MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Terrys Discount Windows & More, LLC (“Terrys”) and Timothy Clancy contracted for Terrys to perform various projects on Clancys house. After a dispute arose about the quality of the work, Clancy sued Terrys for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence, and Terrys counter-sued for breach of contract and abuse of process. Terrys prevailed on all claims at a jury trial and then filed a motion for attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest. The trial court denied the motion. Terrys now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion and that it is entitled to attorneys fees and prejudgment interest under the parties’ contracts and to post-judgment interest by statute. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that Terrys is entitled to attorneys fees for its breach-of-contract claim but not its abuse-of-process claim, to prejudgment interest on its breach-of-contract claim, and to post-judgment interest on the entire judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In June 2020, Terrys entered into five home-improvement contracts with Clancy for various projects on Clancys house. Each contract contained the following provision on default and collection:
If Customer shall fail to make payment to Terrys as provided in this Purchase Contract, and shall fail to cure that non-payment within five (5) business days after issuance of written notice thereof by Terrys, Customer shall be in default under this Purchase Contract, and Terrys shall be entitled to initial [sic] legal proceedings for the collection of the balance then outstanding and unpaid under this Purchase Contract. In the event that Terrys is required to so initiate legal proceedings, Terrys shall additionally be entitled to recover all costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with such collection proceedings, as well as interest on the contract balance outstanding and unpaid at the rate of 11//21/2% per month.
Appellants App. Vol. II pp. 55, 57, 60, 63, 65 (emphasis added).
[3] After Terrys completed some of the projects, Clancy raised issues with the quality of the work and refused to pay the balance due. The parties tried to resolve the dispute but failed. Clancy ultimately filed suit against Terrys in March 2021, alleging breach of contract, fraud, and negligence.
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Terrys counter-sued Clancy for breach of contract and abuse of process.
[4] Just before trial, the parties entered a joint pretrial order. As part of the order, they agreed attorneys fees for Terrys would be one of the issues of law to be determined by the court. The order specifically stated: “Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff TDW has claimed it is entitled to attorney fees, expenses, and interest pursuant to the contractual language of the contracts. If Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff obtains a favorable verdict which would be determined by the Court after judgement is rendered [sic].” Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The parties also jointly submitted an issue instruction setting forth $13,530 as the balance due for the work completed. See id. at 44; Appellants Reply Br. p. 16 n.4 (explaining the instruction mistakenly listed the balance as $11,530 instead of $13,530).
[5] A jury trial was held in April 2023. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict for Terrys on Clancys negligence claim. The jury rejected Clancys breach-of-contract and fraud claims and returned a verdict in favor of Terrys for $13,530 on its breach-of-contract claim and $35,000 on its abuse-of-process claim. The trial court entered judgment for Terrys for $48,530.
[6] Terrys filed a post-trial motion for attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest. At the end of the hearing on the motion, the trial court said it was denying the motion based on the following:
If [Terrys] had submitted to the jury at that point, the attorneys fees that ․ Terrys Discount Windows & More had incurred, which is in fact exactly what theyre asking for, then they could have determined what was reasonable on a counterclaim ․ There was no evidence for the jury to determine what reasonable attorneys fees were ․ [Terrys] could have said, my company spent this much money defending this frivolous lawsuit. That evidence wasnt in front of the jury ․ [T]he motion for attorneys fees is [ ] denied.
Tr. pp. 11-12. In addressing the motion, the court didnt get into Terrys’ specific arguments for prejudgment or post-judgment interest, but it concluded the hearing by noting that “[t]he judgment that was entered accrues interest at the statutory rate at the date of its entry.” Id. at 13. But the court didnt amend the judgment to reflect the accrual of post-judgment interest or enter a separate order awarding post-judgment interest. To the contrary, the court issued a written order ruling that “Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Pre-Judgment Interest, and Post-Judgment Interest is DENIED.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 24.
