MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Juana Linares (“Wife”) appeals the trial courts decree of dissolution. She challenges the courts custody order and marital property division. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Wife and Andres Jaimes (“Husband”) had a church ceremony in Mexico in 2002 and were married in Bloomington, Indiana, in September 2013. They have four children together, including M. and A., who were over eighteen years old at the time of the dissolution hearing, S., who was born in October 2005, and B., who was born in February 2014.
[3] On January 18, 2022, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In March 2022, the court appointed Melissa Richardson (“GAL Richardson”) as guardian ad litem. GAL Richardson filed a report with the court on July 6, 2022, and an updated report on October 11, 2022, recommending that the parties have joint legal custody of S. and B., Wife have primary physical custody of S., and the parties share physical custody of B. on a rotating weekly schedule. The court held a final hearing over three days in February, April, and May 2023. The court admitted an appraisal of the marital residence stating it had a value of $274,000 and evidence regarding several parcels of real property in Mexico indicating their total value was $85,677.29. The court heard testimony from therapist Naomi Koeplin, Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) case manager Robert Cooper, Husband, Wife, GAL Richardson, S., M., and A.
[4] Husband testified that he and Wife separated in October 2021 and B. lived with him. He testified that he was a mechanic and had a small garage. When asked “how long have you been doing that,” he replied “[l]ike 14-15 years.” Transcript Volume II at 52. He testified that, for many years, Wife cleaned houses and that, during the prior five years, she continued cleaning houses and rented equipment for parties and events. He testified that they owned several properties in Mexico, appraisals had been completed, one of the lots contained a house which was partially constructed, and the other lots did not have any construction on them. The court admitted appraisals of the lots, a document showing the currency exchange rate, and a document listing the values of the properties and indicating the total value of the properties was $85,677.29. Husband testified the lot on which they constructed a house was a gift from his parents. He stated that he “would prefer that everything were sold.” Id. at 92. Husband further indicated that he and Wife did not have any joint bank accounts, they had separate accounts, and he did not have any stocks or retirement investments. He stated that he drove a 2010 Nissan which he thought was worth $5,000. He indicated Wife had title to a 2010 BMW which was in his shop, there were serious problems with the motor, and he thought the vehicle in its condition was worth about $5,000. Husband stated “what I have in my garage are my used tools” and proposed “that she would keep the furniture in the house, her business and her personal property and I will keep my used tools and my auto business.” Id. at 94.
[5] Husband testified that, about four to five years earlier, he had fifteen temporary taxi permits in Mexico and three vehicles. When asked what happened to the permits, he replied “[t]hose were [ ] cancelled by the federal government, and as far as I know ․ they found certain irregularities and cancelled more or less 5,000 permits and among those were mine.” Id. at 95. He indicated two of the vehicles were sold and his mother had possession of the other vehicle which was a 2010 or 2011 Nissan worth about $1,000. He indicated he spent between $1,500 and $1,700 for each permit and estimated he spent $25,000 in total. He indicated one of the vehicles was sold for approximately $1,500 and he did not remember the amount received for the other vehicle. When asked if he kept a record of the payments he received as a mechanic, he replied: “Yes, look more or less 80% of them are going to pay with a debit or credit card, and now days they use Zelle, Venmo, CashApp and Goggle [sic] Pay which goes directly into the account and [ ] the gentleman has all of the [ ] bank records since 2017.” Id. at 117. When asked if he had special training to become a mechanic, he answered “[j]ust short courses” at Ivy Tech for two or three days. Transcript Volume III at 46. He indicated that, at one point, he attempted to sell automotive items on eBay. He indicated that he paid off the marital residence in 2020 or 2021 by making a lump sum payment of approximately $24,000 and the money came from “savings that we had from several years.” Id. at 50. He testified his business had been at its current location for about eleven years and he rented the property for about $1,000 a month. He indicated that he did not have a tow truck and he called a truck if needed. Regarding eBay, he testified: “I thought that maybe taking parts out and selling them would be a benefit. But its not for me. And I dont do it. The account is still open because its under my name. I [ ] dont have financial access, I dont [ ] look at the email or sell parts. I told people that run it you get the 1099 when eBay sends it to you, and I dont have any problems. If this is a benefit to you or you all, [ ] you help each other out.” Id. at 59. When asked how much he made with eBay when he was involved, he said he would earn about $200 monthly.
