MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Senior Judge.
Case Synopsis
[1] Randy Tony appeals from the trial courts order granting summary judgment in favor of Patrick Industries, Inc., contending the courts order reaches an erroneous conclusion based on the designated evidence. Tony filed a complaint claiming his employment was terminated, in part, in retaliation for his having exercised his right to receive workers compensation benefits, which would be in violation of our Supreme Courts holding in Frampton v. Central Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). Although we do not question that Tony holds a bona fide belief that his employment was terminated for reasons other than those documented, he has not designated evidence to show that he is entitled to relief. Consequently, based on the evidence, we conclude the trial court correctly granted summary in favor of Patrick Industries and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Patrick Industries’ Interior Components Plus Business Unit (Plant 40) manufactures doors, counter tops, drawers, and other items for recreational vehicle, residential, and commercial applications. Plant 40 also employs drivers who deliver those products to customers. Three drivers at Plant 40 held a Class A commercial drivers license (CDL), while Tony, the fourth driver, held a Class B CDL. The drivers with Class A CDLs were qualified to drive Patrick Industries’ semi-trucks, which had fifty-three foot trailers. Tonys Class B CDL restricted him from operating the semi-trucks. However, his Class B CDL qualified him to drive a smaller truck with a twenty-six foot trailer, which is “a little bigger than what you would rent [from] Penske or U-Haul to move your own furniture.” Appellants App. Vol. II, p. 186. Patrick Industries rented the truck Tony drove from Penske for $1600 per month.
[3] Tony worked at Plant 40 and its predecessor for around sixteen years prior to his termination. It is undisputed that he was a skilled, hardworking, conscientious, and dedicated employee, whose job performance met or exceeded Patrick Industries’ reasonable expectations. Tony rarely missed work, had never been involved in an accident with another vehicle, and had never been disciplined or written up. He regularly received positive job evaluations, which were accompanied by pay raises, and he was acknowledged with a certificate of appreciation on his fifteenth work anniversary.
[4] Mid-morning on March 6, 2019, Tony suffered from fractured ribs, a concussion, and a knot on the back of his head during a work-related accident while his truck was loaded. The business unit director submitted an incident investigation report to Patrick Industries’ Corporate Safety Department later that same day. And Tony received workers compensation benefits arising from the incident.
[5] For a time, due to his injuries, Tony was unable to work in his regular position. He sought treatment and was placed on light duty for several months. During that time, Tony worked in the office at Plant 40. His work restrictions were removed on July 11, 2019 and he was released to return to his regular job. However, on July 15, 2019, Tonys employment at Plant 40 was terminated.
[6] On February 26, 2020, Tony filed a complaint against Patrick Industries, alleging retaliatory discharge. Patrick Industries filed its answer, responding that Tonys employment was terminated due to a reduction in workforce. Patrick Industries later filed a motion for summary judgment and designated materials in support of its position. Tony designated materials in support of his position that his employment was terminated for an unlawful motive, i.e., because he spoke up about his alleged discovery of an employee misconduct cover-up related to his injury, and that a supervisor had made hostile remarks about Tony “milking the system” by remaining off work while on work restrictions. Id. at 185. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and later issued its order granting summary judgment in favor of Patrick Industries.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Tony appeals from the trial courts order, contending Patrick Industries did not negate the element of causation between the filing of his workers compensation claim and his termination.
A. Issue
[8] Tonys argument is that his employment was terminated for an unlawful motive. “Indiana follows the doctrine of employment at will.” Tony v. Elkhart Cnty., 851 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, in Frampton, our Supreme Court held as a matter of first impression that “[r]etaliatory discharge for filing a workmens compensation claim is a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law.” 297 N.E.2d at 428. The Court announced that “the issue of retaliation should be a question for the trier of fact,” and that “such a discharge would constitute an intentional wrongful act on the part of the employer for which the injured employee is entitled to be fully compensated in damages.” Id.
[9] Because the issue of retaliation is a question for the trier of fact, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in this case.
B. Standard of Review
[10] We observe that the trial court entered detailed and thoughtful findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. However, neither of these are required nor are they prohibited in the summary judgment context. Knighten v. East Chicago Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015). Specific findings aid our review of a summary judgment but are not binding. Id. “Instead, when [an appellate court reviews] a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court.” Id. “The moving party must show there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “If the moving party carries its burden, then the non-moving party must present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “In deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we consider only the evidence the parties specifically designated to the trial court.” Id.; see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C), (H). “We construe all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party and resolve all doubts regarding the existence of a material issue against the moving party.” Knighten, 45 N.E.3d at 791.
[11] In Frampton cases, “[w]here causation or retaliation is at issue, summary judgment is only appropriate ‘when the evidence is such that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that a discharge was caused by a prohibited retaliation.’ ” Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “To survive a motion for summary judgment in a Frampton case, an employee must show more than a filing of a workers compensation claim and the discharge itself.” Id. “Accordingly, the employee must present evidence that directly or indirectly implies the necessary inference of causation between the filing of a workers compensation claim and the termination, such as proximity in time or evidence that the employers asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext.” Id.
C. Analysis
[12] To be “successful on a claim for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her discharge was solely in retaliation for the exercise of a statutory right.” Purdy v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 835 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “We have further explained that use of the word ‘solely’ by the Frampton court means only that any and all reasons for the discharge must be unlawful in order to sustain the claim for retaliatory discharge.” Id.