[7] Terrys now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] This case involves whether the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action is entitled to attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest. Parties to litigation generally pay their own attorneys fees but may agree by contract to do otherwise. Reuille v. E.E. Brandenberger Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind. 2008). Where, as here, parties have included a contractual provision agreeing to pay attorneys fees, that agreement is enforceable according to its terms unless the contract conflicts with law or public policy. Id. Even under a contract, an award of attorneys fees must be reasonable. Corvee, Inc. v. French, 943 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The amount recoverable for an award of attorneys fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Fischer v. Heymann, 12 N.E.3d 867, 874 (Ind. 2014), rehg denied.
[9] A contract may also provide for an award of prejudgment interest. A partys right to prejudgment interest according to a contract is not discretionary. PNC Bank, Natl Assn v. Page, 186 N.E.3d 633, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Prejudgment interest is warranted in a breach-of-contract action when “the amount of the claim rests upon a simple calculation and the terms of the contract make such a claim ascertainable.” Song v. Iatarola, 76 N.E.3d 926, 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), affd on rehg, 83 N.E.3d 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The test for determining whether an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate is whether the damages are complete and may be ascertained as of a particular time. Id. An award is proper when the trier of fact does not have to exercise judgment to assess the amount of damages. Id.
[10] Once judgment is entered, the prevailing party is entitled to post-judgment interest. See Ind. Code § 24-4.6-1-101. The language of Section 24-4.6-1-101 is mandatory: interest “shall be” rendered from the date of judgment. Denman v. St. Vincent Med. Grp., Inc., 176 N.E.3d 480, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), rehg denied, trans. denied. “[T]rial courts have no discretion over whether post-judgment interest will be awarded; prevailing plaintiffs are automatically entitled to it.” Id.
[11] Terrys contends it is entitled to attorneys fees and prejudgment interest under the contracts and to post-judgment interest under Section 24-4.6-1-101. We address each argument in turn.
I. Terrys is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection with its breach-of-contract claim only
A. Breach-of-Contract Claim
[12] Terrys first argues the trial court erred in denying its request for attorneys fees. The parties agreed in their contracts that Terrys was “entitled to recover all costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with” legal proceedings to collect any outstanding balance. Yet the trial court denied the request for attorneys fees because there was no evidence from which the jury could determine a reasonable amount of fees. Terrys contends “the trial court arrived at an improper legal conclusion” in denying its motion on this basis. Appellants Reply Br. p. 8. As to attorneys fees for the breach-of-contract claim, we agree.
[13] A request for attorneys fees is generally not ripe for consideration until a judgment has been reached. Song, 76 N.E.3d at 938; see also Storch v. Provision Living, LLC, 47 N.E.3d 1270, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[I]n petitioning the trial court for attorney fees after the jury had reached its decision in this case, Storch was following standard procedure.”). In some cases, the jury may decide whether an amount of attorneys fees is reasonable, such as where the parties have stipulated to that effect or the contract calls for it. Storch, 47 N.E.3d at 1275. But without such an agreement, there is no right to have a jury determine a reasonable amount of fees. Id. at 1275-76. Rather, the trial court is considered an expert on the question of attorneys fees and “may judicially know what constitutes a reasonable attorneys fee.” Id. at 1276.
[14] The parties here didnt agree to have the jury determine attorneys fees; to the contrary, they agreed in the pretrial order that attorneys fees under the contract were an issue of law “which would be determined by the Court after judgement is rendered.” Based on this agreement, the court was the appropriate trier of fact for the issue of attorneys fees under the contract, so there was no reason for Terrys to present any evidence of those fees to the jury. See Song, 76 N.E.3d at 938-39. The trial court erred in denying attorneys fees based on the lack of evidence for the jury to determine reasonable fees because this was not for the jury to determine.
