MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] D.K. and W.K. (collectively, “Appellees”) petitioned to adopt A.J.T. (“Child”), which petition F.G. (“Father”) contested. The probate court conducted an evidentiary hearing after which it granted Appellees’ petition. Father contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to dispense with his consent to Childs adoption. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Father and T.T. (“Mother”) on January 20, 2021. Appellees have cared for Child “essentially since birth” due to Mothers and Fathers incarceration. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 65. On March 17, 2022, after nearly one year serving as Childs guardians, Appellees petitioned the probate court to adopt Child. At the time of this filing, Mother and Father were incarcerated. In April of 2022, both Mother and Father contested Childs adoption. On May 25, 2023, after various continuances, the probate court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellees’ adoption petition. Just before this hearing, Mother consented to the adoption. On July 20, 2023, the probate court granted Appellees’ adoption petition.
Discussion and Decision
[3] “When reviewing the trial courts ruling in an adoption proceeding, we will not disturb that ruling unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion.” Rust v. Lawson, 714 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We presume that the trial courts decision is correct and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to that decision. Id. at 771–72. In other words, we refuse to reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018).
[4] Indiana law generally requires a natural parent to consent to his childs adoption. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(11), a parents consent is not required if the adoption petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent and that the courts dispensing of the parents consent would serve the adoptive childs best interests. While the term “unfit” is not statutorily defined, we have previously noted that “statutes concerning the termination of parental rights and adoption ‘strike a similar balance between the parents rights and the childs best interests’ ” and thus termination cases provide guidance in determining whether a parent is unfit. In re Adoption of D.M., 82 N.E.3d 354, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).
[5] Father argues that there was insufficient evidence before the probate court to support its decision to dispense with his consent to Childs adoption. Specifically, Father asserts that Appellees produced insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that he is unfit to parent Child. For their part, Appellees argue that the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Father was unfit to be a parent and that disposing of the consent requirement would serve Childs best interests. We agree.
[6] The probate court concluded that Father “is ‘unfit to be a parent[,]’ and that ‘the best interests of [Child] would be served if the court dispensed with [his] consent.’ ” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 66 (quoting Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(11)). Specifically, the probate court found that Father has repeatedly “committed acts of domestic violence against Mother[,]” including “particularly severe violence” such as “hit[ting] Mother with his car.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 66. The probate court further found that “Fathers criminal history is not limited to domestic violence, as he has five total criminal convictions, one of which was for Operating While Intoxicated soon after his release on other offenses.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 66. At the time of the adoption hearing, Father was incarcerated with an expected release date of mid-2024, by which point Child will be three-and-one-half years old.
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Further, given Fathers history, the probate court found it likely that his “criminal history will continue apace upon his release from his current charges.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 67. We have previously concluded that “individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.” In re Adoption of K.T., 172 N.E.3d 326, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the probate court abused its discretion in finding Fathers criminal history sufficient to support a conclusion that Father is unfit to parent Child.
[7] Moreover, testimony from various witnesses supports the probate courts determination that dispensing with the consent requirement served Childs best interests. Father himself testified that Appellees are “very good people” and have provided “a safe home” for Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 44. The probate court noted evidence that Appellees “have been in all but name the Childs parents, and give every indication of being both willing and able to continue to do so” and that Child has “been doing quite well with [Appellees].” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 65, 67. Mother also testified to her belief that putting Child in Appellees’ care “would be in the Childs best interests.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 67. Given this testimony, Fathers criminal history, and Childs status with Appellees, we cannot say that the probate court abused its discretion in dispensing with Fathers consent requirement. See M.H.C. v. Hill, 750 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because the ultimate purpose of the law is to protect the child, the parent-child relationship must give way when it is no longer in the childs best interest to maintain the relationship.”).
[8] The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Father argues in his brief, without citation to the record, that Appellees “thwarted his ability to” communicate with Child. Appellants Br. p. 6. However, this argument ignores the probate courts findings regarding Fathers protracted and ongoing criminal history and therefore does not change our conclusion that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in dispensing with Fathers consent requirement.
Bradford, Judge.
Vaidik, J., and Brown, J., concur.