MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Briean Brown appeals his convictions for murder, attempted murder, and Level 5 felony assisting a criminal. Brown raises three issues for our review, which we restate as the following four issues:
1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in its instructions to the jury on attempted murder.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Browns convictions for murder and attempted murder.
3. Whether Browns conviction for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal is contrary to law.
4. Whether Browns sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions that the trial court vacate Browns conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Around 3:30 a.m. on December 13, 2021, Speedway Police Department Officer Scott Highland responded to a 9-1-1 call that had reported a crash with ejection on I-465 northbound near the Crawfordsville Road exit. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Highland observed a crashed red sedan. Near the vehicle, Michael Smith was lying in the roadway in critical condition. Officer Highland also observed that the apparent driver of the vehicle, Miguel Emery,
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was still in the vehicle but deceased.
[4] Both Smith and Emery had been shot, and Emerys cause of death was a gunshot wound to his neck. The red sedan also had a “multitude of bullet holes from the back to the front ․” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 234. Emergency personnel took Smith to a nearby hospital, where he told another officer that he and Emery had just left the Onyx Club in Indianapolis. A later ballistics analysis showed that both Smith and Emery had been struck by bullets consistent with bullets fired from a Draco-model semi-automatic firearm.
[5] A few hours after the crash, Roberto Laboy, Jr. called law enforcement officers and reported having witnessed the incident. In particular, Laboy had been operating a semi-truck on northbound I-465 around 3:20 a.m. when he heard apparent gunfire “echoing off” the sound walls next to the interstate. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 4. Laboy looked in his mirrors and observed two cars behind him—a red sedan and a blue or black Chevy Malibu. He saw that the back side-window of the Malibu facing the red sedan had been rolled down, and Laboy saw muzzle flashes coming from that window. He then saw the red sedan swerve into the median.
[6] Law enforcement officers searched surveillance footage from the Onyx Club and nearby locations for the red sedan and a blue or black Malibu. The clubs footage showed the red sedan arrive at 9:59 p.m. on December 12, with Smith and Emery exiting the vehicle and then entering the club. The footage further showed Smith and Emery exiting the club at 3:05 a.m. on December 13 and leaving in the same red sedan.
[7] Meanwhile, surveillance footage from a nearby gas station showed a dark-colored Malibu pull next to a pump around 1:08 a.m. on December 13, followed by an orange Kia Forte pulling next to the pump adjacent to the Malibu. Several occupants between the two vehicles conversed with each other, and occupants from each vehicle wore jewelry that identified them as being members of the same gang. Brown, who was twenty-one years old at the time, was one of the occupants of the Forte who wore the jewelry and who conversed with occupants of the Malibu. In the gas stations footage, Brown, unlike any of the other occupants of the two vehicles, wore a “goldish color jacket.” Id. at 46.
[8] The two vehicles left the gas station together around 1:24 a.m. At 1:25 a.m., the clubs surveillance footage shows the two vehicles entering its parking lot. Around 1:53 a.m., Brown received a text message from Jailyn Couisnard,
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a female inside the club, asking “[w]here ․ yall at.” Ex. Vol. 1, p. 125. Brown responded that they were “outside.” Id. Couisnard told them to “come ․ in.” Id. But Brown responded that “security at the door want[s] ․ 100 dollars,” which Brown and his associates were unwilling to pay, and so they would stay “outside” and be “by the hotel.” Id. at 125-26.
[9] Both the Malibu and the Forte left the clubs parking lot and parked next to each other at an adjacent hotel. There, the vehicles were still in view of the clubs surveillance cameras, although the hotels parking lot was not as well-lit as the clubs parking lot. Still, the clubs surveillance footage showed “somebody in what appeared to be a gold jacket exit the Kia [Forte] and enter the Malibu.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 137. The gold jacket does not appear in any surveillance footage after that point.
