MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of J.C. (Father) over concerns that his mental health issues, including multiple bouts of suicidal ideation, and recurrent drug use rendered him an unfit parent. Finding no clear error in the termination of Fathers parental rights, we affirm.
Facts
[2] In October 2021, C.C. (Child) was born with traces of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC in his body. DCS quickly removed Child from his mothers care on an emergency basis and petitioned for Child to be declared a child in need of services (CHINS). At the time, Father was in jail for possession of methamphetamine and for strangling Childs mother during her pregnancy. Father admitted using methamphetamine with Childs mother before his incarceration.
[3] After a hearing, the trial court found that Child was a CHINS. In doing so, the trial court noted the circumstances of Childs birth, Fathers incarceration, and a previous CHINS disposition for Childs older sibling. The court ordered Father to, among other things, maintain regular contact with the assigned service providers, complete all assigned programs and services, secure stable income and housing, and refrain from illegal substances.
[4] Father was released from jail in September 2022 into a work release program. Although Father tested positive for illegal drugs several times, he maintained several stretches of sobriety. Father also quickly began meeting with Child, and the visits generally went smoothly. Around this time, Father also participated in a rehabilitative domestic violence program. The course consisted of 40 classes, of which Father completed approximately half. He was dismissed from the program due to his absences.
[5] In March 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate Fathers parental rights as to Child. In the months prior, Father had suffered a relapse in his drug use and expressed suicidal thoughts. A clinical assessment revealed Father had a significant problem with illegal drug use and struggled with his mental health, including a diagnosis for bipolar tendencies. After the filing of the termination petition, Father continued to use methamphetamine and attempted to commit suicide by purposely overdosing in June 2023.
[6] Later that summer, Father completed a substance abuse evaluation. He reported using methamphetamine a month prior but claimed to be currently sober, despite daily marijuana use and one-off uses of other illegal substances, like “shrooms.” App. Vol. II, p. 13. Father attributed his drug use to the stress of the termination proceedings. Although the substance abuse evaluation report noted that Father was generally aware of his problems, even if not completely ready to change, the report ultimately concluded he struggled with a significant substance abuse problem and severe mental illness.
[7] At the termination fact-finding hearing, Father admitted to his struggles, stating he would “probably blow [his] head off” if his parental rights were terminated. Tr. Vol. II, p. 34. The assigned service providers, particularly the family case manager (FCM), the guardian ad litem (GAL), and the court appointed special advocate (CASA), all testified in favor of termination. After considering the evidence, the trial court terminated Fathers parental rights as to Child.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights over Child. In reviewing the termination of parental rights, the trial courts judgment will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In doing this, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id.
I. Termination of Fathers Parental Rights Was Not Clearly Erroneous
[9] The State may terminate parental rights only when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). This high bar recognizes the fundamental right parents possess over their childrens care, custody, and control. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010).
[10] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, in relevant part:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
[11] Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023). If the trial court finds these allegations are true by clear and convincing evidence, it shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8, -37-14-2 (2023).
A. There is a Reasonable Probability that the Continuation of the Parent-Child Relationship Threatens Childs Well-being
[12] In determining whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to a childs well-being, the trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed. In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Termination is always appropriate when the evidence reflects that the emotional and physical development of the child is threatened. Id. Such is the case here.
[13] The trial court described its view of this issue as follows:
The Court has grave concern for Fathers mental health and how it affects his approach to the services he was offered and his ability to care for Child. Multiple times during the last months, he has voiced how a termination of his parental rights would affect his mental health or threaten his very will to live. He has not, at the same time, understood the effect of what those statements and potential action may have had on Child. He has not responded to the mental health services that have been offered and in place since he first engaged in October of 2022.
App. Vol. II, pp. 65-66 (cleaned up). The trial court then noted that Father “has finally begun to understand the need and benefit of the services that have been offered to him,” but Childs “safety and well-being ․ are at risk if the parent-child relationship is continued.” Id.
[14] Father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he “has not responded to mental health services.” Appellants Br., p. 17. In support of his argument, Father relies on his participation in mental health services for almost a year, as well as a letter from the provider stating that Father “has abstained from substance use” and kept up with his psychiatric medications. App. Vol. II, p. 15.
[15] The trial court, however, expressly discounted the providers opinion on this issue, noting its belief that Father “may not have been honest” with the provider. Id. The courts concerns were underscored by Fathers refusal to allow DCS or the trial court to inspect his medical records, choosing instead to rely on opinion testimony from his provider. At any rate, Fathers argument here does nothing to address the trial courts broader finding that it doubted Fathers ability to care for Child given Fathers extensive history of mental illness and history of substance abuse. The key example of this being Fathers deliberate overdose during July 2023.
[16] Accordingly, we find no clear error in the trial courts finding that continuing Fathers parental rights threatened Childs well-being.
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B. Termination is in Childs Best Interests
[17] In determining the best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). “Central among these interests is childrens need for permanency.” Id. And our caselaw is clear that “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014).
[18] Father accuses the trial courts judgment of placing him in an “impossible position.” Appellants Br, p. 18. As he sees it, the trial court faulted Father for not being able to “prioritize [Childs] needs above [Fathers] own [needs] for employment and housing.” Id. (quoting App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20). At bottom, Father seems to suggest that there was something unfair with the trial courts expectation that Father be able to simultaneously care for Child while also providing a safe and healthy environment for the two of them. We disagree.
[19] First, we note that it was the uniform opinion of the assigned service providers, the FCM, the CASA, and the GAL, that termination was in Childs best interests. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that “the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in childs best interests”). Second, and more to the point, there was nothing unfair or “impossible” about the burdens and expectations placed upon Father. Like all parents, Father was simply asked to provide a safe, loving environment for his Child. We commend the efforts Father made toward reuniting with Child, but the totality of the evidence here supports the trial courts judgment that termination was in Childs best interest. Appellants Br., pp. 19-20; see also In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647-49 (recognizing that determining the childs best interests “necessarily places the child[ ]’s interest in preserving the family into conflict with their need for permanency”).
[20] Finding no clear error in the trial courts decision, we affirm the termination of Fathers parental rights.
FOOTNOTES
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. As Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) (2023) is written in the disjunctive, our holding here is dispositive on the broader issue. In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
Weissmann, Judge.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.