[15] The parties differ in their interpretations of the following portion of the pretrial order: “Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff TDW has claimed it is entitled to attorney fees, expenses, and interest pursuant to the contractual language of the contracts. If Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff obtains a favorable verdict which would be determined by the Court after judgement is rendered [sic].” Terrys contends the phrase “determined by the Court” meant the trial court would determine a reasonable amount of attorneys fees to award. Clancy suggests the phrase gave the court discretion to determine Terrys wasnt entitled to attorneys fees at all. To support his interpretation, Clancy cites cases where the issue was whether the amount of attorneys fees was reasonable and this Court explained that trial courts have broad discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable attorneys fees. See Appellees Br. p. 12. In light of our case law that an award of attorneys fees pursuant to a contract must be reasonable, see, e.g., Corvee, 943 N.E.2d at 847, and that the trial court is in the best position to determine attorneys fees, see, e.g., Song, 76 N.E.3d at 938, we take the pretrial order to mean that the trial court was required to award Terrys attorneys fees incurred in the collection proceedings but had the discretion to determine a reasonable amount of fees. Terrys’ breach-of-contract claim is a collection proceeding because it brought the claim to collect the outstanding balance of $13,530. On remand, the court must calculate reasonable attorneys fees for Terrys on its breach-of-contract claim as provided for in the parties’ contracts.
B. Abuse-of-Process Claim
[16] Terrys also claims it is entitled to attorneys fees for abuse of process because it is entitled under the terms of the contract to recover all attorneys fees incurred in connection with the collection proceedings. See Appellants Br. p. 11. And per the pretrial order, the trial court was to decide any contractual attorneys fees as a matter of law. Id. at 11. Terrys likens this case to Storch. There, the parties’ agreement provided that “[i]n the event of any controversy, claim, or dispute between the parties hereto, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof,” the prevailing party would be entitled to recover attorneys fees from the other. Storch, 47 N.E.3d at 1271. After Storch prevailed on a negligence claim, the trial court ruled that because the only matter submitted to the jury was negligence, not breach of the agreement, Storch was “not the prevailing party regarding ‘any controversy, claim or dispute between the parties hereto, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof’ ” and thus was not entitled to attorneys fees under the agreement. Id. at 1273. This Court reversed, holding that the negligence claim related to the parties’ agreement because it had the same underlying subject matter, and the events leading to the claim would not have occurred but for the agreement.
[17] Terrys argues that like the negligence claim in Storch, its abuse-of-process claim is related to the contracts and wouldnt have been brought but for the contracts. But unlike the agreement in Storch, the parties didnt agree Terrys was entitled to attorneys fees in “any” proceeding “relating to” the contracts. The contracts provided only for recovery of “attorney fees incurred in connection with” “legal proceedings for the collection of the balance then outstanding,” and only the breach-of-contract claim involved such collection. The contract provision does not entitle Terrys to attorneys fees for its abuse-of-process claim.
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II. Terrys is entitled to prejudgment interest on the award for its breach-of-contract claim
[18] Terrys also contends the trial court erred in denying its request for prejudgment interest. Clancy argues prejudgment interest is inappropriate here because the damages for Terrys’ breach-of-contract and abuse-of-process claims “could not possibly have rested on a simple calculation by the jury.” Appellees Br. p. 15. But Terrys requested prejudgment interest only on the $13,530 award for its breach-of-contract claim. This amount is based on a simple calculation of the total prices designated in the contracts less the portions Clancy paid, which was readily ascertainable before trial. The parties’ issue instruction informed the jury that Terrys sought to recover the outstanding amount of $13,530, so the jury didnt have to exercise judgment to assess the amount of damages for the breach-of-contract claim. An award of prejudgment interest to Terrys on its damages for breach of contract is proper.
