MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Sixteen-year-old F.H. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing what would have been, if committed by an adult, sexual battery against 13-year-old E.L. F.H. appeals, arguing that the juvenile court wrongly excluded evidence under Indianas rape shield rule. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] F.H. and E.L. met online sometime in 2022. On July 6 of that year, a few days after the two had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, F.H. and E.L. arranged to meet at F.H.’s house in the middle of the night. When E.L. arrived, they went to F.H.’s bedroom in the basement, where F.H. quickly began to pressure E.L. to have sexual intercourse again. Despite E.L. saying “wait” and “stop,” F.H forced E.L. to perform oral sex on him and to engage in sexual intercourse. Tr. Vol. II, p. 74.
[3] Later that day, a distraught E.L. told her mother and sister what had happened at F.H.’s house. E.L.’s mother contacted police and took E.L. to a sexual assault center for a forensic exam. Tests showed that F.H. was the likely contributor of sperm found in and around E.L.’s genitalia. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that F.H. had engaged in acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Level 6 felony sexual battery and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury.
[4] At an evidentiary hearing, F.H. offered a different version of events. He stated that in the early morning hours of July 6, E.L. texted him and offered him pills to hang out with her. In her own testimony, E.L. had admitted to using both drugs and alcohol recreationally. But F.H. testified that he did not take the pills. According to F.H., E.L. arrived at his house around 12:40 a.m., and he let her inside. F.H. and E.L. then went down to his basement bedroom. As F.H. described the incident, he briefly left the room to grab a snack, and when he returned, E.L. had taken off her clothes and was sitting on his bed. F.H. described being “very shocked” and that he “was just expecting to hang out.” Id. at 151-52. Although F.H. thought they might have sex later, E.L. left soon thereafter, and no intercourse occurred.
[5] Before the evidentiary hearing, F.H. sought permission to introduce evidence that when E.L. “has sexual relations with an individual, she is frequently under the influence of alcohol, marijuana or any one of the six (6) different types of [her] prescribed medications.” App. Vol. II, p. 107. In an offer of proof, two individuals testified generally about E.L.’s sexual behavior, including that E.L. had traded sex for drugs in the past and lied about her age before having sexual intercourse. The juvenile court excluded this evidence upon the States objections.
[6] After reviewing the evidence presented, the juvenile court found that F.H. had committed the adult equivalent of sexual battery. F.H. received a two-year sentence, suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
[7] On appeal, F.H. challenges only the juvenile courts decision to exclude evidence of E.L.’s sexual history. The decision to exclude evidence is within the trial courts sound discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
I. Sexual History Evidence Was Properly Excluded
[8] Indiana Evidence Rule 412, known as the “rape shield rule,” provides, in relevant part:
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victims or witnesss sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:
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(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendants constitutional rights.
[9] The purpose of Rule 412 is to “prevent the victim of a sexual assault from being placed on trial and to remove impediments to reporting sex crimes.” Smith v. State, 140 N.E.3d 363, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “The Rule embodies Indianas Rape Shield Statute, codified at Indiana Code section 35-37-4-4, which recognizes that ‘inquiry into a victims other sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become the focus of the defense.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. 1997)).
[10] From this framework, F.H.’s argument proceeds in two alternative steps. First, he contends that his evidence does not fall under one of Rule 412(a)’s prohibited uses and was thus admissible. But if the evidence was prohibited, F.H. nonetheless maintains that the evidences exclusion violated his constitutional rights and should have been admitted under Rule 412(b)(1)(C).
A. F.H.’s Evidence Was Prohibited By Rule 412(a)
[11] As F.H. describes it, the excluded evidence related to whether E.L. had ever: (1) “lied to her prior sexual partners about her age”; (2) “traded sexual favors for drugs with her prior partners”; and (3) “claimed she had sex with other people.” Appellants Br., pp. 11-12. On its face, this evidence goes to E.L.’s sexual behavior and sexual predisposition and is thus prohibited by Rule 412(a).
[12] According to F.H., the evidence was offered not as an improper inquiry into E.L.’s sexual history but rather to prove E.L.’s “motivations as to why she engaged in sex with others.” Id. at 12. Even if true, these pieces of evidence still fall under “Rule 412’s general prohibition of inquiry into the victims sexual history.” Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. F.H. cites to no authority suggesting that so long as the defendant merely questions the victims “motivations,” any evidence otherwise prohibited by Rule 412 is fair game. Indeed, the opposite is true. See, e.g., id. (excluding evidence “that on prior occasions the victim had committed acts of prostitution in exchange for money or cocaine” under Rule 412); Smith, 140 N.E.3d at 370.
B. F.H. Waived His Argument that Excluding the Evidence Violated His Constitutional Rights
[13] Next, F.H. claims that the evidences exclusion violated his constitutional rights to confront E.L. and challenge her credibility. Evid. R. 412(b)(1)(C). Although evidentiary issues are entrusted to the trial courts discretion, we review constitutional claims de novo. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015).
[14] F.H. does not explain the source of his constitutional confrontation right, be it either the Indiana or federal constitutions. Nor does F.H. provide any authority for how we should analyze his claim or explain how his claim fits within relevant case law. Of course, the existence of F.H.’s right to confront the witnesses against him and present a complete defense is not in dispute. See generally Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 984-89 (Ind. 1991). But F.H.’s failure to base his argument on any governing standard necessarily limits our ability, as a reviewing court, to decide his claim. See Applegate v. State, 230 N.E.3d 944, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (collecting cases). Thus, F.H. has waived his argument. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
Conclusion
[15] As no error occurred in the exclusion of the challenged evidence, we affirm.
affirmed
Weissmann, Judge.
Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.