MEMORANDUM DECISION
Altice, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Erin Murphy appeals from the trial courts grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Indiana University Health North Hospital a/k/a IU North Hospital Emergency Room a/k/a IU Health North Laboratory a/k/a IU Health Radiology (IU North) on the issue of vicarious liability. Murphy presents one issue for our review: Did the trial court err in granting IU Norths motion for partial summary judgment?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] In the early morning hours of October 28, 2018, Murphy presented to IU Norths emergency department with severe abdominal pain, vomiting, and diarrhea. While there, she received medical care and treatment from Dr. Jared Gayken, Dr. Jacqueline Combellick, Dr. Ali Hamza, and Nurse Practitioner Margaret Denham (NP Denham). Murphy was diagnosed with viral gastroenteritis and subsequently discharged at 5:16 a.m. Later that evening, IU North received Murphys blood culture results but failed to notify her that the results were consistent with an early infectious process. On the morning of October 29, 2018, Murphy had worsening symptoms and contacted her primary care physician who instructed her to return to the emergency department. Upon her return, Murphy was diagnosed with sepsis and admitted for treatment with antibiotic therapy.
[4] On July 24, 2020, Murphy filed a proposed complaint for medical malpractice with the Indiana Department of Insurance, which was then submitted to a medical review panel (MRP). She filed an amended complaint on October 23, 2020. At that time, Murphy named Dr. Gayken, Dr. Combellick, NP Denham, Dr. Hamza, IU Health Care Associates d/b/a IU Health Physicians Emergency Medicine (IUHCA), Indiana University Health, Inc. (IU Health), and IU North as defendants.
[5] In January 2022, the MRP issued its opinion, which stated:
The evidence does not support the conclusion that the Defendants, Jared Gayken, M.D., Jacqueline Combellick, M.D., Ali Hamza, M.D, [IU North], and [IU Health], failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged in the complaint, and the conduct complained of was not a factor of the resultant damages.
The evidence supports the conclusion that the Defendant[s], [NP Denham] and [IUHCA], failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint, but the conduct complained of was not a factor of the resultant damages.
Appellants Appendix Vol. II at 27.
[6] Thereafter, on March 1, 2022, Murphy filed her complaint for medical malpractice in Marion Superior Court against all the defendants identified in her proposed complaint for medical malpractice (with the exception of Dr. Hamza). The complaint contained allegations materially identical to those asserted in Murphys proposed complaint. Each of the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the opinion of the MRP and Murphys failure to present expert medical testimony to refute such opinion. Murphy responded to the summary judgment motions and designated the affidavit of her own expert. Contemporaneously therewith, Murphy filed a countermotion for partial summary judgment as to NP Denham, IUHCA, IU Health, and IU North.
1
Regarding IU North, Murphy claimed she was entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability premised upon apparent agency.
[7] On November 29, 2022, IU North withdrew its motion for summary judgment and the trial court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions still pending. On January 24, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gayken, Dr. Combellick, NP Denham, IU Health, and IUHCA on the issue of liability and denied Murphys countermotion as to NP Denham and IUHCA. In its order, the trial court used the magic language of Ind. Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C)—“there is no just reason for delay”—and directed the entry of final judgment. Murphy did not appeal this judgment. See Appellants Appendix Vol. II at 101.
[8] On February 22, 2023, IU North filed a response in opposition to Murphys motion for partial summary judgment and its own motion for partial summary judgment. In these filings, IU North argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of NP Denham and IUHCA (or any of the other defendants) because they were released from liability for the care they provided Murphy when the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor with its January 24 order. The trial court held a hearing on the opposing motions for partial summary judgment. On July 18, 2023, the trial court granted IU Norths motion for partial summary judgment. In its order, the trial court expressly directed “Partial Entry of Judgment” in favor of IU North. Appellants Appendix Vol. II at 17.
[9] On July 25, 2023, the trial court entered an order resolving Murphys motion for partial summary judgment by noting that it had granted partial summary judgment in favor of IU North. In this order, the trial court explained its ruling:
The health care providers at issue in this case were released from liability after the Court evaluated the substantive merits of the cases against them and issued its’ [sic] January 24, 2023 Order granting summary judgment in their favor. As such, [IU North] cannot now be held liable for their actions under a theory of vicarious liability based upon apparent agency.
Id. at 19. The trial court again directed entry of judgment in favor of IU North pursuant to T.R. 54(B) and T.R. 56(C).
2
Murphy now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
[10] We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. Biedron v. Anonymous Physician 1, 106 N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Once the moving party satisfies this burden through evidence designated to the trial court, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiffs cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense that bars the plaintiffs claim. Giles v. Anonymous Physician I, 13 N.E.3d 504, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A trial courts grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Id.
[11] Murphy argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that IU North could not be vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of the other named defendants. Her arguments, however, are based on a misreading of the cases she cites.
[12] As our Supreme Court has recognized:
Vicarious liability is “indirect legal responsibility.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979). It is a legal fiction by which a court can hold a party legally responsible for the negligence of another, not because the party did anything wrong but rather because of the partys relationship to the wrongdoer.
Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. 1999). To hold people vicariously liable, courts rely on various legal doctrines, such as respondeat superior or apparent agency, depending on the relationship between the parties. Regardless of the doctrine used, once the servant or agent is released of liability, no negligence can be imputed to the principal. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of NW Ind., 702 N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); see also Estate of Mayer v. Lax, Inc., 998 N.E.2d 238, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a judgment in favor of an employee requires judgment in favor of the employer if the employers liability is based solely upon the employees acts), trans. denied.
[13] In Grzan, a part-time mental health counselor employed by the defendant hospital was alleged to have had a sexual relationship with a patient. The patient later filed a complaint for malpractice and negligence against the counselor and the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the counselor after concluding that his conduct did not fall within the scope of the Medical Malpractice Act and thus, he could not be negligent thereunder. This court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Grzan, 702 N.E.2d at 792. In turn, this court concluded that because the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the counselor on the patients claims of malpractice and negligence, the hospital could not be held liable for the counselors conduct. Id. The import of this holding is that because the employee was relieved of liability, the hospital could not be vicariously liable.
[14] This is precisely the scenario presented by the current facts. Here, the other named defendants, relying on the opinion of the MRP, had argued in their motions for summary judgment that their conduct, whether it met the standard of care or not, was not the proximate cause of Murphys injuries and thus, Murphys malpractice and negligence claims could not stand. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of those defendants on the basis of liability. Murphy did not appeal that decision, which the trial court entered as a final judgment pursuant to T.R. 54(B) and T.R. 56(C). In short, the other named defendants were released from liability for their conduct in treating Murphy. Therefore, as in Grzan, IU North, as the principal, cannot be liable for the actions of NP Denham, IUHCA, and the other named defendants on the basis of vicarious liability.
[15] Contrary to Murphys argument, our Supreme Courts decision in Sword, supra, does not dictate a different result. In Sword, summary judgment was granted in favor of a hospital on plaintiffs complaint for medical malpractice. On appeal, the Court first considered whether the hospital could be liable for the alleged negligence of an independent contractor physician, and concluded that, under some circumstances, a hospital could be vicariously liable.
3
714 N.E.2d at 147. Unlike in the present case, the Court also reviewed the judicial determination that the independent contractor physicians conduct was not the cause of plaintiffs injuries. The Court held there was a genuine issue of fact as to causation and thus reversed the grant of summary judgment on the basis of liability. Id. at 153. In short, because there was no judicial determination that the independent contractor physician was not liable, the issue of the hospitals vicarious liability was not foreclosed.
[16] The other cases relied upon by Murphy are likewise distinguishable. For example, in Anonymous Hospital v. Spencer, 158 N.E.3d 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), this court was asked to make a preliminary determination of vicarious liability of unnamed defendants after the statute of limitations had run and extinguished any possible individual liability on the part of independent contractor physicians. This court held that “the running of a statute of limitations with respect to a physician or physicians does not preclude a complaint against a hospital on a theory of vicarious liability and apparent authority.” 158 N.E.3d at 385, 387. The court also expressly noted that there had been no juidicial determination that the agent was not liable. See also Helms v. Rudicel, 986 N.E.2d 302, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that employer could be held vicariously liable for medical malpractice of its apparent agents even if the agents are “individually immune from suit” due to the running of a statute of limitations as there had been no judicial determination as to liability), trans. denied; Columbus Reg. Hosp. v. Amburgey, 976 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that running of statute of limitations regarding any claim against individual doctors did not foreclose plaintiffs claim against hospital based on vicarious liability for the actions of those doctors where there was no judicial determination that the individual doctors were not negligent), trans. denied. Whether an agent is individually immune from suit due to the running of a statute of limitations is fundamentally different than a judicial determination of nonliability.
[17] Here, we have a final judicial determination by way of summary judgment in favor of the alleged agents on the issue of liability. Murphy did not appeal that judgment and it still stands. As noted above, once an agent is released of liability, no negligence can be imputed to the principal. See Grzan, 702 N.E.2d at 793. The trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of IU North on the issue of vicarious liability for the acts of NP Denham, IUHCA, and the other named defendants.
[18] Judgment affirmed.
Weissmann, J. and Kenworthy, J., concur.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Initially, Murphys countermotion against IU North was limited to the actions of NP Denham and IUHCA. Later in the motion, however, Murphy broadened the scope to include all health care providers who were involved in her care and treatment.
2
. The trial court did not, as Murphy suggests, grant summary judgment in favor of IU North on all remaining claims. Rather, the trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability as to the other named defendants who were previously granted summary judgment on the issue of liability.
3
. The Courts discussion about the hospital providing meaningful written notice to the patient at the time of admission that the care is provided by a physician who is an independent contractor and not subject to the control and supervision of the hospital is a matter for consideration in determining whether an apparent or ostensible agency relationship exists for purposes of vicarious liability. Contrary to Murphys argument, a hospitals written notice or lack thereof is not an independent basis for a hospitals liability for the conduct of its agent.
Memorandum Decision by Chief Judge Altice
Judges Weissmann and Kenworthy concur.