[10] At 3:05 a.m., Smith and Emery exited the club, followed two minutes later by Couisnard. Couisnard then entered the Forte, and all three vehicles left the area. An ensuing forensic analysis of respective cell-phone location data showed that Brown traveled away from the club and around I-465 at an average speed of about ninety miles per hour; that Couisnard, who was in the Forte, traveled away from the club along a similar path but at an average speed of about seventy-four miles per hour; and that Brown and Couisnard were not in the same vehicle. That same data showed Browns location near the crash site at the time of the crash. Browns vehicle then exited I-465 at the next exit, which was near Browns residence.
[11] A few hours after the crash, Brown engaged one of his associates in a text exchange where the associate texted, “1 confirmed 1 critical,” and Brown responded with “a party emoji with a hat and party horn.” Id. at 189-90. Brown then used his cell phone to search for “Indianapolis recent crime” and asked his associate “where they see that at?” Id. at 190-91. His associate then forwarded Brown a link to a local news report about the shooting and crash involving Smith and Emery. The associate told Brown, “see who wanna buy Draco asap.” Id. at 192. Brown responded, “[h]ow much,” and the associate said, “[j]ust say like 1500 for now gotta get it gone tho.” Id. Brown answered, “[s]ayless,” meaning that he would “take care of it.” Id. at 192-93.
[12] On March 23, 2022, the State charged Brown. In its ensuing amended information, the State alleged in relevant part that Brown had committed the murder of Emery and the attempted murder of Smith. The State further alleged that Brown had committed Level 5 felony assisting a criminal “by: concealing and/or selling and/or attempting to sell the weapon used to kill” Emery “with the intent to hinder the apprehension or punishment” of Browns associates. Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 126.
[13] At trial, the State proceeded on the theory that Brown was part of a “common scheme or design” between several associates to kill Smith and Emery.
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Tr. Vol. 2, p. 216. As the State made clear in its arguments to the jury: “we dont know for certain who pulled the trigger that day, but thats why we have accomplice liability.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 210. In contrast, Browns theory of defense was that he was in the Kia Forte, not the Chevy Malibu, at the time of the shooting. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 218-19; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 228. And Brown repeatedly argued to the jury that the State “told you, ‘we dont believe he did it.’ ” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 226.
[14] Without objection, the court instructed the jury as follows with respect to the attempted murder allegation:
Aiding, inducing[,] or causing attempted murder is defined by law as follows:
A person who[ ] knowingly or intentionally aids another person who is engaged, [or] induces or causes another person to engage, in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward killing a third person, when both have the specific intent to kill the third person, commits the offense of[ ] aiding, inducing, or causing attempted murder. A person may be convicted under this statute[ ] even if the other person has not been prosecuted for the attempted murder, has not been convicted of the attempted murder, or has been acquitted of the attempted murder.
Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant
2. [k]nowingly or intentionally
3. aided or induced [one of his associates]
4. in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward killing [Smith]
5. and both[ ] the Defendant[ ] and [one of his associates] acted with the specific intent to kill [Smith].
Appellants App. Vol. 2, pp. 166, 181. The court also instructed the jury on accomplice liability. Id. at 187. The jury found Brown guilty of murder, attempted murder, and Level 5 felony assisting a criminal, and the court entered its judgment of conviction accordingly.
[15] After a sentencing hearing, the court found the following aggravating and mitigating circumstances:
I dont know the full picture. I dont know exactly who pulled the trigger. I dont know exactly whos driving the car. I dont know what the conversations were that were going on during this very lengthy period while [Smith and Emery] were being set-up to be assassinated on I[-]465 which is exactly what happened here. ․ [I]t was a well thought out plan. It was well orchestrated. It was coordinated. Not just the beginning of it, but the after[-]effects of it. ․ Thats the biggest link to you, Mr. Brown, is getting rid of the weapon, being asked to get rid of the weapon. ․ [Y]ou were definitely part of this entire incident from beginning to end. ․ I consider the loss and harm and injury that was suffered to be beyond what was necessary to prove the elements of the offense. I think thats an aggravator. Certainly murder, that the end result is somebody dying, but ․ there are effects that go beyond that to the people who care about the person who was killed. To the traumatic effects of those [two] children who have to live without a father going forward ․ [A]nd the States also correct that ․ to commit attempt[ed] murder you dont have to actually physically hurt the person ․ [,] but that did happen here and ․ it wasnt just a [one] shot, drive away kind of thing, it was a pursued course on 465 where citizens from all over the place are driving and have no idea whats going on ․ Everybodys life [was] put in danger ․ You do have some criminal history. It isnt much. Its not felony level history, but there is some, so there is a little bit of criminal ․ history ․ the Court will consider ․ as an aggravator. ․ [T]he fact that there are multiple victims, I do consider as an aggravating circumstance ․ As to mitigating circumstances, there arent many. ․ [T]here are a lot of people who ․ are going to suffer hardship if you go through a lengthy jail sentence. People who are in your family. ․ I will put some ․ weight to that as [a] mitigating circumstance. Youre so young. Its hard for me not to say that ․ if you were given some short-term imprisonment and probation ․ that you might not benefit from that[;] I consider that to be a potential mitigating circumstance.