[6] Wife testified that she lived in the marital residence and S. lived with her. She testified she had been self-employed cleaning houses for over a decade, she typically cleaned one house per day, and her expenses had increased and she was trying to clean two houses per day. She testified “before I was making between 4 and 5 hundred weekly ․ but lately I need to be working more, so I need to be making around 800 per week.” Transcript Volume II at 242. She stated “a month ago, my salary was 4-500 weekly. But right now, it has, it has gone up. But its complicated. So, yes my salary, therefore, varies.” Id. She testified she had a 2011 Honda which was a gift from one of her clients. She indicated that she has plates, glasses, and silverware, Husband wanted her to have a business, and at the moment there was no established business which was generating money. She testified Husband has a shop where he repairs and paints cars, has a business with a dealer where he buys and sells cars, sells on eBay, sells iron, and has a towing business. Wife indicated that, except for when she and Husband were separated, Husband made the payments on the marital residence. When asked about where Husband obtained the lump sum payment to pay off the house, she testified: “The shop is [ ] very prosperous, a lot of money comes into that. In cash.” Transcript Volume III at 42.
[7] On June 26, 2023, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution. The court found that, in July 2021, A. and S. ran away from home “which triggered the involvement of DCS.” Appellants Appendix Volume II at 23. It found that A. and S. reported that Wife held a knife to her arm and threatened to kill herself. It found S. further disclosed that, in the spring of 2020, Wife had zip-tied her to a chair for hours and that Wife had placed her in a cold shower nude and took photos of her. It found Wife and Husband were interviewed by DCS, they confirmed S. had been tied to a chair for hours and had been hit, and Wife admitted that she made it look like she took photos of S. in a nude state in the shower but denied taking photos. The court stated “[t]he children were removed from the home by DCS in July of 2021 and a CHINS case was opened.” Appellants Appendix Volume II at 23. It found the parties began to participate in services and DCS case manager Cooper stated that Husband was the more stable parent at that time and that Wife failed to take accountability for her actions. It found the children were returned to the parties in September 2021 although Wife claims there was an incident of domestic violence between her and Husband shortly before which she reported to DCS, and the CHINS case was dismissed in February 2022 prior to a factfinding hearing.
[8] The court found that, from October 2021 through February of 2022, Husband had physical custody of S. and B. and Wife had supervised parenting time, Wife began parenting time every other weekend and midweek with B. in April 2022, and on two occasions Wife refused to return B. at the designated time and GAL Richardson had to become involved to have her return him. It found there had been no allegations of Wife being abusive to B. but Husband expressed concerns that as B. grows older he will be subjected to abuse by Wife and that, while there is a history of domestic and family abuse between the parties and children, neither party has been convicted of any criminal charges. It found B. loves both his parents, is a happy child, and expressed a desire to live primarily with Wife. The court concluded both parents were capable and appropriate for B. and have a good relationship with him. With respect to legal custody, the court stated that “[c]learly five of the six statutory factors under I.C. 31-17-2-15 are in favor of joint legal custody,” “[t]he Court has no doubt that both parents are committed to doing what is best to provide for and advance the welfare of the children, but the parties currently have significant difficulty in communicating,” “the Court does hope that the parents will significantly improve related to this issue once they are no longer in litigation mode and, perhaps with the support of some services.” Appellants Appendix Volume II at 27. The court stated that it elected to adopt the recommendation of GAL Richardson and ordered that the parties share joint legal custody of S. and B., that Wife have primary physical custody of S., and that the parties share physical custody of B. on a weekly rotating basis. The court also ordered the parties to participate in co-parenting counseling.
[9] With respect to the marital property, the court ordered that the parties split the equity in the marital residence; if Wife desired to keep the residence, she had ninety days to finance the residence and pay Husband his one-half interest of $137,000; and, if Wife could not or did not wish to retain the residence, it would be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. It further ordered that the parcels in Mexico be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties. It ordered that the parties retain their personal vehicles and, if Wife wished to have the 2010 BMW, she had ninety days to remove it from Husbands garage. It awarded each party the personal property in their possession, awarded Wife the catering business equipment and supplies, awarded Husband his tools and equipment for his mechanic business, and found the bank accounts had been divided by the parties. On July 26, 2023, Wife filed a motion to correct error. On August 21, 2023, the court denied the motion and issued an order that Husband pay child support to Wife of $150 per week.
