
[5] One day in July or August 2021, B.H., K., D., and Archbold were at B.H.’s grandparents’ house, smoking marijuana outside her bedroom window. K. and B.H. shared a “joint,” which Archbold had provided. (Transcript Vol. III, p. 17). D. and K. left together, while Archbold and B.H. entered the house through her bedroom window. Although B.H. had smoked marijuana before, this time she did not feel like she normally felt after smoking. She did not feel “right ․ not [herself], like out of her body.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 19-20). B.H. laid down on her bed and Archbold began touching her and got on top of her. She told him “no” and that she did not want to do anything, but he started pulling his shorts down and put his penis inside her vagina. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 20). Archbold “ejaculated, and he pulled out, and ejaculated on [B.H.’s] thigh. And then he zipped his pants up and just sat there.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 20). Archbold told B.H. that “it was [their] secret to keep.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 21). After D. returned with K., Archbold left with D.
[6] A couple of weeks later, B.H. was admitted on an in-patient basis at Parkview Behavioral Health Center (Parkview). During a counseling session at Parkview, B.H. disclosed what had happened between her and Archbold and thereafter reported the incident to law enforcement. Upon questioning, Archbold admitted to law enforcement officers and to family case workers with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) that he and B.H. had engaged in sexual intercourse. While in jail, Archbold admitted to fellow inmates that he had misrepresented his age to B.H., that he knew B.H. to be fifteen years old, and that he had sexual intercourse with her.
[7] On September 10, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Archbold with level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor and alleging him to be an habitual offender and a repeat sexual offender. On October 10, 2023, the trial court conducted a jury trial, at the close of which Archbold was found guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Archbold to an executed sentence of ten years, enhanced by fifteen years for the habitual offender adjudication and by six years for the repeat sexual offender adjudication, with both enhancements to be served concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years.
[8] Archbold now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[9] Archbold contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, asserting that B.H. was an incredibly dubious witness. The incredible dubiosity rule is an exception to well-settled law mandating that, on appeal, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Toles v. State, 151 N.E.3d 805, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. This rule applies only when the following three conditions are met: (1) the conviction is based on a sole testifying witness; (2) the witnesss testimony is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and (3) there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). If all three conditions are satisfied, reversal is warranted because the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 755. But making this showing is no easy task—while application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “not impossible,” it is “a rare occasion.” Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001). This case is not one of those rare occasions, as Archbold has failed to satisfy the rules requirements: B.H.’s trial testimony was not internally contradictory and there was other evidence of Archbolds guilt.
[10] For the incredible dubiosity rule to apply, the witnesss trial testimony must be so “inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). In making this determination, we consider the witnesss testimony in isolation. See West v. State, 907 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The inquiry is not whether “the testimony of the witness under consideration ․ [is] in contradiction to the testimony of other witnesses.” Id. Rather, a witnesss testimony is inherently contradictory or equivocal only when that witness makes two or more statements that are incompatible with one another. Id.
[11] Instead of focusing on internal contradictions and the perceived equivocal nature of B.H.’s testimony, Archbold points to her “substantial consumption of illegal drugs” immediately prior to the incident and makes the argument that B.H.’s disclosure was motivated by the need to justify her “illicit behaviors” and gain sympathy. (Appellants Br. p. 16). However, these contentions do not amount to inconsistencies within B.H.’s testimony in order to advance the application of the incredible dubiosity rule but rather reflect on B.H.’s credibility and are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561 (Ind. 2018) (our supreme court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the jury under the incredible dubiosity rule, where McCallister selectively tried to discredit the witnesss testimony by pointing solely to her drug use, lack of sleep, and contradictory testimony from other witnesses).
[12] Moreover, B.H.’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses. Besides B.H., two law enforcement officers and two DCS case workers testified that Archbold admitted to having engaged in sexual intercourse with B.H. when she was only fifteen years old. In addition, several inmates testified that Archbold had told them that he had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl. Therefore, as B.H.’s testimony is not equivocal and the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Archbolds conviction.
II. Double Enhancement
[13] Next, Archbold contends—and the State concedes—that the trial court incorrectly enhanced his sentence with both the general habitual offender enhancement and the specific repeat sexual offender enhancement. The trial court attached Archbolds enhancements for his repeat sexual offender status and his habitual offender status to his sentence for a single conviction of sexual misconduct with a minor. “Double enhancements are not permissible unless there is explicit legislative direction authorizing them.” Dye v. State, 972 N.E.2d 853, 856 (Ind. 2012). There are three types of statutes authorizing enhanced sentences for recidivist offenders: the general habitual offender statute, specialized habitual offender statutes, and progressive-penalty statutes. Id. The repeat sexual offender statute is considered to be a specialized habitual offender statute. Id. Double enhancements arise where more than one of these statutes is applied to a defendant at the same time. Id. As such, our supreme court held that “[a] conviction under a specialized habitual offender statute cannot be further enhanced under the general habitual offender statute in the absence of explicit legislative direction.” Id. As there is no statutory authorization for stacking a general and a specialized habitual offender enhancement on Archbolds single conviction, we remand to the trial court to vacate Archbolds repeat sexual offender enhancement.
CONCLUSION
[14] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Archbolds conviction. However, the trial court abused its discretion when it enhanced Archbolds sentence with both the general habitual offender enhancement and the specific repeat sexual offender enhancement, and, therefore, we remand to the trial court to vacate the repeat sexual offender enhancement.
[15] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instruction.
Riley, Judge.
Felix, J. and Kenworthy, J. concur.