Tr. Vol 4, pp. 43-45. The court concluded that it generally found the aggravators and mitigators to balance, most notably due to Browns youth. The court then entered the advisory sentence for each conviction but ordered the sentences for murder and attempted murder to be served consecutively “because there are [two] different victims.” Id. at 46. Browns sentence for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal was ordered to run concurrently with his sentences for murder and attempted murder, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of eighty-five years.
[16] This appeal ensued.
1. The trial court did not commit fundamental error when it instructed the jury on attempted murder.
[17] On appeal, we first address Browns argument that the trial court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury on attempted murder. Brown concedes that he did not object to the jury instructions at trial and that, to succeed on this issue on appeal, he must establish fundamental error. “An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2004). But fundamental error
is extremely narrow and encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation. At the same time, if the judge could recognize a viable reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
[18] As our Supreme Court has explained:
In Spradlin [v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1991)], we determined that a jury instruction
which purports to set forth the elements which must be proven in order to convict of the crime of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing.
569 N.E.2d at 950 (emphasis added). This requirement that the State establish the defendants specific intent to kill in order to prove him or her directly liable for attempted murder stems from “the stringent penalties for attempted murder and the ambiguity often involved in its proof.” Hopkins [v. State], 759 N.E.2d [633,] 637 [(Ind. 2001)]. Thus, we have “singled out attempted murder for special treatment” in the form of the States heightened mens rea showing. Id.
The States need to demonstrate the defendants specific intent to kill remains when the State seeks a conviction for attempted murder under an accomplice liability theory. Specifically, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) that the accomplice, acting with the specific intent to kill, took a substantial step toward the commission of murder, and (2) that the defendant, acting with the specific intent that the killing occur, knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused the accomplice to commit the crime of attempted murder.” Id. (quoting Bethel [v. State], 730 N.E.2d [1242,] 1246 [(Ind. 2000)]).
Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 11-12 (Ind. 2015). In other words: “Under this Courts Spradlin Rule, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense [of attempted murder] intentionally, not just knowingly or recklessly.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 270 n.15 (Ind. 2020) (bold font removed).
[19] Brown contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury as to the mens rea required for the offense of attempted murder under the States theory of accomplice liability. Again, the courts instruction on that allegation stated as follows:
Aiding, inducing[,] or causing attempted murder is defined by law as follows:
A person who[ ] knowingly or intentionally aids another person who is engaged, [or] induces or causes another person to engage, in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward killing a third person, when both have the specific intent to kill the third person, commits the offense of[ ] aiding, inducing, or causing attempted murder. A person may be convicted under this statute[ ] even if the other person has not been prosecuted for the attempted murder, has not been convicted of the attempted murder, or has been acquitted of the attempted murder.
Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant
2. [k]nowingly or intentionally
3. aided or induced [one of his associates]
4. in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward killing [Smith]
5. and both[ ] the Defendant[ ] and [one of his associates] acted with the specific intent to kill [Smith].
Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 166 (emphases added).
