MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Z.D. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her children, S.M. and K.M. (collectively, Children). Mother claims insufficient evidence supports that ruling. In her view, the evidence showed she had successfully addressed her substance abuse, which had prompted both Childrens initial removal from her care two years earlier and Childrens continued placement in foster care. Finding the evidence justified the termination of Mothers parental rights, we affirm.
Facts
[2] When Mother gave birth to K.M. in September 2021, K.M. had drugs in his system and remained hospitalized for several weeks. Mother admitted that she ingested heroin while pregnant with K.M. Upon learning of K.M.’s drug exposure, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) took emergency custody of K.M. and S.M., the latter of whom was three years old. DCS petitioned to find Children to be children in need of services (CHINS) and, with the trial courts permission, placed Children in foster care, where they have since remained.
[3] Mother admitted that Children were CHINS, even agreeing that “continued DCS involvement is necessary in order for Mother to demonstrate sobriety.” App. Vol. II, p. 30. She also agreed to participate in “Home Based Case Work; Parenting Education; Random Drug Screens; and a Substance Abuse Assessment and [to] follow all recommendations of any provider.” Exhs. p. 71. After Childrens father, C.M. (Father), waived his right to a factfinding hearing, the trial court found Children to be CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in the services to which she had agreed.
[4] Mother, who has lived with Father since shortly after K.M.’s birth, did not comply with these services. She was discharged unsuccessfully from Home Based Case Work after two years due to lack of participation. Although Mother completed a substance abuse assessment that resulted in a recommendation for intensive outpatient treatment, she failed to complete treatment. For instance, a DCS staffer dropped Mother off at a drug treatment center on August 31, 2022, after Mother had tested positive for drugs throughout the previous year. Mother left the program before completion, returned to using drugs, and did not submit to any further drug testing. Meanwhile, Father was twice charged and convicted of drug offenses in 2022.
[5] In November of that year, the trial court ordered Childrens permanency plan changed from reunification to adoption based on Mothers and Fathers homelessness, lack of employment, and failure to engage in treatment and achieve sobriety. That same month, Mother was charged with possession of methamphetamine, to which she ultimately pleaded guilty. She was placed on probation and ordered to undergo treatment. Then, in December, two Suboxone
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pills were found in gifts that Mother and Father gave to Children. And DCS later reported that Mother could not stay awake during up to 50 visitations with Children and, in the caseworkers view, appeared to be under the influence of drugs.
[6] In January 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father and to suspend their visits with Children. However, DCS continued to provide some services to Mother and Father. In May 2023, Mother was kicked out of an inpatient treatment program for altercations with other residents and for leaving the facility and returning impaired.
[7] On July 1, 2023, Mother independently enrolled and engaged in intensive outpatient treatment at Wooded Glen Recovery Program. Although Mother later reported to DCS that she successfully completed the program, her documentation showed only that she was scheduled for successful discharge on July 22, 2023. Mother never provided the programs certification of completion nor presented any other evidence of her completion of the program. Mother requested reinstatement of her parenting time but failed to appear for the hearing on that motion in August 2023.
[8] Shortly before the termination of parental rights hearing, DCS offered Mother and Father a final opportunity to undergo drug screens to show their sobriety. Mother and Father did not submit to the screens. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother and Father had been living in a motel for about three months. Mother was unemployed but temporarily receiving financial assistance from her mother. Fathers employment earnings, which were “under the table,” were inadequate to support their family. Tr. Vol. II, p. 34. Mother had not seen Children since January 2023.
[9] After a joint evidentiary hearing at which Father did not appear, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The court concluded that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Childrens removal and for continued placement outside the parents’ home will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Children. The court also concluded that DCS had a satisfactory plan for Children—adoption—and that termination of Mothers and Fathers parental rights was in Childrens best interests. Only Mother appeals that judgment.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Mother contends that DCS presented insufficient evidence to support the allegations in its termination petition. At the time DCS filed its petition to [11] terminate parental rights,
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that petition had to allege, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023). If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence shows the allegations in a termination petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8(a), -37-14-2.
[11] When reviewing the trial courts findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Id. Second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses, we will set aside the trial courts judgment only if clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the trial courts findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law or if the courts legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision to terminate parental rights. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019).
[12] Mother challenges all of the courts conclusions except that adoption was a satisfactory plan for Children. We find no error.
I. Remedying Conditions
[13] Mother first claims that DCS did not show by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that conditions resulting in Childrens placement outside Mothers home would not be remedied. When reviewing such a claim, we first consider the conditions that led to Childrens placement and retention in foster care and then evaluate whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). During the second step in this analysis, we consider a parents fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into account evidence of changed conditions and “balancing any recent improvements against ‘habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” S.E. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)).
[14] Children were removed due to Mothers drug use. They remained in foster care due to Mothers continuing drug use and her later failure to undergo drug testing and to participate in drug treatment and other ordered services aimed at assisting her in parenting and providing a stable home.