[13] Here, Patrick Industries designated evidence showing that in January of 2019, prior to Tonys injury, business leaders at Plant 40 learned that a large customer was to begin manufacturing products in-house in lieu of ordering the products from Plant 40. Appellees App. Vol. II, p. 64. That customer constituted around forty percent of Plant 40s business. Id. at 63. This reduction in business tremendously impacted the need for product to be transported by truck from Plant 40, and likewise decreased the need for drivers.
[14] Additionally, Patrick Industries produced a list of people whose positions were terminated at Plant 40. A business decision was made to terminate those employees’ positions due to the loss of forty percent of Plant 40s business. Although twenty-nine new employees were hired during the period of March and August of 2023, those workers were production workers not transportation workers. One of the Class A CDL driver positions was eliminated because Patrick Industries only required two such drivers for its business needs. And no one was hired to replace Tony, because that position was eliminated due to changes in Patrick Industries’ business. The leased truck that Tony drove was returned to Penske Trucking to reduce costs. Patrick Industries also designated evidence that its human resources director made efforts to locate another driver position for Tony.
[15] Thus, Patrick Industries has made a prima face showing of an independent, neutral basis justifying the termination of Tonys employment. And Tonys lack of knowledge about the business strategies developed due to the reduction in business does not support his contention. As an at-will employee, Tony was not entitled to know in advance that Patrick Industries intended to eliminate his position. Tonys Frampton claim is thus defeated because Patrick Industries has established a lawful reason for his termination. The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Patrick Industries.
[16] We acknowledge Tonys belief that the reason given for his termination was a pretext. To summarize, Tony believes that the incident report generated after his workplace accident was inaccurate and that the inaccuracy was intentionally left in place to protect the alleged illegal activity of the forklift driver involved in the accident. He claims that the forklift driver, a social friend of a supervisor, was under the influence of marijuana and was not tested after the incident per the companys policy. And Tony advances evidence that superiors at Plant 40 allegedly mocked the extent of his injuries. However, none of those actions resulted in Tony being denied his workers compensation benefits.
[17] In Hillenbrand v. City of Evansville, 457 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), a city employee, while riding in a city vehicle with Board of Public Works inspectors, observed Louise OConnell, the executive secretary for the Board of Public Works, entering an apartment complex. The inspectors examined a pothole in a road in that area and then entered the apartment complex parking lot to change the vehicles direction. Some of the inspectors observed a vehicle parked at the apartment complex which they believed to belong to John Vezzoso, the president of the Board of Public Works. Later, Vezzoso questioned Hillenbrand about his whereabouts that day; more particularly about whether he had been in a city car that turned around in the apartment complex. Hillenbrand denied the allegation, was told not to mention the matter, and shortly thereafter was reassigned to a new position, from which he was fired.
[18] We said that “[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorably to Hillenbrand, the most that can be said is that Hillenbrand was fired because he observed something which he was not supposed to see.” Id. at 237 (internal quotations omitted). We held that “Hillenbrand simply presented no evidence that he was fired for carrying out his statutorily imposed obligations.” Id.
[19] In another case, Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1999), the employee was accused of “insubordination, dishonesty and horseplay.” After meetings about the incident, the parties agreed to conduct further investigations into the incident. Later that day, the employee allegedly was the subject of a “near miss” incident, which occurs when employees do not follow safety protocols and an injury could have occurred. Id. The employee reported the incident that could have caused him severe injury and his supervisor signed the incident documentation. The next morning, the employee discovered that the incident had not been reported to the companys safety department. At the same time, the horseplay incident remained under investigation. Ultimately, the employee admitted to engaging in the alleged conduct during a meeting. The employee was sent home after the meeting and was discharged from his employment the next time he reported to work.
[20] Among other things, the employee alleged retaliatory discharge, claiming his employment was terminated because he protested IOSHA violations. However, summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that to prevail, the employee “must show that a clear and statutory expression of a right or duty is contravened and that his discharge was in retaliation for the exercise of that right or duty.” Id. at 503. Because the employees proposed “statutorily created personal right to complain about the near miss safety problem” was unlikely to be adopted as an expansion to the exceptions to at-will employment, the court concluded that summary judgment was proper. Id. at 503-04.
[21] Here, Tony had no statutorily created duty or right to ensure the accuracy of the incident report. And he had no statutorily created duty or right to make a determination about how the workplace incident was investigated and how or if the allegations of the forklift drivers behavior should be managed. Moreover, he had no right or duty to control his co-workers’ attitudes about his injury. Furthermore, Tony received the workers compensation benefits to which he was entitled, and other options for his continued employment were unsuccessfully pursued. As such, we find that this situation is similar to both Hillenbrand and Groce.
[22] Assuming that all of the facts Tony has advanced are true, Patrick Industries has offered a non-pretextual, lawful reason for the termination of Tonys employment. Tony may genuinely hold the belief that he observed and heard about wrongdoing at Patrick Industries and was the subject of ridicule. However, that evidence does not establish that a clear statutory expression of a right or duty has been contravened and that his discharge was in retaliation for the exercise of that right or duty. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Patrick Industries.
Conclusion
[23] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Patrick Industries on Tonys retaliatory discharge claim. Therefore, we affirm the trial courts judgment.
[24] Affirmed.
Memorandum Decision by Senior Judge Robb
Judges Kenworthy and Felix concur.
Kenworthy, J., and Felix, J., concur.