[20] According to Brown: “The elements of proof require that at all stages Brown acted with specific intent, including taking a substantial step toward the commission of the offense.” Appellants Br. at 31. He adds that, under Spradlin, he had “to have specific intent to kill when aiding in that substantial step toward the killing,” and the jury instruction at best “muddied those elements.” Id. Brown further asserts that the knowingly or intentionally language in the instruction is also incorrect, as the State must prove attempted murder was done “intentionally, not just knowingly or recklessly.” Id. at 31-32; see also Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 270 n.15. And Brown notes that the additional jury instructions on accomplice liability did not reference a specific intent to kill for attempted murder.
[21] In Yerden v. State, albeit on a theory of direct liability for attempted murder rather than accomplice liability, our Supreme Court held that the following jury instruction did not demonstrate fundamental error:
To convict the Defendant of Attempt Murder, in this case, the State must have proved each of the following elements:
1. The Defendant knowingly
2. Engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of
3. Knowingly killing another human being.
The Defendant must have had the specific intent to commit Murder in order to be found guilty of Attempt Murder. Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death.
682 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 1997). Our Supreme Court held that, while that instruction was “erroneous” under Spradlin, the instruction nonetheless “adequately informed the jury that [the defendant] must have intended to kill [the victim]” based on its “last two sentences.” Id. at 1285-86. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial courts instruction over the defendants challenge to it for fundamental error. Id. at 1286.
[22] The instruction given to Browns jury is no worse than the instruction given in Yerden. Indeed, in Yerden, the instruction more closely connected a “knowing” mens rea to the elements that the defendant must have “[e]ngaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of ․ [k]nowingly killing another ․” Id. at 1285. Here, on the other hand, the knowing mens rea was at least not clearly applying to the substantial-step requirement, as the fifth element of the instruction stated that the jury had to find that Brown “acted with the specific intent to kill,” and one cannot commit a substantial-step toward a killing without having “acted” to some degree. Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 166 (emphasis added). But, in any event, and as in Yerden, the jury instructions direction that the jury must find that Brown “acted with the specific intent to kill [Smith]” prevented any error in the instruction from rising to the level of fundamental error. Id.; Yerden, 682 N.E.2d at 1285-86.
[23] Browns claim of fundamental error on this issue fails for a second reason. Our Supreme Court has emphasized that,
where there has been only one theory of liability for attempted murder alleged and (1) the identity, and not the intent, of the perpetrator is the central issue; and/or (2) the requirement of specific intent to kill was set forth in other instructions, we have deemed such an error harmless under Spradlin.
Rosales, 23 N.E.3d at 12.
[24] Such is the case here. The State alleged Brown to have been an accomplice to the commission of attempted murder and never alleged that he was directly liable. At trial, the central issue of Browns defense focused on the identity, not the intent, of who was in the Malibu, as Brown repeatedly argued that he was in the Forte. And, again, the specific-intent-to-kill requirement was set forth in the instruction, although perhaps not as clearly as it might have been. In such circumstances, our Supreme Court directs that any error in the instruction be deemed harmless. Id. We therefore affirm the trial courts instructions to the jury.
2. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Browns convictions for murder and attempted murder.
[25] We next turn to Browns challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for murder and attempted murder. For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[26] As our Supreme Court has made clear, “Indiana makes no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.” Id. Thus, “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ․” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (2021). One commits murder when he “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). And one commits attempted murder when, acting with the specific intent to kill, he takes a substantial step toward the commission of that killing. See Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265; see also I.C. 35-41-5-1(a) (attempt). For attempted murder under a theory of accomplice liability, the State was required to show that both Brown and his associates acted “with the specific intent to kill.” Rosales, 23 N.E.3d at 11-12 (quoting Bethel, 730 N.E.2d at 1246).
[27] Brown first asserts that the States evidence is not sufficient to show that he was in the Malibu. Browns argument here is centered on the quality of the Onyx Clubs surveillance footage, in particular that the footage shows the Malibu and the Forte in the poorly lit hotel parking lot adjacent to the club. But the quality of the footage was squarely within the weight to be given to it by the jury, and we will not reassess that weight on appeal. And the footage does appear to show a person in a light-colored jacket exiting the Forte and entering the Malibu. States Ex. 29, file D3_S20211213003145_E20211213025143.mp4, at .mp4 timestamp 1:30:15 to 1:30:22.
