MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] After having been discovered hiding under a pile of clothing in the back seat of a vehicle, Edward Tyrone Nance, Jr., was found to be in possession of cocaine, fentanyl, marijuana, and a handgun. Nance was subsequently charged with and, following a bench trial, found guilty of various drug-related charges. He was also found to be a habitual offender. On appeal, Nance contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial, including the handgun that was recovered from the vehicle and the drugs that were recovered following a search of his person. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In January of 2022, members of the Evansville drug-task force received multiple tips indicating that Glynn Petticord had been seen coming and going from a residence on West Virginia Street and had been seen getting in and out of a silver vehicle there. On January 31, 2022, members of the task force attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Petticord at the residence. When officers arrived at the residence, they observed a silver car parked in the driveway. As the officers began walking towards the vehicle, it pulled out of the driveway and began to drive away. Although the driver of the vehicle initially ignored commands to stop, the driver eventually stopped the vehicle.
[3] Upon approaching the vehicle, officers observed that a male, who was later determined to be Nance, “had concealed himself under a lot of clothing and then had drawn a handgun” from his waistband and dropped it on the floor. Tr. Vol. II p. 59. The officers then removed Nance from the vehicle and detained him. Nance initially refused to tell the officers his name or to provide them with any form of identification. Given that Nance had already been observed to be in possession of a handgun, an officer searched Nances pockets to check for any other potential weapons. During this search, officers recovered a digital scale; a plastic bag containing methamphetamine, fentanyl, and marijuana; and documents identifying Nance. In total, the officers recovered 3.61 grams of methamphetamine, 2.92 grams of fentanyl, and 6.78 grams of marijuana. Officers also recovered the firearm that Nance had pulled from his waistband and dropped in the vehicle.
[4] On February 2, 2022, the State charged Nance with six offenses: two counts of Level 3 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, two counts of Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The State also alleged that Nance was a habitual offender. Nance waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench trial.
[5] Prior to trial, Nance filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been recovered during the search of his person and the vehicle. After hearing arguments on Nances motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement and the case proceeded to trial. Nance objected to the challenged evidence during trial. On May 18, 2023, the trial court denied Nances motion to suppress and found him guilty as charged. The trial court also found that Nance was a habitual offender. Prior to sentencing, the parties stipulated to an aggregate fourteen-year sentence, with the first six years to be served in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the placement for remaining eight years left to the trial courts discretion. The trial court sentenced Nance in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, ordering that Nance serve the first six years of his sentence in the DOC, followed by eighteen months of work release then eighteen months of probation, with the balance suspended.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Nance contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence recovered from the vehicle and during the search of his person. “We review a trial courts ruling on the admissibility of evidence at trial for an abuse of discretion.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 939 (Ind. 2020). “But the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo.” Id.
[7] Nance argues that the challenged evidence was recovered in violation of Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution,
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which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
“Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, Indiana has explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Instead, “[t]he legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
[8] As we consider reasonableness based upon the particular facts of each case, the Court also gives [Article 1, Section 11], a liberal construction to angle in favor of protection for individuals from unreasonable intrusions on privacy. At the same time, Indiana citizens have been concerned not only with personal privacy but also with safety, security, and protection from crime. It is because of concerns among citizens about safety, security, and protection that some intrusions upon privacy are tolerated, so long as they are reasonably aimed toward those concerns. Thus, we have observed that the totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the degree of intrusion into the subjects ordinary activities and the basis upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.
Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940 (Ind. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Our determination of the reasonableness of a search or seizure under Section 11 often ‘turns on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizens ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.’ ” Id. (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361) (internal brackets omitted).
[9] In arguing that the searches of the vehicle and his person were unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11, Nance concedes that the officers degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred “was great.” Appellants Br. p. 10. Nance argues that because the degree of intrusion on his ordinary activities was high, “the deciding factor in this case is the extent of the needs of law enforcement.” Appellants Br. p. 11. Nance acknowledges that “protecting the public from gun violence is certainly a legitimate law enforcement concern,” but asserts that the officers “had no reason to believe” that Nance could not legally carry a firearm. Appellants Br. p. 11. As such, he claims that a balancing of the three Litchfield factors “leans in favor of the search of [his] person being unreasonable in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” Appellants Br. p. 11. We disagree.
[10] As mentioned, Nance concedes that the officers’ degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred was great. Officers went to the residence to serve a warrant on Petticord. When they arrived, a vehicle—similar in description to the vehicle that Petticord was known to have been observed getting in and out of—attempted to leave the residence, initially disregarding orders to stop. Once officers approached the vehicle, they observed Nance attempting to hide under a large pile of clothing in the back seat. They further observed Nance discard a firearm in the vehicle before refusing to identify himself. We agree with the State that “Nances conduct was very suspicious and gave the officers a very high degree of suspicion that he was or could have been Petticord” or otherwise engaged in illegal activity. Appellees Br. p. 9.
[11] Further, while the degree of intrusion on Nances ordinary activities may have been high, we agree with the State that it was justified under the circumstances. Again, officers had first observed Nance hiding under a pile of clothing and had then observed Nance discard a firearm before he was removed from the vehicle. Given Nances suspicious actions, it was reasonable for the officers, out of a concern for officer safety, to verify that Nance was not armed with any other weapons. In addition, at the time they encountered Nance, officers had been attempting to execute an arrest warrant on Petticord and Nances refusal to provide the officers with any identifying information had made it impossible, without locating other identifying information, for the officers to determine whether Nance was Petticord. Nances actions contributed to the need for a high level of intrusion.
[12] Finally, the needs of law enforcement were high. Prior to conducting the search, officers had already observed that Nance had been armed with a firearm, creating the need for law enforcement to ensure that Nance was not armed with any other weapons. We believe that the fact that Nance discarded the firearm as the officers approached gave rise to a reasonable inference that he could not legally possess the firearm. In addition, officers had encountered Nance while trying to serve a warrant and they were initially unsure as to whether Nance was the individual to whom the warrant applied as Nance refused to provide any identifying information. As Nance acknowledged, “[p]rotecting the public from gun violence is a legitimate and paramount concern of law enforcement, and the State is legitimately concerned with deterring gun violence[.]” Grayson v. State, 52 N.E.3d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. In this case, the officers had already observed Nance in possession of a firearm. This fact combined with his attempts to conceal his presence and identity from the officers contributed to their need to determine Nances identity and whether he was armed with any other weapons.
[13] Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence recovered during the search at trial.
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[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Nance does not make a separate argument relating to the Fourth Amendment and has therefore waived any challenge to the legality of the search under the United States Constitution.
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. To the extent that Nance asserts in the final sentence of his conclusory paragraph that his habitual-offender adjudgment must be reversed, we note that Nance has failed to provide a cogent argument, complete with citations to the record and relevant authority, in support of his assertion. He has therefore waived appellate review of this assertion. See Martin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 n.5 (Ind. 2000).
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur.
Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.