[19] As to the appropriate rate of interest, Terrys cites Indiana Code section 34-51-4-9, which permits a court to set a prejudgment interest rate of no less than 6% and no more than 10% per year. But this statute applies to actions arising out of tortious conduct. I.C. § 34-51-4-1. The relevant statute is Section 24-4.6-1-102, which designates an interest rate of 8% per year when parties to a contract havent agreed on a rate. PNC Bank, 186 N.E.3d at 638. But the parties here did agree on a rate—the contracts specified that, in the event that Terrys had to initiate legal proceedings to collect any unpaid balance, Terrys would be entitled to recover “interest on the contract balance outstanding and unpaid” at a rate of 1.5% per month. “When the parties have contractually agreed to a rate of interest, that rate is used to compute the amount of prejudgment interest.” Id. And the prejudgment interest is computed from the time the principal amount was demanded or due. Song, 76 N.E.3d at 939; see also Fackler v. Powell, 923 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding Fackler was entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate in the parties’ agreement from the date of default until the date of judgment). We reverse the trial courts denial of prejudgment interest and remand with instructions for the court to calculate the prejudgment interest due on the $13,530 breach-of-contract award at the parties’ agreed-upon rate of 1.5% per month.
III. Terrys is entitled to post-judgment interest on the entire judgment
[20] Finally, Terrys argues the trial court erred in failing to award it post-judgment interest. Despite ultimately issuing an order denying the motion for attorneys fees, prejudgment interest, and post-judgment interest, the trial court ruled at the hearing on the motion that “[t]he judgment that was entered accrues interest at the statutory rate at the date of its entry.” This “statutory rate” comes from Indiana Code section 24-4.6-1-101(2), which provides, in relevant part, that “interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at ․ an annual rate of eight percent (8%)[.]” Under this statute, Terrys is entitled to post-judgment interest on the $48,530 judgment at the rate of 8% beginning on April 6, 2023, the date the judgment was entered. While the trial court acknowledged this at the hearing, it didnt enter an order awarding post-judgment interest or amend the judgment to reflect the accrual of interest. We instruct the court to do so on remand.
[21] Terrys also contends it is entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 8% on the prejudgment interest and attorneys fees it is owed. Awards of prejudgment interest and attorneys fees also accrue post-judgment interest under Section 24-4.6-1-101(2) beginning on the date the trial court enters the awards. Denman, 176 N.E.3d at 501-02; Pac-Van, Inc. v. Wekiva Falls Resort, 975 N.E.2d 831, 832-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). On remand, after the trial court calculates reasonable attorneys fees and prejudgment interest, it must also award post-judgment interest on those amounts at the statutory rate of 8%. The post-judgment interest on the awards of prejudgment interest and attorneys fees will begin accruing on the date the court enters the awards.
[22] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Clancy also alleged breaches of the Home Improvement Fraud Act, Home Improvement Contract Act, and Indiana Consumer Protection Act, but the parties stipulated to dismissal of these counts before trial.
2
. Abuse of process is a tort claim that can be filed against a party who has allegedly engaged in wrongful use of the judicial process. Crosson v. Berry, 829 N.E.2d 184, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A party may bring an abuse-of-process claim after successfully defending against a wrongful action, see I.C. § 34-52-1-1(c), or as a counterclaim to the wrongful action, see Burke v. Elkin, 51 N.E.3d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This is a distinct tort from a claim for attorneys fees under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1(b), which requires a showing that litigation was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, or in bad faith. See Crosson, 829 N.E.2d at 194; I.C. § 34-52-1-1(c). A party who prevails on an abuse-of-process claim can recover the attorneys fees spent defending against the wrongful action, so long as they havent already recovered the fees under Section 34-52-1-1(b). Lindsay v. Jenkins, 574 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied; see also Burke, 51 N.E.3d at 1288. But the fees are limited to those spent in defending against the wrongful action; the prevailing party is not entitled to recover fees incurred in prosecuting the abuse-of-process claim itself. Tech. Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249, 1256 (Colo. App. 1992). Here, Terrys only claims it is entitled to attorneys fees under the terms of the contract, so we do not reach the issue of whether it would have otherwise been entitled to fees as a result of its favorable verdict on the abuse-of-process claim. Terrys also asked the trial court for fees permitted under Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1, but the trial court denied the request. Terrys does not appeal that denial. See Appellants Reply Br. p. 9 n.2.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Vaidik
Judges Bradford and Brown concur.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.