[15] Mother argues that the trial courts remedying conditions conclusion is faulty because it is based on an unsupported and improper finding: that Mother “failed to provide any evidence that she had successfully completed substance abuse treatment or submitted to drug screens, which would have eliminated any doubt regarding sobriety.” App. Vol. II, pp. 38-39. Mother asserts that the trial court effectively transferred the burden of proof from DCS to her on the issue of drug use. She also contends that her “unchallenged” evidence showed that she had remedied her drug abuse by successfully completing treatment at Wooded Glen Recovery Program and remaining sober since entering that facility on July 1, 2023. Appellants Br., p. 16.
[16] The record shows that Mother exposed her youngest child to drugs before birth and that she admitted to her drug use and need for treatment as part of the CHINS proceeding. A subsequent evaluation showed that Mother needed drug treatment. But she left one treatment center shortly after her arrival and completed no other drug treatment to which she was referred by DCS. Suboxone pills that Mother admitted belonged to her or Father were found in gifts that Mother and Father gave to Children in December 2022. Staff who supervised Mothers visits with Children also witnessed Mother, who was unemployed, falling asleep during 40 to 50 of her visits with Children. Additionally, in August 2023, Mother pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, was placed on probation, and ordered to engage in treatment.
[17] At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she had a “history of substance use” that included use of methamphetamine and opiates when Children were removed. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 11, 26. Mother admitted to missing two drug screens in August 2023—the month after she allegedly completed treatment at Wooded Glen. She reported that she missed the screens because she lacked transportation. Other evidence showed that Mother and Father had a chance to undergo a drug screen on September 15, 2023—about six weeks after her alleged completion of the Wooded Glen program—and did not do so. The guardian ad litem requested documentation of Mothers completion of the Wooded Glen program but never received it.
[18] Mother attempted to refute this evidence by testifying that she independently entered Wooded Glen on July 1, 2023, and was successfully discharged from that treatment center July 22, 2023. On appeal, Mother asserts that DCS did not introduce evidence that contradicted her testimony as to this treatment and, thus, the trial court was required to accept it as true. Mother cites no authority for that proposition, which is contrary to Indiana law.
[19] The trial court, as the determiner of credibility, was not required to believe Mothers self-serving testimony. See, e.g., In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding trial courts credibility determination and weighing of conflicting evidence was binding on appeal). In determining Mothers testimony was not persuasive, the trial court noted that Mother testified twice that she moved into an Indianapolis hotel on July 21, 2023, despite also testifying that she was not discharged from Wooded Glen until July 22, 2023.
[20] Contrary to Mothers claim, the trial court did not transfer the burden of proof to Mother. The court simply weighed the evidence and remained unconvinced Mother had remedied her drug problems that had prompted both the initial and continued removal of Children. It noted that Mother had undergone treatment several times and always returned to drug use.
[21] The trial court also determined the evidence showed that Mother had failed to remedy other issues—such as stable housing and income—that had contributed to Childrens continued removal. As the court correctly noted, evidence of changed conditions may be balanced against a parents habitual patterns including their criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, failure to provide support, and lack of housing or employment. In re R.S., 158 N.E.3d 432, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The court did not err in finding a reasonable probability that conditions resulting in Childrens initial and continued placement outside Mothers home would not be remedied.
[22] Given this conclusion, we need not address Mothers challenge to the trial courts finding that continuation of her parental relationship poses a threat to Children. Because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) (2023) is written in the disjunctive, DCS needed to prove either the remedying conditions prong or the threat to Children prong, but not both. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
II. Best Interests of Children
[23] Mother also challenges the trial courts conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Childrens best interest. In determining the best interest of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. “Central among those interests is childrens need for permanency.” Id.
[24] Mother acknowledged at the termination hearing that she was then unable to care for Children, who by that point had been in foster care for more than two years. Mother requested more time to address the issues that had plagued her throughout the CHINS proceedings.
[25] From the start of the CHINS proceedings, Mother showed a pattern of treatment and relapse without any significant periods of sobriety. She could not stay awake during visits with Children—a circumstance that could threaten Children absent other supervision. And after two years, Mother still lacked the stability that Children needed. She had no income other than temporary assistance from her mother and Fathers inadequate and unreported income. Mothers home was a hotel room with only one bed, although she said she would move to a larger room if Children joined her.
[26] Children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Nor is a trial court required to “wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [the childs] physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The trial court did not err in determining that Childrens best interests dictated termination of Mothers parental rights.
[27] We affirm the trial courts termination of Mothers parental rights.
Affirmed
FOOTNOTES
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. “Suboxone ․ is used to treat opioid addiction. It suppresses withdrawal symptoms and cravings for opioids, which can help prevent relapse.” In re Adoption of S.P., 172 N.E.3d 344, 349 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation omitted).
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. The Indiana General Assembly significantly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 while Mothers appeal was pending. See Ind. Public Law 70-2024, SEC. 4 (eff. Mar. 11, 2024). The amendment alters the allegations that DCS must include in a petition to terminate parental rights. As the amendment took effect after Mothers parental rights were terminated, Mother does not allege that the amendment applied here.
Weissmann, Judge.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.