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Discussion
[10] Wife challenges the trial courts custody determination of B. and division of the marital property. Where a court enters findings of fact and conclusions, we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then determine whether the findings support the judgment. Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
A. Custody of B.
[11] Wife argues the courts physical custody order did not properly consider Fathers history of domestic violence, anger management issues, and lack of stable housing. She argues that B. objected to alternating week parenting time and wished to live primarily with her. She argues the order for joint legal custody was clearly erroneous because the parties cannot co-parent.
[12] Husband argues the court considered all of the statutory factors in awarding joint legal and physical custody. He argues that B. is well adjusted to both homes, there was no evidence that B. was abused by either party or witnessed physical violence between his parents, and GAL Richardson felt very strongly regarding her recommendation of shared physical custody of B.
[13] A trial courts custody determination is afforded considerable deference as it is the trial court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor, and hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945-946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 946. We will reverse the trial courts custody determination only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.
[14] Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8 provides:
The court shall determine custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the childs parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the childs wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the childs parent or parents;
(B) the childs sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the childs best interests.
(5) The childs adjustment to the childs:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
(9) A designation in a power of attorney of:
(A) the childs parent; or
(B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.
[15] Ind. Code § 31-17-2-13 provides that the court may award legal custody of a child jointly if the court finds that an award of joint legal custody would be in the best interest of the child. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-15 provides:
In determining whether an award of joint legal custody under section 13 of this chapter would be in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court shall also consider:
(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;
(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the childs welfare;
(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the childs wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;
(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;
(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:
(A) live in close proximity to each other; and
(B) plan to continue to do so; and
(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.
[16] Here, the trial court found that both parties have a good relationship with B. and were capable and appropriate for him and ordered that they share physical and legal custody of B. The court acknowledged the parties’ difficulty communicating with each other and ordered that they participate in co-parenting counseling. To the extent Wife does not challenge the courts findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.
[17] The record reveals the trial court heard testimony from therapist Koeplin that B. appeared to have a strong bond with both of his parents and Husband was cooperative in therapy and receptive to feedback. DCS case manager Cooper testified that he found Husband to be the more stable parent. The report filed by GAL Richardson on October 11, 2022, provided a thorough summary of her interview with B., concerns related to the parties, and her recommendation that the parties share physical and legal custody of B. At the hearing, GAL Richardson testified that B. “lists [ ] lots of positive things he does with both parents” and expressed a preference to spend more time with Wife. Transcript Volume II at 139. When asked, “despite this preference, you still think that your recommendation should be accepted by the Court, [ ] that they share physical custody of [B.],” she answered “[y]es, hes very positive about [Husband] as well,” “I think that [Husband] has taken heed to some of the statements [B.] has made to me in the past, and is working to make sure that [B.] is well cared for,” B. “likes to do some hobbies with father,” and “as much as the parties do not get along, I believe it would be best for [B.] to have a balance of both parents.” Id. She testified Husband “is very good at seeking out services [and] getting help from professionals for his children” and “I think he has a much better understanding of how to do that than [Wife].” Id. at 144. GAL Richardson testified she thought the best option was to try joint physical and legal custody, and with respect to shared physical custody, she stated “I feel very strong about that.” Id. at 153. She stated that Wife “seems more motivated to have [Husband] involved,” “[o]n the other hand, [Husband] clearly has again been more ․ savvy in seeking out services for the children, knowing to call the school if theres going to be an excused absence ․ those things that [Wife] has fallen short on,” and “in my head the best thing is to try the joint legal custody.” Id.
[18] Based on the record, and keeping in mind the courts order for the parties to participate in co-parenting counseling, we conclude the evidence supports the trial courts findings and judgment. Our review of the record does not leave us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made, and we do not disturb the trial courts custody determinations.
