MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] B.S. was born to the then-incarcerated A.T. (“Mother”) in 2012.
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B.S. lived with Mothers sister (“Maternal Aunt”) while Mother was incarcerated, which she was until her release in 2019. While staying with Maternal Aunt, B.S. was molested by her grandfather. Maternal Aunt returned B.S. to Mother in 2020, and, due to B.S.’s behavioral issues, Mother sent her first to live with Mothers stepmother and then with Mothers boyfriends brother and his partner, who were also caring for a one-year-old. When the one-year-old was severely injured during an apparent sexual assault, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed B.S. from the home, placed her in foster care, and petitioned to have her adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother contends that DCS produced insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile courts finding that B.S. is a CHINS. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] B.S. was born on November 10, 2012, while Mother was incarcerated. Mother was in prison between 2013 and 2019, and during that time, Maternal Aunt was B.S.’s guardian. B.S. later indicated that she had been molested by a grandfather at some point during her time with Maternal Aunt. Due to issues with B.S.’s behavior, Maternal Aunt sent her back to Mother in March of 2020. After approximately nine months, Mother sent B.S. to live with her stepmother due to B.S.’s behavior, where she stayed for two months before returning to Mother. In July of 2022, Mother, who was still struggling with B.S.’s behavioral issues, which included stealing, lying, sneaking out, and being physically aggressive toward a younger sibling, sent B.S. to live with her boyfriends brother, D.B., and his partner, M.W. At the time, D.B. and M.W. also had a one-year-old child in their care.
[3] In early March of 2023, DCS received a report regarding a child with severe anal trauma at the household where B.S. resided. Medical personnel concluded that the injuries had occurred within twenty-four hours of presentation and were “consistent with penetrating trauma with the most likely etiology of his injuries being sexual assault due to the lack of a plausible penetrating history being provided.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 28. When informed of the other childs injuries, Mother did not believe that anything had actually happened, was not concerned for B.S.’s safety, and became angry that B.S. had been removed. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Jeffrey Theil was assigned to B.S.’s case and contacted Maternal Aunt, who initially said that she wanted to dissolve her guardianship of B.S., later indicating that she could only continue if she were to receive financial and “physical help” with B.S. Tr. Vol. II p. 41.
[4] DCS removed B.S. and placed her in foster care. B.S.’s foster placement has noted that B.S.’s behavioral issues include “acting out, defiance, poor attitude, and not following rules.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 110. On March 9, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that B.S. was a CHINS due to the injuries the other child in the household had suffered and Mothers failure to provide her with a safe living environment. FCM Theil referred Mother to home-based therapy, parenting education, and supervised visitation.
[5] Therapist Penny Carter began working with Mother on April 4, 2023, and the two worked on anger-control techniques and identifying coping skills to address Mothers attitude and the trauma she had experienced in childhood. By the time of the evidentiary hearing in June of 2023, Mother “was making progress toward goal attainment[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 27. Supervised visitation between Mother and B.S. generally went well, and, during a visit just prior to the evidentiary hearing, the two expressed physical affection.
[6] The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on June 23, 2023. FCM Theil testified and recommended that B.S. not be returned to Mother or participate in unsupervised visits with Mother because she “has struggled with [B.S.]’s behaviors previously.” Tr. Vol. II p. 43. FCM Theil opined that B.S.’s behavioral issues were the result of B.S. being in the home with the alleged perpetrators of the other childs injuries and expressed concern that if B.S. returned to Mother, Mother would not be able to manage them. FCM Theil was also concerned that B.S. could interact with D.B. and M.W. again in the future. A further concern was that, if B.S. were to live with Maternal Aunt again, Mother would have unsupervised access to her.
[7] On October 16, 2023, the juvenile court issued its order, in which it found B.S. to be a CHINS. The juvenile court concluded that B.S.’s physical or mental condition was endangered because Mother had failed to provide safety and stability for her. The juvenile court also concluded that B.S. and Mother needed care, treatment, and rehabilitation that was unlikely to be provided without coercive intervention.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Mother contends that DCS failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain the juvenile courts finding that B.S. is a CHINS. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that a child is a CHINS before the child becomes eighteen years of age if
(1) the childs physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the childs parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[9] The Indiana Supreme Court has stated the following:
“[T]he State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dept of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider only the evidence that supports the [juvenile] courts decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the [juvenile] court was clearly erroneous. Id.