[28] Moreover, there is no dispute that Couisnard left the club in the Forte, and there is no dispute that the Malibu and the Forte traveled similar paths at similar times from the club around I-465, but at different speeds. The States analysis of Browns and Couisnards cell-phone location data showed that the two were traveling in different vehicles at the time of the shooting, which further supported the States showing that Brown was not in the Forte and instead was in the Malibu.
[29] Brown also asserts that, even if the State did show he was in the Malibu, the State failed to show he was anything more than merely present in that vehicle at the time of the shooting. Relatedly, he argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to show that he had the specific intent to kill required to support his conviction for attempted murder. As our Supreme Court has stated:
Mere presence at the crime scene with the opportunity to commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction. Instead, presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances tending to show participation, such as companionship with the one engaged in the crime, and the course of conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt.
Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up; emphasis added).
[30] The States evidence of Browns conduct before, during, and after the shooting establishes that he was not merely present and that he acted with the specific intent to kill. Someone in the back seat of the Malibu fired a semi-automatic weapon at Smith and Emerys vehicle, so we are comfortable with the jurys conclusion that an occupant of the Malibu had the specific intent to kill. See, e.g., Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008) (“intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury”). Someone drove the Malibu at a high-rate of speed—about ninety miles per hour on average—which enabled the vehicle to either catch up to or keep pace with Smith and Emerys vehicle; that coupled with the shooting also demonstrates a specific intent to kill. And the location of the shooting on I-465 was such that the Malibu was able to immediately get off at an exit near Browns residence.
[31] A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Brown and his associates, at some point before 3:00 a.m. on December 13, learned that Smith and Emery were at the Onyx Club and waited for Smith and Emery to leave the club in order to gun them down from the Malibu. And, prior to them doing so, Brown exited the Forte and entered the Malibu. All of that evidence supports the jurys conclusion that Brown was not merely present but acted with specific intent to kill.
[32] And there is more. After the shooting, Browns cell-phone data shows that he searched for news reports about the shooting and celebrated hearing that Emery had been killed and that Smith was in critical condition. Browns cell-phone data further shows that he then engaged with an associate about disposing of a Draco-model firearm, which is consistent with the type of firearm used in the shooting. And, although Brown asserts on appeal that after-the-fact evidence should not be considered to support a showing of his intent at the time of the shooting, our Supreme Court expressly says otherwise. See Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1068 (the jury may consider the defendants conduct “before, during, and after the offense”) (emphasis added). A reasonable juror could have inferred from Browns subsequent acts that his prior acts had been with the specific intent to kill.
[33] We therefore conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Browns convictions for murder and attempted murder.
3. Browns conviction for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal is contrary to law.
[34] We thus turn to Browns conviction for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal. This issue requires us to construe the statutes that define Level 5 felony assisting a criminal and accomplice liability. We review such questions de novo. See, e.g., Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1080 (Ind. 2022).
[35] As relevant here, Indiana Code section 35-44.1-2-5 states that “[a] person not standing in the relation of parent, child, or spouse to another person who has committed a crime ․ who, with intent to hinder the apprehension or punishment of the other person, harbors, conceals, or otherwise assists the person commits assisting a criminal,” which is a Level 5 felony “if the person assisted has committed murder.” Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 states that a person is an accomplice when he “knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense ․” And, again, in determining accomplice liability, the jury may consider the defendants conduct “before, during, and after the offense.” Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1068 (emphasis added).
[36] Our Supreme Court has made clear that “the assisting a criminal statute was intended to apply to people who did not actively participate in the crime itself, but who did assist a criminal after he or she committed a crime.” Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind. 2000). Accordingly, “both this court and the Indiana Supreme Court have vacated convictions for assisting a criminal where it appeared that the defendants were active participants in the crimes for which they were convicted and their ‘assisting’ convictions were merely efforts to protect or further those schemes.” Newgent v. State, 897 N.E.2d 520, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (collecting cases).