B. Marital Property
[19] Wife argues that, “[w]hile the Trial Court did not assign a value to the parties’ businesses, it allowed each party to retain ownership of their own businesses,” “[t]herefore, it can be reasonably inferred that the Trial Court believed the businesses of the parties had equal value,” and the evidence “clearly shows that Husbands business is more valuable than Wifes business.” Appellants Brief at 33. She further asserts the courts order that she had ninety days to finance the purchase of the marital residence was unreasonable, “especially since no evidence was admitted suggesting the properties the parties owned in Mexico could be sold within ninety (90) days, which would severely undermine [her] ability to finance the purchase.” Id. at 35-36.
[20] Husband argues that Wife failed to present evidence regarding the values of the businesses. He states that Wife had in her possession certain documents, including a number of his tax returns for 2017 through 2022 and his bank account records for three years, but did not produce them at trial. He further argues that his garage is a small operation and he does not own the real estate where the garage is located. He maintains the parties saved for years to accumulate the lump sum payment for the marital residence.
[21] The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the courts disposition of the property. Id. Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. The court must divide the marital property in a just and reasonable manner, and an equal division is presumed just and reasonable. McGrath v. McGrath, 948 N.E.2d 1185, 1187-1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of certain factors including the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property; the extent to which the property was acquired before the marriage or through inheritance or gift; the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the disposition; the conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property; and the earnings or earning ability of the parties. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. The party challenging the courts division must overcome a strong presumption that it considered and complied with the applicable statute. McGrath, 948 N.E.2d at 1188. This presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. Id. The disposition of the marital property is to be considered as a whole, not item by item. Id. We review the valuation of property for an abuse of discretion, which does not occur if the valuation is within the range of values supported by the evidence. Goossens v. Goossens, 829 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[22] The record reveals Husband and Wife presented evidence regarding their assets, their respective contributions to the property, the extent to which they acquired assets prior to their marriage, their conduct, and their economic circumstances and earnings or earning abilities, and the trial court distributed the marital assets in a detailed manner. Although the court did not assign a value to every asset, evidence of the value of the marital residence, the real property in Mexico, and the vehicles was before the court. Husband and Wife testified in some detail regarding their work and their contributions, they were thoroughly cross-examined, and the court was able to assess their credibility and weigh their testimony. The court heard testimony that the land in Mexico which has a house on it was a gift from Husbands parents, that Husband paid off the marital residence using several years of savings, and that, except for when the parties were separated, Husband made the payments on the marital residence. The parties already divided their bank accounts. Husband testified regarding his work as a mechanic, his training, the size of his garage and operation, the length of time he worked from his current location, and that he did not own the building and paid approximately $1,000 a month to rent the garage. Wife did not introduce further evidence of Husbands earnings and expenses. The court heard testimony regarding Wifes earnings and work cleaning houses for more than ten years. The court also heard the parties’ testimony related to catering, taxi permits and vehicles, and eBay sales.
[23] It is apparent from our review of the record that the court carefully considered the parties’ evidence and testimony including that related to the source of the parties’ assets in its division of the marital property, in its distribution of Husbands business to him and the supplies to operate a catering business to Wife, and in its order that the equity in the marital residence and the proceeds from the sale of real property in Mexico be divided between the parties. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the courts disposition, and we cannot say Wife has overcome the strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say the trial court did not reach a just and reasonable conclusion or that reversal is warranted. See Luedke v. Luedke, 487 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 1985) (observing the dissolution decree distributed property to the parties without making findings as to the value of each particular item, the trial court heard evidence for eight days, and it was apparent the trial court considered the source of the items and painstakingly distributed the assets, and holding, without detailing each and every item distributed and upon examining the entire record, that the trial court reached its conclusion in a fair and reasonable manner and that reversal was not merited). As for the equity in the marital residence, the court found the property had an appraised value of $274,000 and was free and clear of any mortgage or liens, and the court ordered that, if Wife wished to keep the residence, she shall have ninety days to finance the residence to pay Husband $137,000. We find no abuse of discretion.
[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
[25] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The court found that a reasonable gross weekly income for Wife was $700 and that a reasonable sum to impute to Husband as his gross weekly income was $1,000.
Brown, Judge.
Riley, J., and Foley, J., concur.