In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (footnote omitted). A decision is clearly erroneous if the facts do not support the findings or if the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard to properly-found facts. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017).
[10] The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish parents but, rather, to protect children. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. Despite a “certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services.” Id. (citations omitted). Where, as here, a juvenile court supplements a CHINS judgment with sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply “a two-tiered standard of review.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78. First, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Here, because Mother has not challenged any of the juvenile courts findings, we must accept them as true, Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992), and the only task left to us is to “determine[ ] whether the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment.” In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. We conclude that they are.
[11] Uncontested evidence of Mothers consistent failure to ensure that B.S. was living in a safe environment outside of her home, placements made necessary by her ongoing inability to address B.S.’s behavioral issues, fully justifies the juvenile courts CHINS adjudication. First, Mother placed B.S. with Maternal Aunt while she was in prison, where, at some point, a grandfather molested B.S. Then, after Mothers release from prison, Mother placed her in a home where another child was sexually assaulted and severely injured. Mother initially refused to acknowledge that the child had been mistreated, became angry that B.S. had been removed, and instructed B.S. not to answer any of DCSs questions. Mother has repeatedly put B.S. into situations where she was harmed or where it is reasonable to conclude that she was at risk of being harmed. The evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion that B.S.’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of Mothers inability, refusal, or neglect to ensure that she is living in a safe environment.
[12] Moreover, the record supports a conclusion that, without court intervention, Mother is not currently able to address the troublesome behaviors that have led to B.S.’s frequent stays with others, including “sneaking out, stealing, lying, and being physically aggressive towards her younger brother.” Appellants App. Vol. II pp. 109–10. B.S.’s foster placement has noted that B.S.’s behavioral issues include “acting out, defiance, poor attitude, and not following rules.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 110. As a result of these behaviors not being adequately addressed, B.S. has been “shuffled from one relative, friend, or guardian after another,” preventing any long-term stability. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 110. Mothers history of repeatedly sending B.S. to stay with others instead of addressing B.S.’s behavioral issues supports a conclusion that those issues will not be addressed without court intervention.
[13] Mother contends that the juvenile courts determination that B.S. was endangered was based on conditions that allegedly no longer exist, focusing on any danger that B.S. might have been in when living with D.B. and M.W. Even if we assume, arguendo, that D.B. and M.W. no longer pose any threat to B.S., this argument does not take into account the larger issue, which is that Mothers as-yet unaddressed inability to cope with B.S.’s behavioral issues and history of poor placements might cause her to place B.S. in another dangerous situation. The unfortunate fact is that Mother has more than once placed B.S. into situations where she was harmed or in danger of being harmed; it is reasonable to conclude that she might do so again, if left to her own devices. Mothers argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, one that we decline. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
[14] Mother also contends that there is no evidence that B.S. requires any care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she is not already receiving. Mother points to evidence that she is caring for three other children in a home that DCS has inspected and found to be appropriate. The issue, however, is neither the condition of Mothers home nor her ability to care for her other children—the issue is whether Mother is able to address B.S.’s behavioral issues without court intervention, and the record readily supports a conclusion that she is not. Over the past few years, Mother has repeatedly sent B.S. to live with others when she found herself unable to deal with B.S.’s behavior, and, while we note and applaud Mothers progress in therapy, the record does not compel a conclusion that Mother has yet gained the ability to do so. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (noting that a juvenile court is entitled to weigh a parents past behavior more heavily than recent efforts). As with Mothers previous argument, she is asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
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[15] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. B.S.’s father has waived his right to a fact-finding hearing and does not participate in this appeal.
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. In a separate section of her argument, Mother urges us to “Scrutinize State Action Exceeding The Powers Conferred On Child Welfare Authorities By Our General Assembly[.]” Appellants Br. p. 24. In our view, however, this section is more accurately characterized as a summary of Mothers previous arguments, and, to the extent that it may not be, is premised on the notion that her other arguments have merit. Because we have already concluded that they do not, we decline to address this section as a distinct argument.Moreover, although it has no effect on our disposition, we find it necessary to observe that Mothers Reply Brief appears to consist largely of material related to another case entirely. We urge Mothers counsel to review documents more thoroughly before submission.
Bradford, Judge.
Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.