[37] This principle is independent of Indiana double-jeopardy law.
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See id. at 529-30. The statutory intent underlying the assisting-a-criminal statute makes it an “alternative” offense to accomplice liability for the same underlying crime. Id. at 529. Thus, where, as here, the State “drew upon” evidence at trial that showed both that the defendant “actively participated” in the underlying crime and also, “thereafter[,]” acted “in continuation of ․ [that] scheme,” the defendant “cannot be convicted of both” the underlying crime and also assisting a criminal. Id. at 530.
[38] As the States evidence of Browns participation in the murder of Emery and attempted murder of Smith included Browns after-the-fact continuation of that scheme by trying to dispose of the Draco firearm, we conclude that Browns conviction for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal was in the alternative to his convictions for murder and attempted murder, and the entry of judgment on all of the offenses is contrary to law. We therefore reverse Browns Level 5 felony assisting a criminal conviction and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate that conviction and its sentence accordingly. See id.
4. Browns sentence is not inappropriate.
[39] Last, Brown argues that his eighty-five-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Sentence modification under Rule 7(B), however, is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Brown bears the burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.), clarified on rehg, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).
[40] When conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Our role is to “leaven the outliers,” not to achieve what may be perceived as the “correct” result. Id. Thus, deference to the trial courts sentence will prevail unless the defendant persuades us the sentence is inappropriate by producing compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense—such as showing restraint or a lack of brutality—and the defendants character—such as showing substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of positive attributes. Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018); Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[41] Browns remaining convictions are for murder and attempted murder. Murder is a felony that carries a sentencing range of forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). Attempted murder is a Level 1 felony, which carries a sentencing range of twenty to forty years and an advisory sentence of thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). Here, the trial court ordered Brown to serve the advisory sentence for those two offenses, which the court ordered to be served consecutively based on each offense having a different victim.
[42] Brown requests that we order his sentences to be served concurrently rather than consecutively based on what Brown describes as the States lack of evidence. We decline Browns invitation and cannot say that his eighty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offenses, Brown participated in a well-coordinated, high-speed shooting on I-465, which not only resulted in one death and one near-death but also ran the risk of serious injuries to third parties. Regarding his character, he celebrated Emerys death and Smiths critical injuries. And we agree with the trial court that Browns consecutive sentences are appropriate for his multiple victims. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1259-60 (Ind. 2008).
[43] Accordingly, we affirm Browns aggregate sentence of eighty-five years.
Conclusion
[44] For all of these reasons, we affirm Browns convictions for murder and attempted murder and his resulting eighty-five-year sentence. We reverse his conviction for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal and its corresponding sentence, and we remand to the trial court with instructions for the court to vacate Browns conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony assisting a criminal.
[45] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Emerys name has various spellings in the record. We follow the spelling used by the State in its charging information. See Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 41.
2
. Couisnards first name also has various spellings in the record. We follow the spelling used in the forensic analysis of Browns text exchanges with her. See Ex. Vol. 1, p. 125.
3
. Our Supreme Court has held that the State is not required to identify a theory of accomplice liability in the charging information. Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198-99 (Ind. 1999).
4
. Brown mislabels his argument as a double-jeopardy argument in his brief, and, in response, the State argues that Brown did not properly apply modern Indiana substantive double jeopardy jurisprudence. See Appellants Br. at 28; Appellees Br. at 22-25. But Brown also recognizes that the assisting-a-criminal statute “was intended to apply to a person who did not actively participate in the crime itself, but rather assisted a criminal after the fact.” Appellants Br. at 22 (citing Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1108 (Ind. 1997)). He also cites our opinion in Woods v. State, 963 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), which discusses the same principles. The State, in contrast, does not discuss Browns reliance on Wright or Woods or Browns recognition that the assisting-a-criminal statute is solely an after-the-fact analysis. We conclude that, Browns mislabeling of this argument notwithstanding, he adequately presented this argument in his brief.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Mathias
Judges Tavitas and Weissmann concur.
Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.