MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] David Edward Jackson III pled guilty to three counts of sexual misconduct with a minor—one Level 5 felony and two Level 6 felonies—and was sentenced to three years, all suspended to sex-offender probation except for time already served. He was also ordered to register as a sex offender for ten years. A few months after being convicted and sentenced, Jackson petitioned for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing and then denied Jacksons petition. Jackson, acting pro se, now appeals.
[2] Jacksons petition, the hearing, and Jacksons proposed findings and conclusions focused largely on a provision in his plea agreement stating that visitation with his children would be left to the discretion of the probation department. He doesnt raise that issue on appeal. Rather, he presents a variety of issues that he didnt raise at the post-conviction hearing or in his proposed findings and conclusions, including: (1) whether, after he pled guilty and was sentenced, the deputy prosecutor on his case improperly disseminated confidential information from his probation file to his ex-wife and the guardian ad litem in his divorce case; (2) whether his plea agreement was illegal and therefore unenforceable; (3) whether his trial counsel was ineffective regarding his sex-offender registration and for failing to “become aware of the criminal charges factual basis requirement,” Appellants Br. p. 19; and (4) whether Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), which concerns the right to a speedy trial, has been violated. By failing to raise these issues in the post-conviction court, Jackson waived them for purposes of appeal. See Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 648 (Ind. 2021) (explaining that issue not raised in the post-conviction court cannot be raised on appeal), rehg denied.
[3] Jackson raises one issue that was addressed in the post-conviction court, relating to his sex-offender registration. His plea agreement and sentencing order say that he must register for ten years. During the post-conviction hearing, Jackson noted that the sex-offender registration website for Porter County, where Jackson lives, was showing that he must register for life. The court indicated that it would instruct the Porter County Sheriffs Office to correct its records. The court added, “And if they dont, they can come and explain why.” Tr. p. 19. Immediately after the hearing, the court issued an order (1) directing the clerk of court to send a copy of the plea agreement to the Porter County registration coordinator and (2) directing the sheriffs office to correct its records. The CCS indicates that a few days later the clerk of court sent a copy of that order and a copy of the plea agreement to the registration coordinator. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 112.
[4] Jackson correctly notes that, notwithstanding the post-conviction courts efforts, the website still shows that he must register for life. He argues that his plea agreement has been breached and that his convictions should be set aside. While we understand Jacksons frustration, this is not a basis for reversal. Rather, the sheriffs offices continuing failure to update its records is an issue that can be addressed through further proceedings in the trial court (either in this post-conviction case or in the underlying criminal cases). Given the courts swift action after the hearing, we trust that it will do whatever is necessary to get this matter resolved.
[5] Jackson has not shown any error in the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
[6] Affirmed.
Vaidik, Judge.
May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.